217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
1447. Embtel 1536. New Delhiʼs 3795.2 On balance after study pros and cons notification problem Dept concludes best continue present policy non-notification. Resumption notification would involve self-conviction, propaganda windfall for Commies, loss of advantage inherent in keeping Bloc in dark as to exact scope and direction our efforts, plus damage to military security.
At same time believe we must seek means avoiding mounting ICC citations of GVN without corresponding citations DRV. After ICC report out and impact observed we intend confer with GVN and GOC on approach to Indians in effort persuade Indians (1) cease citations altogether and pass buck to Co-Chairmen as outlined Deptels 1326 and 1361,3 or (2) agree that future citations GVN must be balanced by roughly equal number citations DRV.
Line with Indians should be based on cause and effect nature VN situation and stress our desire restore force Geneva Accords and authority ICC. Might begin by pointing out continued citation GVN for violations which in fact caused by DRV aggression manifestly unfair. Such citations only likely encourage DRV continue its attack and may discredit ICC itself. After indicating our desire maintain force GA, suggest to Indians that two alternatives occur to us which we would like them consider. First possibility is for ICC to view subsequent GVN actions of the same character as violations of a continuing nature and for ICC to inform Co-Chairman periodically e.g. annually under Article 43 of the Agreement that parties failing put into effect ICC recommendations, and that violations previously reported continue. In this regard point out that there nothing in the Agreement that requires ICC to make citations re each separate incident that occurs. Thus under Agreement ICC is free to decide not to cite GVN for each incident if it considers above procedure most appropriate in particular circumstances. Second possibility is to balance citations GVN by citations DRV. If citations DRV infiltration and subversion too few ICC could insist on controls at times places its choosing in NVN and cite DRV for non-cooperation if refused.
[Page 457]Do not agree we should attempt suggest to USSR that failure to call off DRV may result larger war. We have been careful to indicate we not threatening DRV and would not wish contradict this defensive stance at this time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5-3062. Secret. Drafled by Heavner on June 11; cleared with Cottrell, Wood, Rice, Horgan, Hubbard, Chayes, and Czyzak; and approved for transmission by Harriman. Repeated to New Delhi, Ottawa London, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for Polad.↩
- Dated May 30 and 26, neither printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/5-3062 and 7516.00/5-2662, respectively)↩
- Neither printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/5-462 and 751G.00/5-1862, respectively)↩