Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

277. Memorandum for the Record¹

Saigon, September 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting held at Gia Long Palace, Saigon, Vietnam, 7 Sep 62

ATTENDANCE

• His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam
• General Paul D. Harkins, Commander, Military Assistance Commands, Vietnam and Thailand
• Mr. William C. Trueheart, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Saigon

After the usual exchange of amenities, during which President Diem extended a particularly cordial welcome to his guests, General Harkins expressed to the President his pleasure with the splendid results of ARVNAF aggressiveness during the preceding month—especially in the III Corps area. He attributed these successes to the excellent cooperation of the various fighting arms: the Army, the Air Force, the supporting helicopter units and the River Forces. He said that, not only was he personally delighted, but that he was sure that General Taylor would be pleased with the progress which has been made since his visit to Vietnam in October of last year,² while the Delta area was in the throes of the flood disaster. Mr. Trueheart said that he had personal experience of the remarkable progress that had been made, since he had arrived in Vietnam at about the time of General Taylorʼs visit. General Harkins added that this progress was not restricted to the III Corps area but was evident throughout the country. He then told the President that the purpose of his visit was to present to him the concept of a plan which he thought that the President would like. He said that, the fact that so much progress had been made was the best of all arguments that no stop should occur now. In two or three months, said the General, would come the fruition of most of the efforts which have been made up to now. If all resources were used to the fullest, there could be no reason why one could not push on to victory. General Harkins then started to enumerate for the President the assets which were held by Vietnam. First, he said, the intelligence net which has been in place since May was now producing good results. Even the people were volunteering information—a good, healthy sign. Next, continued General Harkins, the communications system within the country was improving rapidly. The Tropo-scatter system was installed and beginning to work well. On the preceding Tuesday, he said, he had held a conference call with the Senior Advisors of Da Nang, Pleiku and Saigon and reception had been excellent. In reply to President Diemʼs question as to whether the system provided communications security, General Harkins explained that, as in all other systems where transmission was in the clear, there was danger of compromise. He added that there would soon be incorporated a teletype system which would provide security. General Harkins then went on to list, as the next asset, the great increase in mobility of the armed forces. He said that, in addition to all that had already been accomplished there would soon be two more helicopter companies arriving in Vietnam. October would see the beginning of the arrival of one hundred and twelve more M-113 armored personnel carriers. In November, the first of 95 M-114 armored vehicles would arrive. He explained to the President that the M-114 is a new armored reconnaissance vehicle which carries four men, reputed to be very good, and so new that it had not yet been used by the armed forces of the United States. The General pointed out to the President that the assignment of this new equipment to Vietnam was evidence of the great interest placed by the United States in the struggle which was going on here. General Harkins then went on to list as additional assets the 15 armed HU1A helicopters which were to arrive in the very near future. Added to these, he said, would be a half dozen new armed Mohawk aircraft, which he described as well equipped with communications equipment, capable of carrying out reconnaissance missions, of taking aerial photographs, and of providing armed escort and fire support. In answer to a query from the President he explained that they could operate from small airstrips. Next in the recapitulation of assets, said the General, was the fact that the 9th Division had completed training and the 25th Division would complete its formation in January. By December, he added, the Civil Guard would have been trained, as well as most of the Self Defense Corps. Added to all this, he went on, there would be sixteen more Special Forces Training teams (four of which had arrived), consisting of two officers and ten men per team. Already, thirteen Montagnard Scout companies had been trained. As additional assets, the various youth groups of the country had been trained by the thousands and an untold number of women had undergone some sort of indoctrination in the use of weapons. With a smile, the President said that, on a recent visit to an Agricultural Development Center he had noticed that all the guards in the area were women. It had been explained to him that the men were away to attend a course of instruction on Strategic Hamlets—but he added—the women obviously took their guard duties seriously. General Harkins commented that he had seen in the newspapers that some 3,000 more women were about to undergo paramilitary training. The President confirmed this and added that among the women were three Doctors of Medicine and a number of other professional women—all volunteers. Then to complete his summation of the assets on the side of the government, General Harkins mentioned the Catholic Youth Groups operating under the guidance of Father Hoa and Father Bosco and the large number of people enrolled in the Forces Populaires. To this must be added, he said, the Ranger Companies, the four Special Ranger Battalions and the Marine Battalions. The Air Force, he went on, had greatly increased the number of sorties and, by the end of the year, the Vietnamese Navy would have markedly increased strength and would be appreciably more active, with greater capability in coastal and river operations. In all, concluded General Harkins, there would be some 450,000 people under arms, not counting the youth and the women. With all this in a concentrated, integrated effort it should be possible to do something within the country. Perhaps it would not be possible to kill all the Viet Cong—but it should at least drive them underground. Even this would not be bad, because it would permit the continuation of the construction of Strategic Hamlets and the economic development of the country. If, eventually, the Viet Cong should try to come out in the open again the forces would be there to push their heads down again.

Saying that this, then, was the aim—General Harkins showed President Diem a notebook containing the principal elements of the concept according to which an operational plan could be built.

General Harkins then explained to the President what the purpose of the plan should be. He showed that implementation should be in successive phases—the formulation of the plan, preparation, the explosion and then the follow-up. Before continuing his explanation he showed the President a chart³ which indicated the VC strength in each province of Vietnam. On examination of the figures the President protested that those indicated for the I Corps and II Corps regions were too low and said that his national intelligence people had much higher holdings in those areas, particularly in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai and in the mountains and high plateau areas extending from these provinces down to Kontum. General Harkins pointed out that, according to the compilation of all intelligence from Vietnamese as well as American sources there was a total of slightly over 20,000 hard core VC in the entire country. Added to these there could be another 100,000 local guerrillas and an unknown number of sympathizers. The guerrilla companies were composed of a handful of cadres and expanded to 50 or 100 men, many or most of whom were impressed local people. The comparison of strength, the General indicated, was very favorable to the government. General Harkins then told the President that, since his idea was still only the concept of a plan, a great deal of detailed planning remained to be accomplished. He had spoken of this only to Secretary Thuan, he explained, since he had not yet received the Presidentʼs approval to discuss it with others. Detailed study, he continued, could very easily indicate the need for some redeployment of forces so that the sudden explosion everywhere at the same time would be most effective. He cited as examples the provinces of Ba Xuyen and Tay Ninh. Even with actions such as these it might not be possible to accomplish all at once because of such considerations as the varying weather conditions in different areas of the country at any given time. Of prime importance in the development of a workable plan to implement his concept, said General Harkins, was the establishment of a single chain of command, starting with the President as Commander-in-Chief, descending through the Assistant for National Defense through the Joint General Staff down to the lowest operational levels. Only thus could directives be gotten to all areas to ensure that all troops and supplies would be used most effectively. General Harkins next showed the President a chart⁴ which indicated the areas of Vietnam which could be supported by helicopters after the arrival of the new companies. He added that CINCPAC had spoken of the assignment of an airplane carrier from which a battalion of Marines, paratroopers or regular ARVN troops could be transported by helicopter to any area along the coast. The General then said that joint command centers and combined operations centers would have to be established at different echelons and explained briefly why they would be needed. He said that the detailed plan would be Vietnamese and that the role of the United States would continue to be to assist and to recommend. Decisions, he emphasized, would be for the President to make. Overall command, he went on, would have to be at governmental and JGS level since elements other than the military would be included in the all-out effort. Operations would be conducted through the command centers to provide for all eventualities, such as the possible requirement for redeployment of, say, five Ranger companies which normally would be kept under Province Chief control. There could also be a need for increased logistical support, entailing the need to prestock essential supplies such as ammunition, equipment and food. There would certainly be a need for intensified, accelerated training—much of it on a geographical basis—by troops such as marines, rangers and special forces designated to operate in specific areas. It would be necessary to work hard, and at night, and the work would have to be continued until all preparations were completed. Contact would have to be made and maintained with the enemy. Communications would need to be established on a continuous basis throughout the system from the top down to battalion, company and platoon level. Of great importance would be the participation of civic action teams to provide all essential services, such as police, administration, medical. In preparation for an all-out operation—from now on—all possible means of identifying and fixing the enemy should be employed. Complementary to this, should be a good psychological warfare program which would include both the military and the civilian segments of the population. Maximum surveillance of routes to control infiltration across borders and to locate enemy installations would have to be set up. People, such as the Special Battalions, the Montagnard Scout Companies, Special Forces, as well as regulars would have to be put into the field to find the enemy. Whenever possible, where government forces were in sufficient strength the enemy should be killed at once. If conditions would not permit this, they should be marked for later destruction. Wherever appropriate targets could be pinpointed, immediate bombing operations should be carried out against them. General Harkins, at this point, assured the President that, when warranted, massive bombing operations such as those which the President had requested for the VC infested foothills of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai could be carried out. Above all, the General stressed, preparations would have to begin as soon as possible. One of the first steps should be to bring existing units up to strength. There might be need to call up reserves or to increase conscription. Of prime importance was the adequate staffing of the many units which now had only 50 or 60% of their officer and non-commissioned officer strength. General Harkins then said that nothing that he had suggested in the presentation of his concept should be construed to mean that what was now being done should be discontinued. On the contrary, what he proposed would amount to nothing more than an expansion, an acceleration. He considered the Strategic Hamlet program, he said, to be one of the highlights of any plan for total victory and added that a pipeline had been set up to guarantee the orderly, timely flow of materials for this program. After once more stressing the great importance of obtaining all possible intelligence from all possible sources—including the military, the use of agents, the exploitation of civilians and the means available to province and district chiefs, General Harkins suggested to the President that, in each Corps, there should be a special “Quick Reaction Strike Force.” This force, which would consist of a battalion of Airborne or Regular ARVN troops, or perhaps Rangers, would be provided with a half-dozen helicopters and a number of C-47 or C-123 aircraft. They would be on constant alert and able to intervene rapidly wherever needed. They would, in a sense, constitute the Corps reserve force. In summary, said General Harkins, the concept which he had presented could be the basis for a bold plan to destroy the VC with one massive, integrated all-out effort. The Supreme Commander of the operation would be the President himself with command going directly from him in a single chain down to the lowest level.

General Harkins then reemphasized the fact that, if the Viet Cong should go underground, the government could continue its strategic hamlet program and to work toward the economic growth of the country. It could afford to wait and, if the enemy should attempt to rise again, the necessary force would be available to crush them once more. With good intelligence, he said, they would not be able to come back. He then stressed the fact that what he had presented to the President was a concept only. There was no elaborate plan as yet—no details worked out. What was needed first of all was the desire to accomplish the destruction of the Viet Cong—and the will to do it. He was sure, he said, that the Vietnamese people wanted to do it.

President Diem then asked General Harkins what he thought the time required to do this would be—and what results could be expected. General Harkins said that he thought the plan should be prepared for implementation shortly after the first of the year. He reiterated once more that the result might be to drive the Communists underground, but—he underlined, this would be O.K.—since it would permit freedom of action to the government in its plans for defense in the strategic action program, and for offense through the economic growth of the country. He said that he was perhaps optimistic—but that he always was. He felt that one year would be enough to achieve victory. Secretary McNamara had not agreed with him and it was somewhat difficult to find others who would—but he could not see, he insisted, why with all the assets that he had listed—amounting to more than 450,000 people, success could not be achieved. He was convinced that it could be. He then cautioned the President that some of his leaders, even the military, might not approve—in which event he suggested, others must be found that would. The plan, General Harkins continued, would require a considerable amount of training—including schools for senior officers to give them the entire background, to familiarize them with the plan itself and to instill in them the will to accomplish it. The General then showed the President a number of pages in his notebook which listed the proposed training courses at various levels.

The President (obviously intrigued), then said that he thought the plan, in principle, to be very good. He added that it must be examined in the light of all forces presently available—and he added, the political aspect must be considered. As a first impression, he said that one had better look to three years instead of one. To reduce the Viet Cong like this—he mused—would be better to think in terms of three years. The VC, he thought, would not accept a defeat of this kind. In answer to General Harkins’ remark that they were going to have to accept it, the President protested that the viewpoint of the enemy was unknown—no one knew what the reaction would be. General Harkins then said that his philosophy in war was not to worry about the enemy but, rather, to let the enemy worry about him. The President agreed that this was good, in principle, but added that, since we did not know what to expect we should consider the situation not only in the light of what both sides now have, but also from the viewpoint of what the enemy can do. Since the VC cannot accept a crushing defeat it should be expected that they would reinforce. For example, in the field of logistics they could start using air supply. General Harkins replied that they couldn’t, we would destroy them. President Diem then said that, in the mountains of Quang Ngai the VC are reported to have anti-aircraft sites prepared. General Harkins reminded him that we have radar and intercept aircraft which fly every night. These planes operate from Tan Son Nhut and fly out to meet every aircraft that is not properly identified. Any effort on the part of the communists to use air supply would be crushed. Also, continued the General, if the Viet Cong bring in more forces there will be more of them for us to defeat. He reminded the President that during the past two months 2,500 VC regular and paramilitary personnel had been neutralized. Three battalion headquarters had been destroyed in the III Corps area and another had been hit in the I Corps area. If, for the next five months, all efforts could be concentrated on the gathering of intelligence-military units, penetration agents, civilians and all the rest, the enemy could be pinpointed and hit everywhere at once. If all could not be killed—they would at least have to go into hiding and government operations could continue unhindered—with the populace convinced that the average VC is not twelve feet high. General Harkins then suggested that a system of rewards be instituted to stimulate reporting of VC identities in the villages. If the morale of the people were lifted to the point where all desired the elimination of the VC there would be no reason why this plan should miss. As an example of the already raised morale of the people the General cited the example of the latest volunteer class of officer candidates at Thu Duc, for which four hundred more applied than could be accepted. The President agreed that this had been a very good sign and added that, during the war, a similar appeal for volunteers had met with no response.

President Diem next pointed out to General Harkins that the timing of his proposed plan coincided with the target date for the completion of i/2 of the Strategic Hamlet plan. General Harkins agreed that this was so and mentioned the fact that machinery had been set up to provide much of the needed materials for the execution of this plan—on a recurring three months basis. He added that he did not feel that all hamlets had to be provided with the same physical security. The President agreed and said that the philosophy behind the entire plan was to set up and teach basic democracy as a countermeasure against the teachings of the North and against those who were pressing for neutrality. He said that, with the means which were now available to the government, the enemy had been disturbed and that this was why they had recently started to cry for international conferences on neutrality. General Harkins commented that they would cry louder if—based on the concept which he had presented—a resultant plan were to be implemented and carried out. The President once more expressed his doubt that the communists would accept defeat in this way and referred vaguely to political maneuvers which they might adopt. Mr. Trueheart commented that these maneuvers would not bother him. The President then, stating that his remarks were made in confidence, said that there had been recent evidence of subversive activities—such as the extension of their espionage net—by the French. This he interpreted as evidence that they were attempting to pursue the same policy in Vietnam that they had followed in Laos. Mr. Trueheart assured him that the United States policy in Vietnam was not at all the same as that which had been followed in Laos. The President then said that he was not happy with the position which the United States had adopted with respect to Laos. He felt that the United States could have stated that they favored a government of “National Union” and that there could be no question of helping one part of a coalition. Further, he said, there should have been a statement that the United States was not in agreement with “Neutralism”. Mr. Trueheart said that, in Vietnam there was no question of “Neutralism” and that the policy of his government was one of total war aimed at the destruction of the Viet Cong. General Harkins added that he wanted to destroy the VC in order that the people of Vietnam might enjoy their country and see its beauty as he had—mentioning the wonderful attractions of Cap St. Jacques, Dalat and Nha Trang. He deplored the fact that the people of Saigon could travel no farther than Tan Son Nhut—where they gathered in crowds each Sunday. President Diem replied somewhat wryly that General Harkins was indulging in flights of imagination. He said that, not long before, he had attended a graduation ceremony at Thu Duc. He had heard that American advisors had planned to travel to the site by helicopter because they considered road travel to be too dangerous. They had changed their minds when they learned that the President was travelling by road. He added that his British advisors, in their report on the Strategic Hamlet program, had explained that the VC, since they could no longer safely attack the villages, had concentrated their attacks on the more vulnerable roads and the railroad. He added that, in the same report, it had been pointed out that, the VC, facing the loss of part of their control over the countryside, had begun a program aimed at exciting students as a first step in their activities on a political plane in Saigon. General Harkins commented that if the VC were attacked and killed they could not do this. He pointed out that there were now some 500 incidents per week—in which an average of 700 VC were killed and 100 Vietnamese soldiers and civilians lost their lives. If the plan were implemented the VC would be destroyed and all this would end. Mr. Trueheart explained that, on the one hand, the civilian strength of the country should be mobilized to support the plan. The Strategic Hamlets would constitute part of this mobilization. What General Harkins proposed, he added, was the simultaneous total mobilization of the armed forces. General Harkins commented that he felt that the VC were now off balance. They were losing much of their force and it would be very difficult for them to bring in more either by land or by sea. With the Montagnards—the Rhade, the Bahnar, the people around Aschan and Aloui—on our side, large scale infiltration of VC was becoming increasingly difficult. President Diem pointed out that one of the most critical areas was still the Annamite chain in the Center, particularly the province of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Their plan was still to push from the foothills down to the coast in order to obtain the supplies which they needed badly. Recent helicopter operations in this area had helped considerably because it had caused the VC to hesitate in carrying out their plan. As long as they stayed in this redoubt they were safe and even had caves and tunnels in which they could hide. Because of the helicopter operations they were beginning to fear that if they left their bases the areas would be seized and they would not be able to return. General Harkins commented that the answer was to go in and get them in their tunnels. He then told the President a story which he had heard on two occasions, once in Bac Lieu and once in Saigon. An ARVN Commander had taken up a position with his battalion along the banks of a river. Someone pointed out to him that the area on the other side of the stream appeared to be a better bivouac and asked him why he did not go there. His answer was that the area was occupied by the VC. When he was asked why he did not go after them he replied, “as long as we donʼt bother them, they won’t bother us.” The President said that this commander was a lazy man and admitted that there were areas where his commanders hesitated to attack. Normally the Viet Cong do not attack government forces where they have infiltration routes or in the areas where their headquarters are located. In these areas very little activity occurs. General Harkins protested that this was not right and was certainly no way to win. The President said that he had spoken strongly to General Don, telling him that there could be no war without men being killed or wounded. Reports from I Corps had shown few if any ARVN casualties. Also, said the President, he could not see a commander preserve his forces while Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps members were being killed. General Harkins commented that if commanders did not want to fight they should come to the President and tell him so, and the President could find others who would. President Diem agreed with the General and spoke of events which had taken place in Kien Hoa Province. There the VC had assembled their “brains” for three years and there were no reports of activities. The President had warned the Province Chief that he was due for a rude awakening and that he was in fact cooperating with the enemy by failing to take aggressive action against him. He then gave the opposite example of the situation in the Plaine des Joncs where there is much action because Colonel Cao provokes the VC to combat and tries to select his own battleground. General Harkins remarked that the same thing should be done in other areas. Mr. Trueheart commented that it should be done in all areas at the same time. The President then pointed out the difficulty of operating in certain areas where the people are dispersed in tiny groups. One such area lies near the Cambodian border close to the trails used by the VC to travel back and forth across the line. He spoke of the necessity of regrouping these people into “combat hamlets” but said that it would be more difficult than in Binh Duong because of the necessity of building foundations for their houses. General Harkins told the President that he could show him an “open gate” and indicated on a map,⁵ a road which crossed the border close to the point where the Mekong flows from Cambodia into South Vietnam. In this same area, he added, there was a “common market” which operated every night. The President then pointed to a second area (Tay Ninh) where he indicated that the people were dispersed like specks of dust. He said that the District Chief in the area had announced publicly that the people would be regrouped. In fact he did not have the means to do it but his announcement caused the Viet Cong to send reinforcements into the area. General Harkins commented that it would be good if they could be provoked into gathering together. It would then be easier to destroy them.

General Harkins then told the President that he had recently visited the provinces of Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, Phuoc Thinh and Phuoc Long. The President spoke highly of Lt. Colonel Vien, the Province Chief of Phuoc Long, saying that he was a “guerrilla” fighter who spent most of his time in the woods on small scale operations against the VC. General Harkins said that he was aware of the manʼs activities. He agreed with the President that Lt. Colonel Vien knew where the VC were and added the comment that Vien had good Montagnard agents. He suggested that it might be a good idea to give him some help—a battalion of troops and some helicopters. If he could knock out the VC it would be easier for him to continue his strategic hamlet program. The President replied that it was hard to catch VC in this area on the edge of Zone “D” and close to the Cambodian border. General Harkins told the President that Lt. Colonel Vien did not believe that there was much border crossing activity. He added that Lt. Colonel Vien kept the VC moving so much that they rarely slept in the same place two nights in a row. The President commented that Lt. Colonel Vien was accomplishing as much with a company as was being done in other areas with two battalions. He agreed with General Harkins that the VC were permitted no rest in this area. General Harkins remarked that the government had enough troops to keep the VC moving everywhere, all of the time. If they were kept moving constantly for two weeks they would be so tired that they would have to rest and they could all be killed. The President then referred once again to the vast mountainous areas of the coastal provinces saying that only helicopters could penetrate into them and that when attempts were made to send troops in it took four or five days to reach their objective and they had to come out after a week or less. General Harkins pointed out that the VC were in the areas and asked why government troops couldn’t do the same. They could be supplied by helicopters. The President replied that, for two years, he had been telling his people that they had to go to the heart of the enemy. He then added that the British had advised him that areas like Tay Ninh, where people were widely dispersed demanded much patience. A great deal of money and time would be needed before they could be regrouped and controlled. Priority, according to the British, had to be given to the Delta. General Harkins pointed out that we have communications, mobility, regular forces and the Civil Guard and Self Defense Forces as well as the Montagnards. Mr. Trueheart asked why both could not be done at once. General Harkins reminded the President of the successes attained in the Delta during the past month and expressed his desire to see the same thing done all over the country.

The President, illustrating his remarks by referring to a large map⁶ then spoke at some length about the difficulty of containing the Viet Cong threat in the center of the country. He pointed to infiltration routes, safe areas and remote valleys in which the VC raised the crops which sustained them. He spoke of the need for the construction of roads to cut across the VC axis of communications and to permit access to their safe areas. He pointed to the new province of Phu Bon which he had established in the area surrounding Cheo Reo in order to provide closer local control and spoke of the need to apply massive bombing to certain areas in order to make them untenable to the Viet Cong. General Harkins assured him that bombing would be one of the elements in the plan which would evolve from the concept which he had proposed. He again reviewed very briefly the many assets available to the government and told the President that he need only say “go” and work could begin immediately on the plan for a sudden, explosive effort to destroy the Viet Cong. The President replied that he was convinced that the principle of the concept outlined by the General was good, but that he was still of the opinion that it would be better to expect that three years would be needed to complete the job. If it were tried—and failed, he added with a smile, people would charge General Harkins with inefficiency. When the General responded that he was more than willing to run this risk, the President, said that he did not believe that the Viet Cong was a worm which could be crushed under oneʼs heel. They had many resources available to them—including Communist North Vietnam. General Harkins then asked the President if he had his permission to start work on the plan. The President replied “Yes” and added that he would discuss the proposal with Secretary Thuan. General Harkins said that he would see General Ty immediately and arrange for their staffs to get going on the preparation of detailed plans.

As the meeting ended President Diem asked General Harkins if there were any particular subjects which he thought should be discussed with General Taylor. It was agreed that it might be profitable to speak of the situation relative to Cambodia and Laos, and about operations in South Vietnam. Also there might be an exchange of views on press relations. General Harkins reminded the President that General Taylor was on a world tour with the object of bringing himself up to date prior to assuming his new job as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In reply to the Presidentʼs question as to the accuracy of newspaper speculation on General Taylorʼs views on the emphasis to be given to conventional vs nuclear forces in Europe, General Harkins replied that he was sure that General Taylor felt that forces should be balanced to include appropriate nuclear, conventional and special forces elements. He assured the President, in closing, that if he became aware of any specific questions, he would inform him.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 A 5159, Sgn(62)42 Taylor Visit. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was prepared from the interpreterʼs notes and should not be considered a stenographic record of the meeting.
2. For documentation on Taylorʼs visit to Vietnam, October 18-25, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Documents 169 ff.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. Not found.
6. Not found.