Office of the Historian

314. Memorandum From the Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bagley) to the Chairman (Taylor)1

Washington, November 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Proposed Memorandum Concerning Viet Cong Attacks on Strategic Hamlets
1.
There is considerable differences of opinion within the Executive Branch as to the progress being made in the strategic hamlet strategy. This is not unnatural during a period of transition, but resolution of opposing views is difficult because of a paucity of information. This problem is recognized in Saigon and effort is being made to get at [Page 728] the true facts by better administration and production of information on the GVN side. In the meantime, it would be wise to evaluate the incomplete information available cautiously.
2.
The doubters exist in the Pentagon, as well as State and in the White House in the person of Mr. Forrestal. Last week, Governor Harriman called General Krulak over for a general talk on our military efforts in SVN with emphasis on the security aspects of the strategic hamlet strategy. General Krulak allayed Governor Harrimanʼs uneasiness, using the basic information contained in the attached draft memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.2 The provision of this information to the Secretary of Defense, and perhaps distributed in some form to other interested Departments, is probably intended by General Krulak to spread the gospel and offset opposing views in Washington. This will not be easy, however, because of information gaps and other factors, some of which are as follows:
a.
The American Consul in Hue has reported Diemʼs brother, Bishop [sic] Can, is according priority to his Republican Youth Civic Action and Self-Defense Program rather than the strategic hamlet program being pushed from Saigon and, as a result, the strategic hamlet program s not effective in its present form.3
b.
While current Viet Cong actions against hamlets (kidnapping, theft, murder) are direct attacks against the people, they serve the political purpose of showing that the GVN is not able to protect the populace using the strategic hamlet concept. This is important as the program gets underway.
c.
Neither the Fiscal Year 1964 MAP nor AID programs provide for strategic hamlet kits. This is not a serious matter at this point except to indicate that administration of the strategic hamlet program is not yet an efficient matter. In this particular case, there is also a dispute between AID and DOD as to division of funds for such kits.
d.
Information available from Saigon continues to indicate that the GVN strategic hamlet program is handicapped by poor implementation by province chiefs.
e.
In Malaya, the requirement for reinforcement to meet Communist attacks at night was met by the collection of good intelligence and by assuring that villages and posts had defenses sufficient to resist attack for the 6-8 hours until daylight when reinforcements could be deployed. It is not clear how this problem is being met in SVN.
3.
The draft memorandum as prepared raises certain questions which follow:
a.
Is the additive of 300 strategic hamlets per month being applied in the area of the some 2700 poorly conceived hamlets which now exist or is it merely an add-on to the current total of 3353 strategic hamlets? If the latter is true, the program remains seriously weak; if the former is true, real efforts at improvement are in progress.
b.
How many strategic hamlet kits have already been delivered? How does this figure compare with the total of not more than 600 properly conceived hamlets? In other words, is the number of effective hamlets directly proportional to US provision of hamlet kits or does it, in fact, depend to a major degree on other action by the GVN?
c.
To be useful, figures showing attacks against strategic hamlets and other villages should indicate the total targets in each category. Further, there should be a breakdown of the numbers of strategic hamlets attacked into those which were properly conceived and those which are poorly defended.
d.
There should be a statement indicating just how the US/GVN is meeting the problem of “considerable significance” concerning Viet Cong attacks at night.
4.
I recommend that answers to these basic questions be sought and that a specific reporting system be instituted to refine reports now made by Com USMACV. At the same time, there is no reason why the proposed SACSA memorandum should not go forward to the Secretary of Defense as a current appraisal. I would suggest adding the following paragraph to assure the data is in proper perspective:

“6. Continuing assessments of the effectiveness of the strategic hamlet concept requires better information than is now available. Action is being undertaken to develop a broader reporting system which will become the basis for future analyses of this program.”

5.
If you concur with the above, I will:
a.
Have the draft memorandum typed in final form, with the addition of paragraph 6 and, on signature, distributed to State and to Mr. Forrestal.
b.
Advise SACSA of the need to develop answers to the basic questions remaining, preferably through a refined, continuing reporting system levied on the field.
W.H.B.4
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-239-69. Secret.↩
  2. Not found. For the memorandum that Taylor sent to the Secretary of Defense, see Document 319.↩
  3. See Document 303.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩