Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹

Hong Kong, May 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

• The Communists and South Viet Nam

In making future assessments of the effect which our military/diplomatic role in Viet Nam has on the Communists I believe we should keep the following elements in mind. The list is not exhaustive. I have discussed the following with Consul General Green and key members of his staff in Hong Kong. They have made sound contributions and agree generally.

1. The ChiCom-Russian split. The Russians think Communism can make gains without local wars. They will back wars of “National Liberation” provided the risks are controllable. The ChiComs think local wars are the best way to spread Communism and will accept higher risks. (Moral: if we prove the Russians right, we are lost.)

2. For all their toughness the ChiComs are realists. Given their economic plight and because they will not have an effective way of delivering the bomb in the foreseeable future, they donʼt want a major war. Proviso: If they thought they were being attacked, they would stop at nothing. (We can communicate our limited intentions to the ChiComs by our acts.)

3. If the ChiComs took over all SEA, it would not solve their immediate rice problem. Later they would quadruple the rice production of SEA, but this would not permanently solve their rice problems. They probably know this and we can assume that they will not move into SEA because of their food problem.

4. The North Vietnamese have committed their prestige to the conquest of South Vietnam, but they will not voluntarily accept massive ChiCom assistance. They know that to gain South Viet Nam by this method would lead, in turn, to being swallowed by the ChiComs. They have an abiding, neighborly hatred dating back 1500 years.

5. The North Vietnamese react badly to internal, covert dangers. As orientals they do not naturally band together to face a common danger. This tendency to look out for themselves is accentuated by Communist training to act as separate cells and cadres and to spy on each other. There are already indications that the North Vietnamese are afraid of sabotage, that there is an atmosphere of distrust which can no longer be papered over by warring revolutionary zeal (these tensions should be discreetly exploited).

6. The South Vietnamese peasants fear the Communists more than their own Government. If convinced they have the means to resist the VC, they will. If convinced they donʼt have the means, they will, through fear, give the Viet Cong more than they will the GVN.

7. The GVN wants to win its own war. It now realizes the importance of Civic Action as a means of helping the peasant. The confusions in this program are not insuperable. The GVN has not yet fully faced the other side of the coin—to really root out the VC it will be necessary for ARVN units to stay out in the field longer and with less support than is now the case (experience will help them gain the confidence to do this, but we must also help through joint planning and by supplying the right kind of light equipment. We must not let them become so dependent on daily US provisions that they canʼt be weaned and hardened off into the jungles).

8. International Conference—At present the Communists (Russia, the ChiComs and North Viet Nam) would only come out for a conference if they felt they could gain two objectives: i. a neutralized SVN really ripe for the takeover (they were fooled on this one in 1954 and would want to be satisfied); ii. paint an “aggression” label clearly on the U.S. without any rubbing off on themselves (that is why we must work so hard to get the ICC to pin “subversion” on them).

In the future when the war goes badly for the Communists, they will want a conference (this will test our nerve. We should remember the Communists understand our actions. If we agree to a conference, they will assume it to be an act of weakness. We must assume that a conference will not lead to an agreement which will bind them. By the thrust and parry of diplomatic and military action we can reach a de facto understanding, but we should only do so when the GVN has the ability to exercise sovereign control over South Viet Nam. Finally the publicity of a conference on Viet Nam is apt to make it a poor form of diplomacy, particularly since our friends and allies are apt to get into a greater degree of public disarray than the Communists).

Conclusions

1. Maintain our present program in SVN.

2. More discreet sabotage in NVN.

3. Play down US role.

4. Try to get subversion finding from ICC, if possible with showing that this is cause of increased U.S. assistance.

5. Communicate our intentions clearly and without conferences.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Official-Informal Letters, GVN 1962. Secret. Transmitted from Hong Kong under a letter from Wood to Cottrell, May 11. Signed for Wood by Marshall Green, the Consul General in Hong Kong, who appended a note stating that he agreed with the conclusions but would have phrased Woodʼs points differently.