Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

303. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)¹

Washington, October 16, 1962.

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Central Vietnam

On Friday, October 12, I had an interesting talk with John Heble, the U.S. Consul in Hue, about the situation in Central Vietnam. The Consul in Hue has always gotten around the countryside much more than any other US diplomatic official in Vietnam. When I prepared my paper on the “Central Government and the Countryside”² I found the reports of Mr. Heble and his predecessor among the most useful sources of information on the situation. Since his return to Washington, Mr. Hebleʼs relatively pessimistic reports on the present situation in Central Vietnam have provoked a good deal of interest; Governor Harriman and Ed Rice have taken a personal interest in them. Following are the principal points made by Mr. Heble in his talk with me:

1. The situation in Central Vietnam can be characterized in general as one in which the rate of deterioration of the Central Governmentʼs position has been reduced but deterioration itself has not stopped.

2. In Central Vietnam the strategic hamlet program is mostly pure facade. Often creation of a so-called strategic hamlet involves nothing but a very inadequate fence around one-quarter of the hamlet. This in itself might not be so significant since, while the hamlet fences have become the symbol of the strategic hamlet program, other elements are of equal or greater importance. However, in Central Vietnam the “strategic hamlet” begins and ends with such a fence. There is no other effort to improve the defenses of the hamlet and nothing at all to improve the internal situation in the village in connection with the strategic hamlet program. In part this failure may be the result of differences between brothers Can and Nhu. Can is unconvinced as to the value of the strategic hamlet program. More generally, however, it reflects customary defects of Vietnamese administration-its basic inability to handle such a program, particularly with the speed that is presently being demanded. The result is failure combined with an effort to cover up failure through superficial compliance which can be reported to the Central Government as full compliance.

3. The villagers in Central Vietnam can see no advantage in the strategic hamlet program and they complain because work on the hamlets takes them away from their fields. Province and district chiefs with whom Heble has talked admit that the strategic hamlet program has had no effect whatsoever on the number of VC attacks, etc.

4. Canʼs Popular Force is in Hebleʼs view a much more promising approach to the problem of security in the hamlet and village. This program is based upon the realization that the VC are much more deeply rooted in the village than the Government has been willing to admit. Experience in Central Vietnam suggests that about 1/3 of the males in any village are likely to be active VC collaborators. You can build all the hamlet defenses you wish, but if you leave the VC cadres in the village untouched you will not increase the villagersʼ sense of security and his willingness to collaborate with the Government.

5. Can recruits his Popular Force on a volunteer basis. Its members are given training which is comparable to US Marine boot camp training in its rigor. Members of the force are required to work all day and much of the night. After a few weeks of training members are given the option of leaving, of taking a somewhat easier administrative job in the Popular Force, or of staying on in the military units of the force. The Popular Force has a good deal of esprit and has something of the same appeal to the youth possessed by the VC. It offers adventure and dedication to a cause.

6. After training, a Popular Force unit of 150 men is put in a village. The members live with the villagers and help them in the fields, in the construction of public works, etc. over a period of six months. The members are strongly disciplined and behave in a proper manner toward the villagers. After working all day members of the force spend much of the night on military patrols and forays against the VC. They use VC tactics, hitting the VC when they outnumber them or can achieve surprise and retreating from the village when attacked by a stronger VC force. Their activities create a sense of gratitude on the part of villagers—a feeling that the Government is interested in the village and its welfare. The Popular Force builds up an intelligence net and gradually begins to get the cooperation of the villagers. Even more significant, VC cadres in the village begin to defect. (Although interrogations have provided some information on the reasons for such defection, a more intensive effort is going to be made by Can to determine the reasons.) After six months or so, when the Popular Force feels it has rooted out the VC organization, has developed the village defenses and has created an intelligence net it moves on to another village. In Hebleʼs view the strategic hamlet program can make sense only if it is made an adjunct to such an effort as this. At the same time he cautioned that if the Popular Force concept is introduced generally in Vietnam—and there is some present trend in this direction—it may not be effective in areas where Can does not control it.

7. There has been a struggle between Can and Nhu over the Popular Force. Until recently Nhu and Thuan tightly controlled the Central Governmentʼs support for the Popular Force and it was largely dependent upon local resources in Central Vietnam. Recently, however, Diem has been convinced of the desirability of increasing support for the Popular Force and has reduced Nhuʼs and Thuanʼs control over its finances. …

8. In Central Vietnam about the only welfare program of the Central Government that reaches the villager or hamlet dweller is the program for elimination of crop pests. This program, for which we supply much of the support, has done an effective and important job of significantly increasing crop yields. When I asked Heble what sort of welfare programs he would recommend he mentioned small public works—especially roads and small irrigation works.

9. A general exception to Hebleʼs statements about the ineffectiveness of Government programs was his view of the Montagnard program. The Government has in recent months been doing a much more effective job with the Montagnards. Nonetheless he is a little afraid that there may be a gap in planning between the kind of immediate relief activity in which the Government is presently engaged and its longer term resettlement programs. I mentioned to him that I had had a similar concern as reflected in my paper but had been assured by Bill Trueheart and others that, in fact, the Government was moving beyond the immediate welfare stage.

10. Mr. Heble confirmed what I have heard before with respect to intelligence; namely, that while intelligence on the VC has improved as a result of improved organization and efficiency of military intelligence collecting system, cooperation of the villagers in providing intelligence has not significantly improved. This failure is, of course, a significant indicator of the inability so far of the Central Government to obtain the loyalty and cooperation of the rural populace. The Popular Force program has, in the limited areas where it has been developed, resulted in improved intelligence from the rural population.

11. Heble emphasized the need for better training of officials, particularly those in immediate contact with the rural population. The rural populace rarely saw officials above the level of district chief. Heble thought that a training program directed in the first instance at the district chiefs would be of considerable utility. This is, of course, the suggestion I made in my paper. Heble also agreed that there could be real value in using visits to districts and provinces where an effective job is being done as part of a training program for district chiefs and others. It provided one means by which one could hope to change the attitudes of district officials.

12. Heble also agreed with my conclusion that the election of hamlet councils under present circumstances had little, if any, value in providing a channel of communication between the Government and the countryside. As long as the councils were fundamentally the instrument of the central Government for the imposition of certain programs in the countryside, truly free elections would be difficult to achieve and even if achieved would not produce a body that could serve as a channel of communication. Heble believes that the establishment of such channels of communication is of considerable importance.

Comment: I did not attempt to check all of the proposals in my paper with Mr. Heble. However, his account of the situation in Central Vietnam confirms the validity of the recommendations to which his remarks had a bearing. At Ed Riceʼs invitation I chatted with him (Ed) Monday about what further actions we might take in Vietnam and I am contemplating following up that conversation with a memo.³

1. Source: Department of State,S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Vietnam 1962. Secret. Drafted by Johnson. A copy was also sent to Henry D. Owen and Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. See footnote 3, Document 249.
3. A copy of this 2-page memorandum, dated October 18, is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, R. Johnson Chron.