Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

165. Memorandum for the Record by the Secretary of the Army (Stahr)¹

April 20, 1962

SYNOPSIS OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMYʼS FAR EAST TRIP, 5-20 APRIL 1962

The following summarizes principal impressions of my recent trip to the Far East. I am aware of the dangers of reaching conclusions on the basis of hit-and-run visits, but since I had had fifteen months of daily concern with one aspect or another of our problems in the Far East, and my sources of information were themselves very much attuned to the situations in their own countries, I was able to get quickly to the point in most cases. And, because it was known that I served in Asia with Asian troops two years in World War II, I was received with genuine trust.

[Here follow accounts of Stahrʼs visits to Hawaii, Kwajalein, Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan.]

Saigon—32 hours

Principal persons with whom discussions were held:

• US
  • Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.
  • General Paul D. Harkins
  • Major General C. J. Timmes, Acting Chief, MAAG
• Vietnamese
  • H.E. President Ngo Dinh Diem
  • Hon. Nguyen Dinh Thuan—Secretary of State for the Presidency and Under Secretary for National Defense
  • General Le N. Ty, Chief of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF

Briefed by USMACV; commanders and staffs of I and II Corps, Vietnamese Army; Commanding Officers of Army helicopter and light aviation companies recently deployed to Vietnam.

Principal sites and activities visited: extensive flight from Saigon over a major portion of Vietnam, with stops at Da Nang and Nah Trang.

Comments—I found the President bright and serious and talkative. As is well known, he is unwilling to delegate authority sufficiently and appears adamant about maintaining a dual chain of command for military operations, but he still seems to be far and away the best man for us to rely upon. In this regard I found the feeling among the U.S. on Saigon that those South Vietnamese intellectuals who oppose and criticize Diem seem unable to convert their criticism into any form of constructive assistance. He himself appears to have a very clear grasp of his military problem. He has studied in great detail the causes of the failures of the French and is determined not to repeat them.

My own eyes convinced me that the difficulty of terrain of which I had heard so much for so long is not a myth but very real. It seems to me important that key U.S. decision makers find the time to look for themselves at this country.

The Vietnamese are greatly encouraged by our policy toward them and by our strong support. Slowly but surely they are working out the techniques of counter-insurgency and of civic action. They seem fully aware of the importance of associating the ideas of military and civic actions in the minds of the villagers. They also realize the importance of training villagers to perform civil guard and self-defense roles and are facing up to the tough problem of having to keep the villages protected while simultaneously conducting the training for the civil guard and self-defense units. Gradually they are learning to use the new techniques which we are making possible, such as the use of helicopters and direction finding equipment. In this regard our buildup in their country is very fast by their standards; we must be a little patient as they try to assimilate the new resources and absorb the related operational techniques.

The Armed Forces of South Vietnam are committed to a larger degree than I had realized to the village defense and counter-insurgency roles. They are so spread-eagled by these deployments that a conventional attack by major units of the North Vietnam Armed Forces would present them with a hard choice between concentrating to meet the conventional threat (knowing full well that the rear areas would immediately erupt with increased Vietcong activities), or alternatively, pitting small regular Army forces against greatly superior conventional forces of North Vietnam. As I see it, this clearly adds up to a requirement for us to prepare to come quickly to their assistance if they are jumped by conventional forces from North Vietnam. Ground combat troops could be supplied by, e.g., the GRC and ROK, but our Naval and Air Forces could play very important roles.

With respect to Laos, their “open back door,” they were too polite to complain openly about our policy but referred over and over to the extreme difficulty of cleaning up their country while the Vietcong have such an opportune means of access. One of the South Vietnamese pointed out the analogy of Greece, making the point that only when Tito closed his border and denied the guerrillas both access and sanctuary were the Greeks able to eradicate them from their country.

The Army of South Vietnam impressed me as one which, though certainly not up to the standards of the Korean much less the Chinese Nationalist, is nonetheless very promising. It has some good young officers and mostly needs continued good training and experienced leadership. Within the Army there is a recognition that the struggle will be long and difficult, but, possibly for the first time, they believe there is reason to be quietly optimistic about the long pull. General Harkins has taken hold well. He spends much time in the field and is at once firm and friendly in his dealings with the Vietnamese. He and Ambassador Nolting work well together.

There were a few random impressions worth noting. The feeling was expressed by Minister Thuan that the mainland Chinese (and other Asians) have not been so brainwashed as to have lost a basic good will toward the United States. They are practical people who have duly noted our according independence to the Philippines and who remember such things. He further expressed the opinion that now is the time for the ChiNats to hit the ChiComs, a feeling which he says he distinctly did not have at the time of Quemoy and Matsu. He bases this estimate on his assessment of the bad conditions in China and also North Vietnam. He added that the ChiComs are putting the squeeze on North Vietnam in the same way the Russians are squeezing the ChiComs. He said that the full impact of our decision to keep South Vietnam free is greater than we may realize. He believes it has actually recreated an opportunity to free Southeast Asia from communism. He indicated quite spontaneously that his country is very happy with Ambassador Nolting and that the Thais like Ambassador Young.

A high-ranking and apparently able and astute Vietnamese officer expressed his concern that we seem content to remain strategically, strictly on the defensive in the field of guerrilla warfare. He pointed out that there is always a great disparity in numbers between those who fight as guerrillas and those who play the role of counter-guerrillas (ratios of counter-guerrillas to guerrillas normally range from 10 to 1 to 20 or more to 1). He reasoned from this basic fact that we must necessarily ourselves become the guerrillas and place the onus on the communists to provide the much larger numbers of counter-guerrillas.

[Here follow accounts of Stahrʼs visits to Japan and Alaska.]

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Departments and Agencies, Army, 1961-1962. Secret. The source text provides no indication of the date of preparation.