Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

187. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, undated.

VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 8-11 MAY, 1962

[Here follow sections I and II.]

III. South Vietnam

1. As in Thailand, the period in South Vietnam was spent largely in visits to military activities in the field. It included visits to the Corps headquarters, to the scene of Operation Sunrise, to three strategic hamlets, to the SVN training center for Civil Guard units, as well as interviews with US unit advisors in their areas of operations, and with all three of the ARVN Corps commanders. The field visits covered generally the length of South Vietnam, from the 17th parallel to the Delta, and measured some 1400 miles. Included also was a conference with Chief, MAAG Laos, a meeting with President Diem, and a final meeting with Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Commander in Chief, Pacific and their staffs. The detailed itinerary is shown in Appendix 5 and a map representation of the area covered is shown in Appendix 6.

2. Impressions gained during the visit included the following:

a. Strategic villages (townships) and strategic hamlets (communities).—The program, in reality, is just beginning to gain momentum, and unqualified conclusions as to its efficiency cannot properly be drawn at this fume. It is plain, even at this early point, that in the resettlement process often involved in the strategic hamlet program, and in the attendant regimentation, the South Vietnamese authorities are obliged to use some of the same arbitrary techniques as the Communists themselves. It is to be hoped that the very real motivations of ultimate freedom from terror, a sense of national or local pride, and the prospect of a life of individual opportunity will be enough to make the regimented system work. There is good reason to believe that it will.

There are about 14,000 hamlets (small communities) in South Vietnam. As of this fume, 1579 have been organized as strategic hamlets, with an additional 1230 planned for this calendar year. Most of these actions did not involve resettlement and were created on the original site of the hamlets, in areas where the GVN already exercised a strong measure of control. They are thus serving mainly to solidify or to enhance the degree of GVN control. A few, such as Ben Tuong, which was visited in the Sunrise Project, and one seen near Ca Mao in Delta, were actually created in areas which were liberated from VC control. The Sunrise undertaking—a most ambitious effort to clear the VC from an area 40 miles northwest of Saigon—has proceeded satisfactorily to date, with a great reduction of VC influence in the area and the creation of a completely new strategic hamlet, into which families from the area have been concentrated. The project is portrayed and described in detail in Appendix 7.

The Strategic hamlet program undertaken near Ca Mao on the Delta presented an equally impressive picture but from an entirely different viewpoint. Here, the commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment had gone into an area 95% controlled by the VC, declared martial law, and resettled 11,000 people (some under duress) in 9 strategic hamlets, while fighting the VC wherever he found them. It is a bootstrap program, essentially without material aid from outside. Since inception of the program, none of his villages have been attacked, and the freedom from VC taxation (extortion) is proving most appealing to the people. It is the commanderʼs hope (doubtless optimistic) that he will be able to turn the whole area over to the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps within 6 months.

It would appear, at this early moment, that the strategic hamlet program promises solid benefits, and may well be the vital key to success of the pacification program. Plainly, it:

(1) Provides physical security for the villagers from the Communists.

(2) Precludes extortion of the peopleʼs limited means.

(3) Offers promise of a tranquil existence, and a substantially improved economic condition.

(4) Provides for better housing, more education and a higher order of health and sanitation.

(5) Impedes greatly the VC capability for surviving off the land, both in terms of food and information.

On the other hand, the program gives evidence of having weaknesses—all of which are probably susceptible of correction. They include:

(1) A lack of adequate orientation for the people who must be resettled, to make plain all the reasons why they should be willing to leave their homes and fields and surrender some of their liberties.

(2) A shortage of competent GVN administrators to make the communities operate properly.

(3) Inefficient and unstandardized construction methods.

(4) A lack of warning communications.

(5) Insufficient training and equipment for local defense forces.

The first three of the above problems are on the way to solution now, through a National Academy for Strategic Hamlets which opens on 17 May, with an initial class of 500. The last two problems are most serious, and each is deserving of separate treatment here, by virtue of their magnitude and complexity.

b. The training of Vietnamese paramilitary forces.—The subversive technique adopted by the communists fixes the hamlet as the decisive battle ground. The hearts and minds of the villagers are the major objective of the Viet Cong. Thus the security, prosperity and tranquility of each hamlet needs, at all costs, to be preserved from terror, violence and extortion, and this can be done best by young people who (1) have a blood identity with the area and an interest in its welfare; (2) have adequate arms, equipment and training for the task; and (3) are properly organized and led. The program to accomplish these things is just beginning to gain momentum. It has three elements:

(1) Training of the Civil Guard (provincial paramilitary forces).—A visit to the Song Mao Civil Guard Training Center disclosed an active and effective program, capable of handling 15 Civil Guard companies at a fume. During this calendar year it will give 12-week training courses to 188 of the existing 449 Civil Guard companies, or about 20,000 men. By the end of next year 372 companies will be trained. These units will be adequately armed and capable of small unit offensive action against the VC, in local security tasks. One problem in the program turns on what point in time the Civil Guard units should be given their US weapons. At present the companies are inspected at their home stations and, when found capable of handling them, are issued the weapons at that fume. On this basis, a total of 338 Civil Guard companies now have US weapons.

(2) Training of the Village Self Defense Corps.—This is a paramilitary program, formalized and like the Civil Guard, involving paid, full-time participation. It is less sophisticated than the Civil Guards. The SDC is identified with the village (township) in the same sense as the Civil Guard is identified with the province. The program for the Self Defense Corps training is not as far developed as Civil Guard training. It comprises a six-weeks basic course at seven SVN training centers. The SDC man is issued a US weapon on the day his unit reports to the training center, and is held responsible for the weapon thenceforward. Under the present program 65,000 SDC will have received training by 1 April 1963.

(3) Training of the Youth Corps.—This is an undertaking identified specifically with the hamlet, and completes the paramilitary spectrum from the province downward. The participants are unsaid volunteers, both male and female. Their training is not standard, being accomplished by various ARVN units, and their weapons are heterogeneous. Nevertheless, their importance is great, inasmuch as the volunteers are actually a part of the hamlet which they undertake to defend.

One Youth Corps group observed at the strategic hamlet of Luong Son near Song Mau in the central part of the country, was obviously highly motivated, but its weapons—ranging from shotguns to 1892 Mausers—gave little cause for confidence. There is no crystalline program for Youth Corps training, no detailed plan for its uniform armament, nor has a plan been prepared to equate the Youth Corps requirement with the number of strategic hamlets which will ultimately be created. COMUSMACV was directed to have such a plan developed, as a matter of urgency.

(4) The problem of warning communications.—The transmission of intelligence reports and the processing of urgent reports of VC activity in the hinterland parallels closely the paramilitary security force problem. Communications are planned, from the metropolitan level to the district, and from the district to the village (township), but the hamlet, where the issue of violent subversion is really joined, has not been firmly linked—even in planning—in the communications system.

At the present time, 220 of 242 districts are linked with Saigon by radio

At the next lower level, the plan contemplates 2400 village radios, of which 215 had been installed by 2 May, with a forecast of 2019 by October. In this connection, the need for completion of this project, expressed by US personnel interviewed the length of South Vietnam, is urgent.

At the lowest level, the hamlet, little has been done. It is acknowledged locally that a communication system from hamlet to village is essential, and a pilot group of 1000 very simple radio sets win be tested.

The Secretary of Defense, in view of the importance of this project, advised the Ambassador and COMUSMACV that DOD would support the hamlet communication project, and asked for an early and complete plan which relates the communication need to the number of strategic hamlets contemplated.

c. Visits to the I and II Corps Areas.—Both Corps Areas are vast, comprising terrain of extreme military difficulty, minimal road communications, a sensitive Laotian border and a wide assortment of VC activity. In this regard, probably the most significant tactical impression gained was that the ARVN forces—doubtless because of dynamic guidance by US advisers—are pressing aggressively to keep the VC off balance, and to make his existence as unfruitful as possible. There seems little question but that this vigor is paying off.

Small unit patrols, ambushes, attacks of company size, sweeps involving a battalion or more, imaginative employment of helicopters, air observation and heavier weapons—all must be having some effect on denying initiative to the VC Eight such recent operations are described, and critically analyzed, in Appendix 8.

A point of possible significance, in connection with the increased scale of helicopter-borne operations is the fact that the pilot area of the aircraft is suffering hits with increasing frequency, leading to the possible conclusion that the VC are learning to concentrate on the pilot. This, in turn, raises once again the matter of whether there should not be some form of suppressive weapon integral with a fraction of the assault helicopters.

Specific observations regarding visits to the Corps Areas include:

(1) An imaginative utilization of education, civic action and psychological activity has resulted in the voluntary resettlement of 11,900 people in the Kontum area. It could well be done elsewhere, but success apparently demands the happy combination of a willing provincial authority, a vigorous ARVN commander and a dynamic US advisor.

(2) The primitive country is an ideal setting for exploitation of our superior mobility in the helicopter and our superior radio communication capability. In both Corps Areas a desire was expressed for more of this support, particularly helicopters. At the present fume, there are scarcely enough helicopters for operational purposes, leaving the logistic problems involved in supply and evacuation for remote patrols to be solved by slower and less effective means. It is most likely that more helicopters are needed.

(3) There is little infiltration by sea reported, attesting to the effectiveness of the maritime patrol. The same is hue with respect to the 17th parallel. Some increase in infiltration across the Laotian border was reported by the I Corps commander, following the growth of communist activity at Tchepone in Laos.

(4) US advisers in both Corps commented upon the great need for more junior officers and NCOs in both ARVN and Civil Guard units. In some organizations the number is as low as 15 to 25% of the authorized strength.

(5) Advisers in both Corps were enthusiastic about the value of civic action, and urge acceleration in training of Vietnamese administrators in community development. They express a need for medical supplies for civic action purposes.

(6) In contemplating the sum of the operations in I and II Corps, it was not possible to overlook the reality that these activities actually do relatively little to impede movement across the long and rugged Laotian border, a practical fact which assumes even greater importance in light of current developments in Laos.

d. Conference With Chief MAAG, Laos.—The Chief, MAAG Laos joined the party at Nha Trang during the visit to I and II Corps, and gave a late summary of events in Laos. His recital of the developing situation paralleled closely the official reports available in Washington from other sources. However, he added the following personal views, which are significant:

(1) That he had earlier appealed to the Laotian military leadership to readjust their low-ground defenses at Nam Tha, without success.

(2) That the Laotian private soldier involved in the Nam Tha fighting gave a reasonably good account of himself, but that the officer and NCO leadership was gravely deficient, and that the pusillanimous example was set at the very top.

(3) That this weakness which, in his views, is widespread, gives rise to the conclusion that what is left of the Laotian Army cannot be expected to fight with any effectiveness.

(4) That there are grave doubts, in his mind, as to the real violence of the fighting, following the initial blow at Nam Tha, inasmuch as the field commander took pains to prevent direct US observation of the operation, and inasmuch as few casualties were noted.

(5) That there is a substantial logistic build-up along the whole of the former cease-fire line; that logistic activity in the Tchepone area is growing; and that an attack may well be expected in the general area

e. Conference at MACV Headquarters.—A conference at MACV Headquarters, attended also by representatives of CINCPAC and the US Embassy, Saigon, treated the following matters:

(1) A review of major VC military activities.—Since 14 April there have been no VC operations as large as battalion size, the largest involving about 50 men. Present VC organized strength is estimated at 16,500. While this is a reduced estimate, the reduction was described as being more a matter of accurate reporting than of lesser numbers. There are estimated to be at least 100,000 active communist guerrillas. With regard to these facts, it is likely that we shall be getting better information in the future, inasmuch as there are now intelligence advisers down to the section level.

(2) Review of RVNAF operations.—Since 21 March there have been over 40 operations of battalion or larger size, along with 400 minor offensive efforts. The Air Force has flown over 400 sorties, of which 275 were in close support. COMUSMACV is now concerned about how to maintain the tempo of operations during the rainy season, and has a study in progress on this subject.

(3) The status of Clear and Hold operations.—Activities in Operation Sunrise and at Ca Mao have been discussed earlier. Additionally, it was reported that, while there is no time schedule set for the approved Delta Plan, the Vietnamese seek to divide the clear-and-hold scheme into three phases, involving tasks of ascending difficulty, and each to be accomplished in three months.

(4) Progress in gaining GVN acceptance of issue of weapons to CG and SDC.—This has been discussed earlier, except for the single significant point that, in the case of the SDC, the reluctance to issue weapons at home stations is wholly a GVN decision. It is their view that issue of the weapons at the training center is a powerful lever to procure the participation of the SDC in training. Actually, a far graver problem lies in the absence of a sound program for arming the Youth Corps. (To be taken under study by MALV.)

(5) The relief of ARVN units by Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps in static tasks.—There has as yet been essentially no replacement of ARVN units by Civil Guard or SDC, nor is there likelihood of any until a greater number of these para-military units are properly trained. This is so because the trained CG and SDF units are now used to replace untrained similar units which, in turn, go to the training centers. At the same time it is significant to note that probably 85% of the ARVN forces, while technically addressed to “static” duties, are actually engaged in pure operational functions of defensive nature—protection of vital installations, airfields, supply depots, etc.

(6) Establishment of the Intelligence Net.—At the present time 92% of the people and 98% of the equipment for the intelligence net are in place, and substantially operational. While there is stik some requirement for US personnel to depend on Vietnamese resources for information, the need is steadily decreasing. There is now a joint US/VN intelligence element existent from section through division, corps, and field command to general staff. There should be a visible improvement in intelligence quality and timeliness in the immediate future.

(7) Communications in Provinces, Districts, Villages and Hamlets.—This has been discussed above.

(8) Infiltration.—Infiltration, which has been at a low level for the past few months, is estimated to be on the increase, using routes through Laos.

(9) Current Desertion Rate in RVNAF.—The Army rate has dropped from 6/1000/month to about 4/100/month. There is no desertion problem in the Air Force or Navy.

(10) Defoliation.—A detailed and generally favorable report was submitted on defoliation, as a result of a comprehensive survey by chemical warfare, agricultural and botanical technicians. The defoliation technique was characterized as potentially most effective, and its operational resumption, under specialist technical advice, was recommended. Its usefulness, in terms of selective crop destruction, was also emphasized. MACV was directed by the Secretary of Defense to submit a specific recommendation covering both defoliation and selective crop destruction.

(11) A progress report on whether we are winning or losing.—MACV offered one practical index for appraising the problem, acknowledging always the multitude of imponderables involved. It has to do with the control—geographic and by population—exercised over the country by the GVN and by the VC. The geographic picture is presented in Appendix 9, with a detailed rationalization. In essence, it says that:

• The GVN controls 14.7% of the country.
• The GVN is in the ascendancy in 24% of the country.
• Neither the GVN nor VC controls 18.3% of the country.
• The VC is in the ascendancy in 24.8% of the country.
• The VC controls 17.4% of the country.

In terms of population, the picture is brighter, in that:

• The GVN controls 18.1% of the country.
• The GVN is in the ascendancy in 37.8% of the country.
• The VC is in the ascendancy m 11.4% of the country.
• The VC controls 15.6% of the country.

The above population figures, moreover, are developed without considering the 1.7 million people in the cities, essentially, all of whom are under GVN control.

Another interesting index to the trend of affairs is portrayed in Appendix 10, which shows, for a 5 month period, the trend of GVN combat losses in killed, wounded, deserted and defected, as well as weapons lost, contrasted to the same figures for the VC. The trend is plainly a favorable one.

3. Vietnam Summary

a. US military forces in South Vietnam are acquitting themselves well, exhibiting much energy, great initiative and imagination in dealing with their Vietnamese counterparts.

b. There are skill some material needs in S. Vietnam—helicopters, hamlet communications, and suitable arms for paramilitary forces. MACV is aware of each problem and has been directed to submit specific proposals.

c. There remain urgent training and organizational problems related to hamlet security. These too, are recognized by MACV.

d. Beyond this, and in a broader sense, there was an atmosphere of restrained optimism evident in every area visited, on the part of both US and GVN personnel. All the way from the intensely proud attitude of the administrator of a strategic hamlet to the military and civil leadership at the top, the Vietnamese exhibit confidence and resolution. The US participants in the battle are likewise solid in their determination that the future holds genuine promise. At the same time, there seems to be universal comprehension of the inevitable reality that for fifteen prior years the war in Vietnam was in the process of being lost—progressively and day by day—and that there is no alchemy or magic that can convert that sort of loss into a dramatic victory overnight. Put otherwise, there is evident a general conviction—first, that victory is clearly attainable through the mechanisms that are now in motion and, second, that hopefully, it will not take fifteen years fully to consummate it.

1. Source: JCS Files. Top secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but declassification markings indicate that it was prepared in the Department of Defense. In addition to the summary of the trip to Vietnam, May 8-11, printed here, the report, which is 71 pages in length, includes an introduction stating that McNamara was accompanied by Lemnitzer and Sylvester, a summary of the Thailand portion of the trip, May 8-9, and 10 appendixes, including itineraries, maps, force strengths charts, descriptions of some ARVN operations, and a summary of Operation Sunrise.