306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
443. To Harriman from Nolting.Deptel 459.2 It will be a diplomatic defeat if Diem severs relations with Laos. It will be something considerably worse if he breaks relations with Laos after approach in terms your telegram. I am convinced he will do so unless approach is [Page 717] coupled with threat of severe sanctions, and even then outcome would be doubtful. I do not believe that such sanctions are in the interests of the United States and I gather this is also Washingtonʼs position.
The further approach prescribed—which advances no arguments not previously put to GVN and to Diem personally, but which directly engages President Kennedyʼs prestige—would in my judgment undermine our future influence here, and, with it, the carrying forward of our program. Whatever success we have had to date rests in important sense on our ultimate respect for GVN sovereignty, including its right in final analysis to make decisions in field of foreign policy.
Within limits indicated above (respect for countryʼs sovereign rights and no threats of withdrawal of US aid), we are doing everything we can on this issue. To take the position set out in your telegram would, in my judgment, defeat our purposes here—on an issue which in itself cannot compare in importance to the United States with that of maintaining an independent, non-Communist Vietnam.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/10-2062. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- Document 304.↩