Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

305. Memorandum for the Record¹

Saigon, October 21, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting at Gia Long Palace, Saigon, Saturday, 20 October 1962

ATTENDANCE

• Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Political Advisor to the President
• The Honorable Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., United States Ambassador
• Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific
• The Honorable Edward J. Martin, CINCPAC Polad

Mr. Nhu met his visitors at the door to his office and, after everyone was seated, asked Admiral Felt how the SEATO meeting had progressed.² Admiral Felt answered that he thought that the meetings had been successful and had been concerned principally with the refinement of the latest plan. He commented that, of the four plans which had been prepared up to now, three of them concerned South Vietnam.

Mr. Nhu then asked the Admiral what he thought of the situation in Laos. Admiral Felt held up his crossed fingers and said that we must hope for the best. Ambassador Nolting explained that crossed fingers meant, in Vietnam, “nothing doing”. The Ambassador then said that the Phoumi charges concerning the locations of North Vietnamese Communist units had been delivered to the International Control Commission. He added that the forces which were working in Laos appeared to be driving Phouma more to the right. Admiral Felt agreed, and said, in confidence, that that very morning the Pathet Lao had launched attacks in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements. He could not, he said, understand what their interest could be in doing this. Ambassador Nolting agreed that it was difficult to understand what they could gain by such violations. Mr. Nhu stated that these actions could be the result of the fact that there were many factions, many “tendances” within the Communist element. The Ambassador commented that there was not much coordination between the factions. Mr. Nhu then volunteered his personal opinion that the two North Vietnamese regiments which were in Laos did not want to return to Hanoi. They wanted to come to South Vietnam—which was contrary to the desires of their leaders in the North. He then said that last year, there had been a meeting in Hanoi which had been presided over by the Chinese. At the meeting zones had been assigned within South East Asia—including Vietnam, Malaya, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia in connection with the settlement of the Laotian question. North Vietnamʼs task was to provide two regiments which would operate in the South. Since that time, authorities in Hanoi had decided to replace the two regiments in South Vietnam by two regiments which were more reliable and the two units originally assigned to South Vietnam were ordered to the area surrounding Saravane. This action created doubts within the two regiments which had been reassigned and their morale was affected by the knowledge that they were not trusted. They had sent emissaries to Mr. Nhu with the request that he take a strong position against neutralism in Laos—since the realization of this state would result in their forced return to North Vietnam—which they did not want.

Admiral Felt then asked what the monthly rate of defection was. Mr. Nhu said that he did not know but that it was increasing because of the growth in the number of strategic hamlets. He went on to say that the defection of officers remained a question of the individual and that the surrender of entire units still remained in the contact-negotiation phase. He then told the story of how, in Khien Phong Province, a leader—Colonel—of the Viet Cong had been seriously wounded during an offensive operation carried out by government forces. A check of the serial numbers of this officerʼs pistol (which Mr. Nhu produced and showed to his visitors) revealed that the wounded man was a person who had been favorable to the government. Generally, said Mr. Nhu, the dissatisfied Viet Cong troops wanted no part of neutrality in Laos. One of their leaders, a General, had attended a number of meetings held by the Communist chiefs and had reported that one must not believe that the Communists really wanted a neutral Laos. He had added that the creation of the present government in Laos had served to demoralize the factions in the North who were opposed to the Communist regime. Ambassador Nolting then asked Mr. Nhu if he thought that there were many malcontents in the North. Mr. Nhu replied that, although the number of people who were opposed to the Communist government was important, they were not properly organized. Reverting to his discussion of the two regiments he said that some of the troops were willing to return to North Vietnam, but most of them would rather return to the South. He added that a peculiar problem had been raised by the possibility of the Russiansʼ refusal to supply the Communist regiments in Laos. If this occurred Hanoi would be forced to take care of them. Meanwhile, the effect of this problem was felt in Zone “D”. It had been planned that this area would be stocked in a manner to provide for the needs of a division. Recently, however, the plan had been upset. Operations carried out by forces of the Government of South Vietnam had resulted in the loss of one-third of these supplies. Another third had been stolen to meet the needs of the two regiments in Laos. This was why it was necessary, concluded Mr. Nhu, for the government to launch an operation which would result in the seizure of the remaining stocks, leaving the projected VC division hungry. In reply to Ambassador Noltingʼs question, he said that he did not believe that the effective of a complete division were actually in Zone “D”.

Mr. Nhu then said that he believed that the doctrine of Mao Tse Tung contained a basic fallacy. According to Mao there was a natural progression from guerrilla activity—through irregular forces to conventional warfare. The fallacy became evident when the Viet Cong tried to progress to the stage of irregular forces and found that they did not have popular support. This was the reason for their many recent failures, to which mobility of regular government forces and improved counter-guerrilla tactics had contributed a great deal. He ended this part of his statement by saying that there was a direct connection between the events in Laos and the Viet Cong plans for Zone “D”, adding that the Geneva solution of the Laotian problem had caused much hesitancy among the Viet Cong forces which had been sent to Saravane.

Ambassador Nolting then asked Mr. Nhu for a clarification of what he had said. Did he mean, asked the Ambassador, that the continuation of Pathet Lao control on the borders of South Vietnam was an encouragement for the defection of Viet Cong troops and an advantage for the side of the Government of South Vietnam. Mr. Nhu answered that he thought that it could be—if we could inspire confidence in the defectors. He said that he had met with their spokesmen twice, only, but that they had spoken at length with their old friends now in the South. Many of them, he felt, were serious minded men. Eight or nine months ago they were worried about the results of the Geneva Conferences. From the standpoint of basic doctrine, as well as that of strategy, they were opposed to neutrality—recognizing it as merely a step toward communism. When Ambassador Nolting pointed out that these people continued to fight on the side of the Communists, Mr. Nhu said that their approach to him was with the objective of finding out what the government had to offer. They saw the American approval of neutralism in Laos and an aberration—and asked—“if they fought for real freedom, who could they count on to fight along side them?” When Ambassador Nolting insisted that, in Vietnam, there was no question of neutralism, Mr. Nhu answered that he believed this, but that others asked, in view of Laos, where the United States policy would stop. He then went on to say that there was a decalage—an echelonment in time between the psychology of the United States and that of the under-developed countries of Southeast Asia and the captive nations of Europe. This, he said, was the greatest worry of those who were hesitant about which cause they should support. The second reason, he added, was himself. The concept of the strategic hamlets had been accepted as a stroke of genius. But, people said, you, Mr. Nhu are an intellectual and you have tended to surround yourself with intellectuals who are incapable of realistic action. This is a cause for their hesitancy now—and later. Mr. Nhu then made reference to the Dulles policy—which he said was still being applied to Southeast Asia. He said that the Dulles concept, which he described as a concept of a personal universe, was better understood outside America—particularly in the under-developed countries of Southeast Asia and the captive countries of Europe. Ambassador Nolting then protested that the world picture of the Dulles policy was wrong—an illusion. He said that Dulles was a firm man—that he was credited with having said that “there was no morality in neutralism” but. insisted the Ambassador, the basic policy expounded by Mr. Dulles was the same as that of the present administration. He added that Mr. Rusk, as well as Mr. Dulles and before him Mr. Acheson and he, himself, saw things alike. Mr. Nhu replied that, perhaps there was an illusion—an optical illusion—but he felt that dealing with neutralism was dealing from a position of guilt. He said that he had the impression that the government in Washington was above prejudice. When it dealt with under-developed countries or the captive countries of Europe it was, in a sense, like the dealings of Russia with Albania. Once again he used the word “decalage”, (an echelonment in time) to explain that the continuation of the Dulles policy vis-à-vis the nations of Southeast Asia was similar to the Russian, or Khrushchev, policy vis-à-vis Communist China—still considered to be operating under the policies outlined by Stalin. This, Mr. Nhu went on to explain, was one of the reasons for the misunderstanding over the settlement in Laos. It has caused hesitancy on the part of the anti-Communists in the North. Vietnam, he reminded his guests, has been at war for twenty three years. It cannot afford to settle for an intellectual ideal. To be objective equals folly. For the past six months, he emphasized, the war has been intense. The people have been convinced that they have been fighting for a just cause—one worth dying for. Now they are told that they must die for half this cause. Ambassador Nolting asked, at this point, what we could do. Given the fact, he said, that there is an agreement which we are committed to uphold, what could be done to reaffirm our resolution? Mr. Nhu replied that Washington should realize that they must not let go of the prey to grasp the shadow. South Vietnam is at war, he said, she must not be sacrificed for the shadow of Laos and Cambodia. When the Ambassador said that the United States had no intention of doing this, Mr. Nhu insisted that the position of South Vietnam had been weakened in favor of an overall policy for Southeast Asia—which exists, he added, only because of the solid spiritual and political strength of Vietnam. He then said that the policy of the Communists should be emulated. They had worked toward the consolidation of the North—and the spread of revolution in the South. We should reverse this by consolidating the South and spreading revolution to the North. Ambassador Nolting suggested that the word “magnetize” be substituted for the word revolution. Mr. Nhu agreed, with the proviso that the effort be a solid one. The thinking in Washington, he thought, was somewhat abstract—adding that he could ask for nothing better than to be mistaken. He went on to say that Vietnam certainly did not want to precipitate clashes. He then referred to Mr. Harrimanʼs written account of the Yalta Agreements pointing out that these agreements rested on the signature and the word of Stalin.³ He quoted Harrimanʼs question in which he asked Stalin why he had not lived up to the agreements—and Stalinʼs answer that the conditions which had made the agreements necessary no longer prevailed. Mr. Nhu then said that the events in Laos were the direct consequence of the Vienna discussions between Khrushchev and Kennedy.⁴ Ambassador Nolting reminded him that at the time of the Vienna meeting, some twenty months ago, the Communists were doing very well in Laos and conditions there were in their favor. Also, he added, the tension which existed in Laos was not the same as that which prevailed at Yalta. In Laos, the Communists had created the tension themselves and were free to lift it whenever they chose to do so. He then asked Mr. Nhu if he thought that Khrushchev wanted real neutrality in Laos. Mr. Nhu replied that the actions of the countries of the Free World were such that the initiative was always left with the Communists. The “agreements” in Laos were entirely dependent upon the will of Khrushchev. Why, he said, canʼt we provoke an anti-Communist movement through our own initiative? When Ambassador Nolting referred to the present policy of the United States, Mr. Nhu retorted that Americans, ideologically, think that governments really govern. Passing over Ambassador Noltingʼs remark that this was true in the United States, Mr. Nhu said that, in under-developed countries control of the people had to be established at hamlet level. How, he asked, could Phouma or Phoumi hope to do this? In Vietnam, he added, the government in Saigon could be changed 36 times and the people would never know it. We must think seriously, he said, of organizing the villages in Laos—and in Thailand. If the villages are not held, there is no hope of stopping Communist progress. Ambassador Nolting then said that Phouma had expressed his intention to travel extensively throughout the country. Mr. Nhu retorted that President Diem had been traveling throughout Vietnam for eight years. He was adored by the population, but there still remained the question of organizing the masses. For this, he added, there must be a revolution. In Thailand and Cambodia this was equally true. In Thailand the great difficulty lay in the fact that two revolutions would be necessary. There, the Army and the police constitute two separate forces. Reorganization of the villages would involve paramilitary forces—the police—and consequently the Ministry of the Interior. The Army, of course, would not approve and there would consequently have to be two revolutions—one at the summit—and the other in the villages. In Laos too, added Mr. Nhu, there would have to be a revolution and if this revolution is not better than the one which the Pathet Lao have to offer, the country will be lost. Ambassador Nolting at this point commented that, when Phouma visited Washington⁵ he was asked his views on social and economic reform. The general impression gathered from his answers was that he had a good fundamental program. Mr. Nhu interjected the facetious remark that Phouma had promised such things as hospitals and schools. The Ambassador insisted that Washington was convinced that Phouma had ideas which went deeper and that he was genuinely interested in reform. Mr. Nhu commented that reform was not enough—there had to be a real revolution.

Mr. Nhu next said that he had discussed some of his theories with an American journalist. This man had told him that if he really carried them out he was working toward his own destruction. Nhuʼs answer to him was that “unless the seed die, there can be no new harvest”. He then, once again, spoke of the “decalage” or time gap in Washington thinking. Ambassador Nolting admitted that there was a tendency on the part of Americans to think of governments doing what they say they will do vis-a-vis the people. Still, he added, responsible people in the United States Government were beginning to understand more and more what Mr. Nhu had said about the need to win over the people at the basic hamlet level. Mr. Nhu agreed that this was good but insisted that the need for social revolution in under-developed countries should be appreciated. Cambodia, he said, was a country in which this was not realized. Sihanouk wanted no part of agricultural reform or of any other revolutionary move. He was content to hide behind the “alibi” of nationalism. Ambassador Nolting commented that this was somewhat like the Sukarno government in Indonesia. Mr. Nhu then went on to say that in 1945, the need for revolution was not appreciated. When he had said to the French Commander, during the period of Japanese occupation, that it was time to do something about reform and independence, the Admiral had said, “Yes—after we have achieved victory”. It was useless to tell him that, without reforms, there would be no victory. The need in all the Southeast Asian countries was for an economic and social revolution. Governments could not prevail unless they themselves carried out this revolution.

Ambassador Nolting then reminded Mr. Nhu that he had continuously expressed the hope that South Vietnam would keep its representation in Laos. Mr. Nhu said that there would still be a South Vietnam presence in Laos, though, he added in response to Admiral Feltʼs question, there would be no Embassy. Perhaps, he said, there would be Consulates—and by his manner implied that there would be other forms of presence. He then said, somewhat lightly, that the Laotian Embassy would remain in Saigon—though the only time they had anything to say was when they wanted money or something else. He once again mentioned the differential in the thinking in Washington and in Vietnam. He said that he was not against the basic Washington policy but that his objection to it was one of degree and form. Ambassador Nolting suggested that there might be some difference of perspective—to which Mr. Nhu replied that South Vietnam, not having the means of the United States, could not afford this basic policy. Ambassador Nolting then said that if there was any doubt in the minds of the people of Vietnam, or amongst the Viet Cong who wanted to return to the side of the government, a way must be found to clarify the fact that the Americans are in Vietnam at the invitation of the government and that they intend to continue to help until victory has been won. They would then leave. Any doubt about the United States shifting its policy toward neutrality must be dispelled. Mr. Nhu said that there was no fear that the Americans would remain too long—the fear was that they would leave too soon—and that they would slip out through the door of neutrality. Ambassador Nolting then said that Admiral Felt, who had frequent and recent contact with Washington, could attest to the fact that, in Washington, there was no thought of neutrality for Vietnam. Admiral Felt said that he had never heard the faintest whisper of such an idea. Mr. Nhu then said that he, personally, was convinced that the United States had no idea of abandoning Vietnam, but that others could not understand the reason for what had taken place in Laos. Those who had the desire to confront the Communists thought that Laos offered the perfect terrain for their struggle. Admiral Felt made the point that there was a big difference between Vietnam and Laos. In South Vietnam people were willing to fight, and to die if necessary for their freedom. This had not been true in Laos. Mr. Nhu repeated that the guerrilla-minded people thought that, if ever they had to fight the Chinese Communists, the ideal terrain would be Laos. Here, they said, was the place to open a gigantic hemorrhage in the belly of Communist China.

Admiral Felt, at this point, asked Mr. Nhu what the status of the amnesty program was. Mr. Nhu said that it was now too early to announce this program and that it should be proclaimed at the time of the general offensive proposed by General Harkins.⁶ He said that the Viet Cong were preparing plans for their fall and winter campaigns—but that the initiative would be taken away from them by the government. He said that the recently increased government activity was preparatory to the general offensive. In reply to Admiral Feltʼs question as to when this campaign would be launched, Mr. Nhu replied that this was a military matter to be decided by the military, but that he felt that it was closely linked to the Strategic Hamlet Plan which, at the first of the year, would have three-quarters of the population under government control. Admiral Felt commented that, at that time, the second of the two new divisions would have completed its training. Mr. Nhu again pointed out what he believed to be the great fallacy in the Mao doctrine and said that his concept of the Strategic Hamlet Program had grown out of this.

Admiral Felt then said that he was much encouraged by the attitude of the government authorities he had talked to during this visit. He added that a great change for the better had taken place since he first visited Vietnam some four years before. Mr. Nhu agreed that much progress had been made and said that, in three months the problem of desertion would be solved. Admiral Felt said that he had examined the desertion reports carefully and had been quite worried about them. Mr. Nhu explained that one of the principal causes of desertion had been the feeling of injustice which had spread amongst conscripts who, ostensibly had been drafted for eighteen months service but who had subsequently been extended indefinitely. The major problem, he said, had been that if the conscripts were released after. eighteen months service they would return to their native villages where they would be impressed by the Viet Cong. This, in effect, amounted to the government training troops for the enemy. As of the first of the year, all draftees who had completed thirty-six months service would automatically be released. When Mr. Nhu repeated that there had been a terrible sense of injustice amongst those who were kept beyond the originally specified period, Admiral Felt assured him that there was no difference between their feelings and those of Americans. Mr. Nhu then said that an impending problem would be that of taking care of the defectors who would come over to the side of the government in ever-increasing numbers. Smilingly he said that this was really a post-war problem. Ambassador Nolting added the comment that it was an optimistic problem. Admiral Felt said that he kept statistics on the number of people killed in action, wounded in action and captured. To this, he said, he would add a column showing the number who defect to the side of the government. This, he said, would become the most significant figure.

Admiral Felt then asked Mr. Nhu what actions were being taken to solve the problem of dependent housing. Mr. Nhu replied that the problem had been placed high on the priority list of things to be accomplished through the strategic hamlet plan. He said that first priority in the hamlets was given to families of combatants—not only for housing but in such matters as agricultural credits. Their children were granted scholarships to attend schools. In reply to Admiral Feltʼs question as to what had been done for the families of conscripts, Mr. Nhu said that these people could be divided into two categories. The first of these, in the tradition of the French expeditionary forces, were the camp followers. Eventually this problem would be solved by the completion of the Strategic Hamlet Program which would assure the security of the families and protect them from the threats and reprisals of the Viet Cong. Meanwhile, a special policy was required to take care of them. Not only was there need for housing for them, but an organization had to be set up to train them in “mobile” skills such as nursing, midwifery, hairdressing, teaching and sports. With these skills, which they could take with them as they followed displaced troop units, they could supplement the family budget instead of whiling away their time uselessly while their men were away. The presence of these families would also constitute a cordon sanitaire around troop installations. The establishment of strategic hamlets would provide for the second category of families. Freed of the menace of Viet Cong reprisals they could remain on the family land and devote themselves to productive tasks. Mr. Nhu insisted that he should not normally be concerned with these problems which, in essence, were military, but, as Admiral Felt agreed, the strategic hamlet program touched on all basic problems—including that of morale.

Ambassador Nolting who, earlier, had said that he would have to leave in a relatively short time in order to say farewell to Ambassador Hooten, the Canadian member of the ICC, told Mr. Nhu that it was long past the time when he should have left, and the meeting came to a close

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that it was prepared from the interpreterʼs notes and should not be considered a stenographic record of the meeting. A note attached to the source text states that it had not been reviewed or cleared by any of the participants.
2. Since there was no formal SEMO Council meeting in 1962, Nhu is probably referring to the informal SEATO Council meeting in New York on September 29.
3. Presumably Nhu is referring to Harrimanʼs account of his discussion with Stalin in Peace with Russia? (New York, 1959), pp. 163-164.
4. Reference is to the Vienna meeting, June 3-4, 1961.
5. Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma visited the United States, July 27-30.
6. Regarding the general offensive, see Document 277.