Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

164. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, April 19, 1962—6 p.m.

3313. For Harriman. Reference: Saigonʼs 140 to New Delhi, sent Department 109.² While I have no desire to extend my range of concern I continue think that South Vietnam is our most dangerous problem and I would take strong exception to reference telegram. While respecting your judgment as to the timing of any conference, the latter could be extremely useful in moving this from a military to a diplomatic solution and search for diplomatic solutions is after all the business of diplomacy.³ In different ways offensively and defensively the Geneva accords are being violated on both sides of the line. It could well be the business of the conference to consider ways of getting full observance⁴ and the effect of course would be to focus world public opinion on the issue and as the Laos cease-fire has shown this can have a restraining influence.

I also take strong exception to the cliché which is so persistently damaging in our diplomacy that we must subordinate our policy to whatever will maintain the confidence of the regime to which we are accredited. This leads us to the absurdity that any action, however sensible, may undermine confidence if it doesn’t fit the particular preferences of the government we are supporting. Nolting suggests that confidence of Vietnam people and war with Viet Cong may begin to waver if we show disposition to diplomatic discussion. In fact they should never be in any doubt about our preference for diplomatic settlement.

Finally I confess to some concern over the attitudes exemplified in the first paragraph of reference telegram. If we must fear losing our position vis-à-vis a government as utterly dependent on our military and charitable support as that of Diem our diplomacy is in a sorry condition. And if we can only inspire confidence by emphasizing willingness to fight war we are in even worse shape and ought to get Dulles back to take charge. I would also note typical tendency in telegram to identify the people with Diem and vice versa, an identification which no close observer of the South Vietnam scene can take seriously.

Galbraith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-1962. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Document 158.
3. Next to this sentence were written the words “Not entirely.”
4. Next to this sentence were written the words “DRV pull-out.”