Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 23, 1962—3 p.m.

1503. SecDef and other recent Washington visitors have expressed need for additional information about progress of war in Viet Nam.² Embassy, USOM and USIS therefore initiating new joint weekly report on political, economic and psychological aspects of Vietnamese situation.MACV continuing separate weekly cables on military aspects. This is first such joint cable. Future reports will be much shorter and will seek insofar as possible draw conclusions as to progress or lack of it in overall counterinsurgency effort from base reflected herein. Washington suggestions for improvement format and content welcomed.

Political: 1. Delta Plan: Plan Commissioner Colonel Lac awaiting presidential approval of his proposed concept of counterinsurgency operations based essentially on coordination and planning. Lac to act as central coordinator with representatives of his coordinating organizations at various lower levels. Planning to be done essentially at division tactical zone level with plans to be submitted Saigon for technical review only. Until concept approved unlikely any specific operational plans will be developed. Operation Sunrise in Binh Duong Province (part of Delta Plan area) is already under execution and appears to be progressing satisfactorily. However, operation commenced before approval of Delta Plan and further operations in Delta area may be organized differently. We pressing GVN for prompt decision and action.

2. Operation Hai Yen II: This is coordinated clear-and-hold plan for Phu Yen Province in central Viet Nam under control of regimental commander in area with province chief as his deputy. Military phase began May 8, and seven battalion-sized operations have taken place since then. Strategic hamlet construction (84 hamlets) has been initiated in most secure areas of province, especially around provincial seat of Tuy Hoa. Certain initial difficulties re personnel, piaster and material requirements have been resolved or are on way to solution by US and GVN.

Latest reports by US observers in area give encouraging picture of progress and high morale those responsible for this operation.

3. Strategic hamlets program is in progress in every province and has highest priority. Min Interior reports 1,600 strategic hamlets built to date. Effectiveness and degree of planning and coordination varies widely from province to province. At this juncture perhaps fairest conclusion is that there is considerable momentum behind promising idea. US objective is to encourage increased planning and coordination with eye to defensibility and effectiveness. To this end specific US assistance has been concentrated on operations meeting these objectives and falling within areas of economic or strategic importance.

4. Montagnard Program: Recent months have seen greatly increased flow of Montagnards from mountain areas seeking GVN protection and support. Some 47,000 have been resettled in Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, and Quang Duc Provinces. Flow continues, however, and possibly as many more are in great need of assistance. As flight of Montagnards probably deprives VC of important source of support in highlands, it is most encouraging sign. To prevent their return to highlands, it is essential they be given assistance in terms food, tools, etc., and establishment new villages. GVN agrees on opportunity this represents and urgency attacking resettlement problems and we are working closely with them.

5. Cambodia: Believe tension has eased between RKG and GVN over Vinh Lac incident.³GVN has decided not reply latest Cambodian note and press attacks on Cambodia have toned down both in number and nature.

6. Korea: Korean survey mission has arrived Saigon. Appropriate liaison being established.

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8. Australian position toward Viet Nam: Australian FonMinʼs statement Australia prepared furnish few military trainers to assist GVN Armed Forces warmly received by GVN which already presented request for such aid.⁴

9. ICC: Indications from Chairmen both Indian and Canadian ICC Delegations that ICC moving toward early decision (perhaps within week or so) on DRV subversion South Viet Nam. Report also expected cite GVN-US for violations Geneva Accords since Dec 1961 through introduction additional American military personnel and equipment and establishment “factual” military alliance. Canadians preparing minority supplement pointing out cause-and-effect relationship between DRV activities and military build-up in south. This also expected be implicit in Indian report. Hanoi press and radio currently engaged in growing attack on ICC in hope of forestalling subversion decision, but there no indication this having any effect on ICC. ICC report will go to UK and USSR as Co-Chairmen. Poles expected submit minority report.

GVN recently furnished evidence to ICC on use ChiCom weapons, ammunition, compass and medicines by Viet Cong in SVN and captured document showing that “Peopleʼs Revolutionary Party” simply another name in SVN for Lac Dong Party (Communist Party of DRY). GVN also sent letter to ICC proposing detailed system of ICC controls along Laos-South Vietnamese frontier and in western part demilitarized zone to detect infiltration of Viet Cong. It offered helicopters and other cooperation in carrying out these controls.

We are working with GVN to obtain maximum publicity on recent letters to ICC. To enhance interest of correspondents in these letters GVN planning open to press May 24 exhibit at general staff headquarters of evidence VC infiltration and Communist supply of weapons to guerrillas in south.

10. DRV political activities: VC liberation broadcasting station and Hanoi Radio quick to exploit release two American Special Forces sergeants captured by VC in Danang area. Claimed release of prisoners part of SVN National Liberation Front policy of leniency toward POWʼs. Also alleged prisoners had repented their “aggressive activities” and requested “pardon” from “Liberation Front”. Both Americans denied making any such statements of repentance.

Hanoi Radio playing up open letter from sixteen Americans to President Kennedy attacking US policy re Viet Nam published mid-April in “New York Times”. Hanoi published responses to letter from “prominent Vietnamese personalities”, actually Communist and pro-Communist individuals. We believe there could be relationship between this letter and release two sergeants, as DRV may feel letter indicates considerable popular opposition to US Govt policy supporting South Viet Nam and that DRV clemency toward two American prisoners might increase that opposition.

Hanoi VNA reported March 9 that central committee of “Liberation Front” had protested McNamara visit to Saigon and stated it “will call on government and people of DRV” and others in world to give “active assistance by all means, including material assistance”. Previous “Front” threats to call for assistance have included preface “if necessary”. We believe Communist bloc will however continue try keep its assistance covert.

11. Economic and social: General: Fiscal and budget problems continue overshadow GVN and USOM programs, and account in part for delay in adoption of project counterpart program, special counterinsurgency, and military budgets. Deficit for 1962 now projected by USOM approximately 3.5 billion piasters, which “per se” no cause for alarm except GVN has made no decision how to cover.

GVN has requested US give cash dollar grants and liberalize aid regulations re limited world wide procurement and shipping on US flag vessels. May 10 Diem handed Ambassador memo arguing GVN has fulfilled commitments recommended by Thuc-Staley mission, that foreign exchange reserves have fallen far below general range $200 million agreed upon as fitting level at time of mission, and that as result fiscal reforms, higher prices American goods and freight rates, commercial demand for imports has declined to point where GVN ability meet essential military and civil budget requirements imperiled.⁵ Memo claims GVN has already engaged in deficit financing to extent of piasters 2.7 billion, recommends relaxation Buy American and American flag shipping rules and direct US Treasury purchase piasters from National Bank Viet Nam.

Article by Dean Thuc in Sunday “Times of Viet Nam” echoed points re inflexibility and burdens American aid regulations and alluded budget problem posed by low demand for imports.

USOM proposal to increase aid impact at village level by establishing special counterpart fund for direct financing by USOM of provincial activities was turned down by GVN. However, GVN has subsequently approved agreement between USOM and Chief Phu Yen Province for financing operation Hai Yen II (para 2 above) and there is reason to believe this type arrangement can be repeated elsewhere.

Total piaster-producing import licensing all funds in FY 62 approximately $183 million at May 10 indicating probably shortfall of $10 million below revised forecast $215 million FY 62.

Importers and bankers still rather gloomy over business conditions but no longer voice earlier exaggerated fears of bankruptcies. Sales of imports to interior still slack but steady. Inventories in customs warehouses are normal again, although imports inventories in private godowns above normal.

Domestic rice trade normal with prices reasonable for both farmers and consumers. GVN-controlled reserve rice stocks ample, and 44,000 tons PL-480 rice expected in June.

Specifications processing and organizational work on several pending industrial ventures evidence some return of confidence in industrial circles, but no large orders placed yet in 1962 for capital equipment.GVN announced plans for medium-term loans to cover new 5/7 tax on such capital goods but none granted yet.

Searching re-examination under way of social and economic programs in which US plays a part to determine what further changes of emphasis may be desirable to combat insurgency. Changes adapting USOM program more closely to such activities as military civic action, Montagnard rehabilitation, and strategic hamlets may be feasible. Success of such adaptation, however, will depend partly on degree to which overall govt policy and operations in nationwide counterinsurgency effort are clarified.

Otherwise, progress in economic and social programs is steady. For example, anti-malaria campaign continues go forward toward goal of total eradication despite serious disruption by VC. National communication facilities expanding, 50 kw transmitter at Quan Tre having opened May 15 under nearly full power for broadcasts covering nearly half the country. In field local govt, trained nucleus of district and provincial administrators returning to provinces as instructors other officials in new spirit and administrative techniques.

Review of situation in other key fields follows, together with some of more significant current developments.

12. Public Safety: Draft plan for basic reorganization police and security services completed and under final review GVN and USOM. Creation modern unified national police service should increase substantially counterinsurgency capability of govt in this sphere. One aspect of reorganization will be decentralization of operations. In this connection aid now recruiting 20 rural police advisors to serve in regional and provincial headquarters.

Other developments in public safety field:

A. Village Radios: 426 of 2,500 installed to date; following provinces completed or nearly so: Gia Dinh, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Phooc Tuy, Kien Phong, Dinh Tuong, An Xuyen and Kien Giang. Installation rate now 300 per month with four teams operating simultaneously, each with USOM technician, two signal corpsmen and personnel of Vietnamese telecommunications service. Substantial assistance rendered by MACV helicopter lifts. Manufacturing in process or delivery to Saigon accomplished for 1,220 sets; procurement order for balance of 1,200 sets issued May 21. Technical examination of hamlet radio problem proceeding.

B. Identification card program has issued 2,750,000 cards in all provinces of target 7,000,000 (all adults over 18 years). Program coordinated with rehabilitation operations e.g., USOM specialist now in Phu Yen Province training special teams to accelerate card issuance in connection Hai Yen operation.

C. Training of police in firearms stepped up. May 17 2,000 carbines obtained on replacement basis from ARVN stocks for special training sessions to commence soon for Saigon police, three northern regional directorates, and for south and southwest regional directorates.

3. Public Health: Concern of health officials in recent months has been care large numbers civilian battle casualties, including Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Standard plans recently approved for new surgical suites for provincial hospitals (joint USOM-GVN project). Construction bids received and accepted for 25 provinces. Meanwhile dollar-funded orders for surgical and nursing equipment and supplies being placed for time phased deliveries. Mobile medical teams for which worldwide recruiting in process will fit into this program

Result before end year can be surgical facilities for all Viet Nam within 100 kilometers any point and major gain in social counterinsurgency sphere.

14. Public works: New jet runway at Tan Son Nhut now in use by all types aircraft including military; construction 85 percent complete. Despite continuing sabotage, US supplied dredges continuing dredge inland waterways and canals essential to transport of rice to urban markets and transport of military troops and equipment; in presidentʼs road program (directed at construction and rehabilitation of roads primarily in strategic rural areas) 13 separate road projects under way at 17 sites. An average of ten bridges being damaged weekly by enemy action are being repaired at the same rate with US assistance. Railroad sabotage recently increased. Repairs undertaken immediately with US assistance and minimum interruption of service. Well drilling proceeding in military installations, hospitals and strategic villages, including well being dug (now down to 400 feet) in Father Haoʼs village, An Xuyen Province.

15. Education.

A. Summary of current action:

1. Vocational Education: 2 Major schools opening July 1962 which, with 3 in operation, will enroll 3,700 students.

2. Teacher training capacity will be expanded as result current negotiations to produce 350 secondary school teachers per year (against present capacity 250 teachers); annual rate production elementary teachers will be expanded by July 1962 to 1,400 per year.

3. Textbook production to date approximately 3,000,000; under new agreements establishment of 19 provincial centers for instructional materials will greatly help production.

4. Elementary, secondary classroom and science laboratory construction continues.

B. Perhaps only impediment to complete integration public education programs with other geographically phased counterinsurgency operations, e.g., construction of school in strategic hamlets, is lack of firm schedule of areas to be “cleansed”. Nevertheless, school construction in strategic hamlets completed in many cases, on basis last minute coordination plans, and priority being given where possible to Delta Plan provinces and other areas where rehabilitation operations under way.

16. Agriculture: Distribution rodenticides to farm families in six central provinces got under way last week and now moving top speed. One hundred gram plastic packages being delivered local family group leaders through province and district offices, which will in turn give to each of 100,000 families.

Meanwhile, new permanent organization for overall plant protection program being beefed up with transportation and other equipment, training, and construction of facilities. One shot rat poison program significant in immediate circumstances, but of less importance than institutional capacity combat all forms plant destruction year after year.

Agricultural credit distribution in doldrums during first quarter of 62. Loans issued through National Agricultural Credit Office in that period 50 percent less than during similar period 1961, which itself far below 1960 rate. Security conditions root of trouble, and efforts adapt to it through new methods augur well for coming quarter; heavy emphasis being placed on loans in kind, especially fertilizer, to central VN rice deficit areas; NACO moving toward decentralization of operations to district offices. In general production activity of agricultural population remarkably constant in face insurgency.

Psychological:

17. Appointment of new Director General Information: GVN May 21 announced appointment Phan Van Tao as Acting Director General Information to succeed Dr. Tran Van Tho, who expected return to National Assembly seat. Tho openly opposed activity foreign newsmen here, created roadblocks which source constant irritation correspondents. Also pursued policy heavy censorship, other controls local press. New Director, Tao, former deputy to Civic Action Minister Ngo Trong Hieu, expected take more moderate position both with respect foreign and local press.⁶

USIS also anticipates more favorable reception other on-going and proposed information projects. In recent conversation with USIS Deputy Pao, Tao profuse in expressions his desire cooperate fullest with US mission. He well and favorably known US reps.

18. Foreign press relations: still difficult. Exodus majority Western journalists to Thailand temporarily abated complaints of GVN cable delays, other official harassments. Newsmen remain in such suspicious mood that alleged VC order to Saigon-Cholon cadres directing them send appeals to resident Western press by name believed by some Western correspondents be GVN “plant” designed discredit their stories. AP correspondent Malcolm Browne expressed similar view origin two recent alleged VC grenade-throwings, believing them covert GVN effort convince Americans VC intends single them out for assassination despite current propaganda line to contrary. PAO Mecklin interview President Diem last week⁷ indicates President continues believe Western newsmen out to reflect discredit him and regime. Diem reluctant at this time consider improving press access to information on progress war against VC but indicated he willing listen to suggestions for improvement which post is preparing.⁸

19. In apparent breakthrough on long-standing problem, Civic Action Minister Hieu gave USIS go-ahead on nine sub-posts: Phan Thiet, Pleiku, Nhatrang, Quinhon, Danang, Quang Tri, Hoi An, Quang Ngai and Phu Yen province (town unspecified). Minister proposed and USIS accepted joint GVN-US field operations committee. Hieu predicted committee, sub-posts could start functioning in about two weeks.

Overall evaluation:

Compared to six months ago, I have no doubt that the GVN is stronger now, relative to the Viet Cong, within the confines of SVN. This judgment based on following factors: fighting capability of armed forces and para-military forces; morale of armed forces; morale of civilians; government planning and implementation; intelligence. During the same period, however, VC strength and determination appear also to have increased, and it now seems clear that the VC are not going to back down (or voluntarily retard their time schedule) as a result of increased American aid. We are thus faced with the probability of a struggle increasing in intensity. The GVN is aware of this and is trying to prepare for it (in the “clear and hold” operation). Coupled with the strategic hamlet program, the GVN has, in a sense, moved to take the offensive. This in itself has improved public morale. There are, however, many weaknesses in the GVN administration: delays in decisions at the top, vying for position and lack of cooperation among officials, some poor planning and more sloppy execution, poor public relations (both at home and abroad). I think these weaknesses are gradually being improved, but there is still a long way to go. On the whole, I think US counsel and advice are becoming increasingly acceptable and should produce further dividends.

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5-2362. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Manila, Paris, Taipei, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Hong Kong, Hue, and Fuchu. The Department of State was requested to pass copies to various intelligence and military agencies in Washington, as well as to AID; CINCPAC was requested to pass copies to its subsidiary commands; and Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and Manila were requested to pass copies to their respective military representatives. A handwritten notation at the top of the source text reads: “Hurrah!”
2. See Document 187.
3. Reference is to an incident on April 20 in which unidentified raiders from Cambodia attacked the border hamlet of Vinh Lac, murdering some of the inhabitants and pillaging the area. Telegram 1346 from Saigon, April 25, reported that the raiders were probably members of the Cambodian Civil Guard and the attack was most likely not politically motivated. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-2562)
4. Reference is apparently to an offer made through Admiral Felt, who visited South Vietnam and President Diem following the ANZUS meeting in Canberra as related in telegram 1469 from Saigon, May 17. (Telegram 1469 from Saigon, May 17; ibid., 751K.5/5-1762)
5. An English translation of the original memorandum in French, was sent as an attachment to despatch 476 from Saigon, May 16. (Ibid., 451K.116/5-1662)
6. In the margin of the source text next to this sentence was written: “Unlikely. Press policy comes from top.”
7. See Document 199.
8. In the margin of the source text next to this sentence appears the statement: “Diem is real block, not Tho or Tao. Win him over and Tao will be fine.”