Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

337. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr)¹

Honolulu, December 23, 1961, 11:35 a.m.

232135Z. Military Operations in SVN. A. My 060247Z. B. Your 140914Z. C. Your 210957Z. D. Your 190651Z.²

1. Your recommended modifications of ref A contained in ref B are approved for inclusion in plan.

2. I note in ref C that Gen Minh has not been able to convey purpose and intent of ref A, which has resulted in backfire for Minh. I still believe ref A necessary instrument for bringing about effective coordinate RVNAF action against Viet Cong. In this premise, I feel you should discuss with Amb Nolting a personal approach to Diem, possibly in company, to attempt to overcome Diem’s objection to our plan. It should be explained to Diem that the plan and command arrangements therein were designed by me to fulfill requirements for efficient control of military operations. He should be reassured in most earnest terms that we have no motive other than to counsel a military campaign plan and control arrangements therefore designed to attain the objective of mutual interest to his government and ours to lick the Viet Cong.

3. Unless effective command arrangements based on a clear-cut delegation of authority as set forth in ref A are established for military operations in South Vietnam, it is doubtful that US/GVN military goals for defeating Viet Cong can be realized in foreseeable time frame. Para 3 of ref D provides additional ammunition for our case in selling Diem on a campaign plan that puts mobile, hard-hitting forces, efficiently organized and commanded, against VC at proper time and place. Concerning this plan, and other important military policies and operations, I cannot overemphasize the necessity for personal contact and discussion with Diem in lieu of letters or memoranda. I have distinct impression that at times the written word is misinterpreted and takes on erroneous connotations. Therefore, suggest in this type negotiation you rely primarily on personal discussion attempting to insure that Diem and his principals clearly understand your purpose and intent.

4. Discussion during SecDef meeting 16 Dec desirability of getting on with a smaller, more readily-accomplished operation was emphasized because of possible delay in developing and implementing GVN version of ref A. There is vital need for early GVN victory, both for military and psychological reasons. Therefore, while continuing to press for our campaign plan and for zone D operations, we should devote immediate effort toward mounting a smaller operation that has a chance for early success and will contribute to zone “D” problem. Further, that for such operation a single province should be selected for clearing and holding. Plan should not be developed on basis that operations will depend on defoliation. Further, zone “D” plan itself should be modified to de-emphasize reliance on defoliants.

5. My staff has been working to provide you an assist on plan for securing a single province. Outline plan quoted below is in line with decision made by SecDef. Unless you have a better plan, request you use your influence to get it implemented. Use soft sell as indicated above.

6. Begin province plan:

[Here follow four pages describing in outline form a plan for “a timely, aggressive, coordinated military operation to secure early GVN control of Binh Duong Province in II Corps Tactical Zone.”]

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, 12/ 19/61-12/23/61. Top Secret. Repeated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JACK AJCC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and PACAF. A notation in the margin of the source text indicates that it was a copy furnished to Bromley Smith and McGeorge Bundy.
2. Reference A, Felt’s telegram 060247Z, December 6, contained an outline of a campaign plan for systematic armed action against the Viet Cong, with instructions to McGarr that unless he saw deficiencies in the plan, he should “sell it to General Minh as a plan he can use as his own.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center Microfilm, Reel 10714) Reference B has not been found. Reference C is Document 333. Reference D, McGarr’s telegram 190651Z, December 19, described the revised estimate of the Viet Cong threat in the area from the 17th parallel to Zone D which Diem had given McGarr and Nolting in their talk on December 14. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center Microfilm. Reel 10718).