340. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)1
SUBJECT
- Vietnamese Command Problem
CINCPAC’s message to you, 232137Z [232135Z] December 1961,2 outlines the problem of President Diem giving control authority to Big Minh as his military field commander, when Diem is apprehensive of a coup. CINCPAC then solicited your help to get State to direct Ambassador Nolting to make a concerted approach to Diem with General McGarr.
In CINCPAC’s proposal, as in other comments on this problem, I have yet to note anyone come up with an answer to Diem’s apprehension. It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do, and this basic point needs resolving. How are Nolting and McGarr to reassure him on this point?
U.S. policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President. We know that Big Minh has been outspoken about a coup. Diem certainly knows about the way Big Minh has been talking, also. Now we ask Diem to give practical control of his military force to a man who has talked about a coup. What realistic assurances can we give Diem that the action he fears won’t take place?
It would seem that the increased U.S. military stake in Viet-Nam should afford some means for stabilizing the political relationships within the Vietnamese Armed Forces long enough for all concerned to get on with the war. Armed with facts about such a political stability, Nolting and McGarr should have little trouble in getting Diem to play ball.
Brigadier General, USAF
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Viet-Nam 1961-2 Dec. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were also sent to McNamara, Gilpatric, and Heinz. Printed also in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 427.↩
- Document 337.↩