Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

190. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam

I believe the time has come to force a confrontation on the role of Hanoi in Southeast Asia and thus bring our Laos and South Vietnam policies clearly into line.

The common stand has been, of course, that we are trying to force the return of North Vietnamese forces to their own borders; but this fact has been obscured in our diplomacy, our military posture towards Laos, and in the public consciousness.

The fact is that the Nam Tha operation and the whole Communist operation in Laos has depended on North Vietnamese forces which are operating extra-legally.

They evidently hope that we either fail to react now or react in such a way as to permit a de facto split which would have the effect of permitting North Vietnam (and probably Communist China) to take over Northern Laos, continue to chew away at a demoralized Southern Laos, and hold the corridor to South Vietnam. This is a bad and unstable outcome which, I would predict, will force us to put U.S. troops into Southeast Asia at a later and more disadvantageous time to protect vital U.S. interests.

I would propose, therefore, that our next moves be designed to put the heat directly on Hanoi—in the context of both Laos and South Vietnam.

Specifically—

1. We should inform Moscow that we are counting on continued Soviet support for the Laos solution agreed between us at the highest level; i.e., a neutral, independent Laos. We have moved the politics of the RLG in this direction and are prepared to move them further. But the role of North Vietnam in Laos, in the context of the Nam Tha engagement, is unacceptable to us, as is the North Vietnam role in South Vietnam.

2. We should inform Hanoi by some reliable route that their role in both Northern Laos and South Vietnam is unacceptable to us; that we are prepared for a neutral and independent Laos and for a return to the Geneva Accords in South Vietnam; but that we shall have to take direct retaliatory action if they continue on their present path.

3. We should move carrier forces into the South China Sea south of the 17th parallel.

4. In addition to the possible movement of the U.S. battalion to the Laos border in Thailand and of naval forces into the Gulf of Siam, we should signal our seriousness of intent by:

(i) a Jungle Jim attack on Tchepone:

(ii) a small but overt Jungle Jim attack on a North Vietnamese rail line. (They have been systematically harassing the South Vietnamese railroads.)

5. We should ask the Australians to inform the Chinese Communists that if the situation in Laos deteriorates they will have to hold up their grain shipments.

6. This line of action is not only based on an assessment of vital U.S. interests but also on an estimate of Soviet, Chinese Communist, and North Vietnamese intentions and capabilities.

Moscow. Soviet behavior suggests that they have agreed to let Hanoi and Peiping experiment with extended aggression in Laos; but there is no indication that they are prepared to let their prestige become involved or their freedom of action be determined by others in a U.S.-Hanoi or U.S.-Peiping military engagement. On the other hand, they have permitted to happen precisely what they promised they would not permit to happen; i.e., a Communist exploitation of our pressure on Phoumi. And this we should not take.

Hanoi. Ho perceives that it may be possible that the U.S. will not react and thus permit a Communist takeover in Laos; but, in any case, he is clear a split would be better than a unified government involving North Vietnamese withdrawal and loss or degradation of the Tchepone corridor. He is persuaded by our actions thus far that he can pursue this game and the game in South Vietnam without endangering his North Vietnam base, since we have reacted to his extra-legal actions only inside Laos and inside the 17th parallel. But his domestic base is weak-weakened by another bad harvest.

Peiping. By reason of its abiding ambitions in Southeast Asia and its desire to lead the Asian Communist movements, Peiping is backing Ho. Basically, however, the Chinese Communist domestic situation has never been so weak. By every indicator, popular morale is bad, people are hungry, industrial production is radically down, and they calculate that for the next years their dependence on Western grain will increase. We have, in fact, within the week two separate indications that we shall soon have a direct indication of Chinese Communist desire to buy U.S. wheat. It seems outlandish, but a first-class Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Hong Kong wrote a piece (which you should read) entitled “Peace for Food.” It suggests that the Chinese Communists have encouraged Nam Tha in order to gain bargaining leverage with the U.S. for a Laos settlement versus a food deal. This is, of course, a long shot; but it is essential to look at the incredible state of the Chinese Communist domestic scene in making our assessment of the proper U.S. course of action.

7. The course I propose is based on the defense of vital U.S. interests, not on pious hopes. We should not undertake it unless we are prepared to back our play. But I believe that if we are bold enough, lucid enough in our communications, and make it clear that Hanoi cannot any longer safely be used as a Communist cats-paw without paying a direct price, we have a fair chance that we can foreshorten both the Laos and Vietnam crises. But down the line, quite conceivably, could be a China grain deal.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Laos. Top Secret. Transmitted to the Secretary of State through the Executive Secretariat.