Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

218. Memorandum From Senator Mansfieldʼs Legislative Assistant (Valeo) to Senator Mansfield¹

Washington, June 15, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Vietnamese Ambassador

I met with the Vietnamese Ambassador, Tran Van Chuong, from 9:00 p.m. until 12:30 a.m. on June 14, 1962. The conversation covered a great range of matters; much of it was confused and disjointed. However, there emerged from it several principal ideas which he apparently wanted to communicate to Senator Mansfield without doing so directly himself.

(1) That the Diem government is in very deep trouble and has little prospects for survival. The principal faults, as he saw it, are those which have been indicated in the press from time to time, such as the family control, Diemʼs obliviousness to the realities around him, his mandarin tendencies which discourage any but relatives and “secretaries” from working for him. He made no criticism of Diem as a man, of his patriotism and his dedication, but it was clear that he felt these were insufficient attributes to deal with the present situation. He did not say so in so many words, but there was implicit in his remarks, a belief that a coup was imminent.

(2) He was trying, I believe, to find out through me what Senator Mansfieldʼs position would be in the event of such a coup. He had a very clear recollection of what he believed to be a decisive statement at the time Diem first came to power. He made reference to the fact that Senator Mansfield had said at that time that it was either Diem or no foreign aid and he knew that this was what had persuaded both Bao Dai and the French to bow out. He was exploring to see what would happen at this time in the event that Diem was threatened with imminent overthrow. Would it mean that Senator Mansfield again would say, in effect, Diem or no foreign aid? I told him that I did not know what Senator Mansfield would say but that he would very likely support President Kennedy who had to make the critical decisions.

(3) As regards the speech,² he understood the factors which had given rise to it, both those at home and those in Viet Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. But he feared for its effect on foreign aid appropriations. I told him that Senator Mansfield was, as far as I could see, trying to deal only with the realities in the situation, recognizing the difficulties in Southeast Asia as well as our own limitations, but that Senator Mansfield had given and would undoubtedly continue to give full support to whatever the President decided.

(4) He apparently expects the coup to come from a combination of the military and the presently dispossessed intellectuals, including those whose political backgrounds, like his own, predate Diem. He does not expect this to be a democratic uprising. On the contrary, he was highly critical of the fact that Diem had established the forms of democracy in Viet Nam, forms which he felt were unsuited to the situation and which led to irresponsibility. In other words, what he anticipates and, I am quite certain that what he is inclined to support, is something on the Korean pattern in the hopes that such a regime can more effectively administer the nation and use aid more pointedly. He was, to some extent, also critical of the past administration of aid in Viet Nam. This he attributed both to the inadequacies of some of our people and to the type of Vietnamese administration which had evolved under Diem. The successor group which he anticipates, presumably, would be far more militant in its military policies than Diem. He spoke even of the possibilities of moving into Laos militarily if not into North Viet Nam by hit-and-run tactics.

(5) He is afraid of the Laotian solution for a somewhat ironic reason. He is afraid that the Communists will make it work. He believes they may do so as a preliminary for what would be a diplomatic offensive to bring about neutralism in South Viet Nam. These steps he believes are part of a plan for the conquest of Southeast Asia by the Communists without force. He expressed fears at the present tendencies in American policy. While understanding the political limitations on actions, he raised questions about where this course would eventually lead, insisting that if we continued in the Laotian pattern we might in time have no alternative but a nuclear war. He dated the development of this approach from the time MacArthur was prevented from bombing behind the Yalu. He obviously would like to see a much more militant policy. He mentioned the possible use of Chiang Kai-shek against the mainland, the use of Thai forces as well as the previously noted references to Vietnamese forces in Laos. He expressed the hope at the end of the conversation, once again, as he had done several times during the talk, that Senator Mansfield would not despair of the situation in Viet Nam and that he would recognize that there are good and able people and a considerable amount of leadership ability not now being used. This, again, I took to be a reference to the imminent possibilities of a coup against Diem.

1. Source: University of Montana Library, Mansfield Papers, Box 105, Folder 19. Unclassified.
2. Reference is presumably to the commencement speech that Mansfield presented at Michigan State University, June 10. See Document 214, footnote 4.