Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

189. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Policy Implications of General Harkins’ Appointment

In order to provide a command structure for the US forces being moved to Thailand and the Southeast Asian area in connection with the situation in Laos, the Joint Chiefs propose ordering the establishment of the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI). General Paul Harkins, who heads the US Military Command, Vietnam (USMACV) will additionally assume command of USMACTHAI. As head of USMACTHAI, General Harkins will command Joint Task Force 116 (headed by Lt. Gen. Richardson), MAAG Thailand, and such other US forces as may be in Thailand now or subsequently.

There are undoubtedly sound military organizational reasons for establishing this command structure. This we do not question. However, from a somewhat less specialized point of view, we can see a number of undesirable implications in the action taken (or about to be taken).

1. Communist Reactions:

The limited purpose of our military buildup in Southeast Asia may have been made abundantly clear publicly and in private approaches to the Soviets. Moscow is, in our view, likely to give credence to the limitations we assert. Peiping and Hanoi, however, are more directly concerned than Moscow, and we think they are apt to view our assertions with a jaundiced eye; they will be quick to draw conclusions from any of our actions which do not, in their view, square with our limited objective. Thus, we believe both Peiping and Hanoi likely at a minimum to regard the establishment of USMACTHAI under General Harkins (with all his other responsibilities) as an indicator of US intent to draw a line in a permanent fashion from Thailand through Laos to South Vietnam. They will believe this not only threatens their position in southern Laos, but their support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam as well. As long as we are not compelled to move US/Thai troops into Laos itself, this conception on their part is of no great significance. If we move into Laos, however, it is almost certain to make them more likely to initiate hostile action against US and Thai troops than we have previously estimated. They would have great difficulty, as we crossed the Mekong into southern Laos, in not concluding that this was the beginning of an effort to pinch off the whole southern panhandle.

2. In US Policy Terms:

In South Vietnam we are assisting a national government in a divided country to check and beat back an insurgency. We are going to great pains to make clear that it is not our war but that of the GVN. With respect to Laos we are mounting a deterrent to further communist territorial encroachment so as to create the conditions in which a new government of national union can be formed and the area neutralized. Only if neutralization proves impossible would we consider armed intercession to effect a de facto partition. US policy is differentiated for the two areas. A central regional military command does not reflect this policy differentiation, and indeed it cuts across the concept. When the new command structure becomes public, the question will be not whether the policy and command problems are different, but whether the policy has changed.

3. In Terms of US Governmental Operations:

In his memorandum of May 29, 1961² the President made it clear that the Ambassador is to “oversee and coordinate all the activities of the US Government” in the country to which he is accredited. An exception was made in the case of “US forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a US area military commander.” It is not clear whether General Harkins becomes a “US area military commander” responsible to another US area military commander (Admiral Felt). If so, some confusion arises as to the responsibility of the Ambassadors in Thailand and South Vietnam (and perhaps eventually in Laos); more importantly this could lead to a greater confusion in policy recommendations from the area, with the JCS claiming a direct line to the President. If not, General Harkins is put in a difficult position of being overseen and coordinated by two (or potentially three) US Ambassadors.

4. In Laos:

Announcement of the command is likely to make it more difficult to persuade Phoumi that US military moves are directed toward making a political solution possible. Equally important, it would tend to reinforce his personal position within the RLG at a time when the US is preparing to reduce his political stature and even to seek his replacement. To Phoumi and others in the RLG the implied linking of US military operations in South Vietnam and Laos would bolster hopes of securing southern Laos. There is recent evidence that Phoumi has this thought the more in mind since the loss of northwestern Laos. It would also strengthen the force of his appeal (“we are fighting the same battle”) for support from South Vietnam and South Korea.

5. In South Vietnam:

Diem is not likely to feel overly sensitive to the broadening of General Harkins’ authority beyond the borders of South Vietnam, and whatever deflation of Saigonʼs stature may be implied will be compensated by the vision it opens for Diem (as for Phoumi) of pinching off southern Laos.

At the popular level, making the senior American military officer in South Vietnam the commander of Southeast Asia plays directly into Communist hands. The war in South Vietnam is a villagers’ war. They are nationalistic and sensitive to the possible reimposition of a colonial regime—this time American. The Viet Cong works hard on this theme, and will now have additional rationale.

6. In Thailand:

The Thais have little interest in the South Vietnamese situation but great interest in protecting their entire border with Laos. Phoumi may well seek to enlist their support in interesting the new USMACTHAI in pinching off southern Laos, but to the extent that they support this thought it will be without prejudice to their interest in protecting their northern borders. The end result could be an expansion of Thai expectations of US actions in their security interest.

7. In Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, Japan, India:

At a minimum there is likely to be immediate and public questioning of US intentions. The bloc will do its best to manipulate the propaganda effects in these countries as adversely to US interest as possible. Sihanouk in particular is likely to be most upset by what to him will appear a hedging in of his country.

Recommendation:

In view of the non-military policy disadvantages we see to the present conception of a command structure in Southeast Asia, we suggest that a more appropriate structure (if military considerations are not overriding) might be based on the following principles:

1. There should be no connection apparent directly between USMACV and our command in Thailand or Joint Task Force 116.

2. The command in Thailand should not be a Military Assistance Command (which obviously parallels our set-up in a totally different situation in South Vietnam).

3. The deterrent buildup should be susceptible to ready dismantling once its purpose has been achieved. It will undoubtedly be difficult vis-à-vis the Thai Government, for example, to retrogress (as they will see it) from USMACTHAI to MAAG once the Southeast Asian buildup has served its hoped-for purpose with respect to Laos. If we really intend to create a long-term USMACTHAI, it should not be done by the back door.

4. Since there is no immediate threat to Thailand, the US forces sent to Southeast Asia in connection with Laos (even if introduced into Thailand) should be under command of (for example) JTF 116. This will tend to dramatize the temporary and limited purpose of their presence in the area.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Laos, Top Secret. Drafted by Neubert (INR/RSB) and Coolidge (INR/RFE).
2. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 271, footnote 5.