219. Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, June 15, 1962, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follows a list of participants including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U. Alexis Johnson heading the Department of State delegation, Henry R. Rowen for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and General Carter representing the CIA.]
I. Viet Nam
Admiral Anderson indicated that the JCS would appreciate Mr. Johnsonʼs thoughts on what course of action we would follow if Diem should pass from the scene. Mr. Johnson replied that last fall certain general guidance on the subject was passed to Ambassador Nolting.2 The thrust of this guidance is the provision of a high degree of flexibility and authority to the Ambassador as the man on the spot. He has a wide measure of discretion in determining who the most likely successor will and should be. His guidance, which has just been reviewed with him indicates that the most likely candidates for the present are Tho and Thuan. We recognize that the military would probably constitute the base of power for any successor regime. However, we have indicated that if at all possible a new regime should be given a civilian complexion with emphasis on the constitutional aspects. Diemʼs departure [Page 460] from the scene would place a great strain on our entire mission in Saigon and one man (the Ambassador) must be free to call the shots as he sees them.
Admiral Anderson asked if Tho would be the constitutional successor in the event of the death of Diem, and Mr. Johnson replied in the affirmative indicating that Tho was acceptable to us. Mr. Wood said that Tho and Thuan were in jail together under the French and are very close personally. We would have a satisfactory situation with Tho as the civilian head of government supported by big Minh heading the military element. We would like to use people presently in the government and avoid the use of local people who are not now active in the government. We do not wish to have the government taken over by politicians who are presently in exile because they are out of touch with the local situation and would compound the problems involved in a change of leadership. We would have to move rapidly if we are to avoid a Communist takeover, and we do not need a quarterback in Washington. The Ambassador has proper guidance and full authority to carry it out.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, State-JCS Minutes. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that this record was a Department of State draft, not cleared with the Department of Defense. The meeting was held in the Pentagon. A memorandum from Guthrie (S/SS) to Brubeck (S/S), June 15, indicates that the briefing material on U.S. policy in the event of loss of Diemʼs leadership was included only in Johnsonʼs briefing book (not found) in view of its “sensitivity.” (Ibid., State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328)↩
- See the enclosure to the letter from McConaughy to Nolting in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 181.↩