Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

339. Memorandum From the Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in Viet-Nam (Anspacher) to the Ambassador in Viet-Nam (Nolting)¹

Saigon, December 23, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Conversations with USIA (Mr. Murrow) in Washington

As suggested earlier, here is a brief list of topics which should occupy whatever time you find you can spend with Mr. Murrow during your stay in Washington.

1. Foremost, if not most important is, of course, the question of unauthorized “leaks” in Washington. I am assuming that the leaks are not authorized-that some individuals are simply talking too much. It may well be that the Department of State feels it is important to broach certain ideas to the American people, but it would be most helpful if they would notify us too. My own feeling of course is that we should go as far as possible with the press both here and in Washington on an agree-upon basis-within the ICC limitations. It would seem to me most appropriate to go back to what was laid down in the original guidance cables and work up from there on a “non-attributable” basis. We should be able to deal with almost any subject that comes along if we all observe those clearly stated principles.

2. Although I can describe ideas as to what USIS can do in the present situation in VietNam, I think some exploration along those lines with Mr. Murrow would be helpful. For example, there is much that needs to be done for and with the GVN which basically lies in the USOM bailiwick. However, the fact of the matter is-and USOM would be the first to admit it-that the talents are not always available there. We are solving part of the problem through the Psychological Operations Committee, of course. But I am concerned that effective psychological/information operations (as part of the war effort) require more and closer professional advisory assistance to the GVN at a coordinated Presidency level. I am thinking also in terms of provincial “information officers” who might pass as administrative advisors to provincial councils, let us say, or even as teachers. Ordinarily USOM would provide such personnel, I presume, but I am not sure that USOM is prepared to do so. On the other hand, the kind of people we need are those who are ordinarily allied with USIA. Perhaps of Peace Corps type technicians, under whatever name (IVS, for example), might suggest how we can put our talents and our resources together in terms of field operations, as well as professional advisory assistance at the Saigon level.

In this connexion, I talked with the British Counselor (J.A. Burrows) today about just such matters. As an old BIS hand, he is not only interested but anxious to contribute BIS help wherever possible, with our concurrence. He is drafting a letter to the FO about the critical weaknesses in the information/propaganda effort, suggesting that his people and ours (such as Ed Murrow) consider this as seriously as we do and prepare to do something about it. A sample proposal: a week-long Murrow visit here to “survey” the GVN’s needs and offer ideas to satisfy them, such as an advisor to the “program planning board” at the Presidency referred to earlier, and professional personnel to advise (if not do) in the provinces. According to Burrows, the British might be in a position to help in this, …, when it’s operational.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Since you have indicated you are probably going to discuss at least the Newsweek story² in Washington, this is perhaps an appropriate context in which to inject my comments, albeit belatedly:

It seems to me we are extending ourselves in the interest of the GVN into an area of complaint and protest against activities in the U.S. over which we have always maintained we have no control, and little influence. Would it not seem more logical for the GVN Ambassador in Washington to raise such issues, rather we [than us?]? This could apply equally to the VOA broadcast, although the question of “control” obviously does not apply in the same way here. My own impression is that by eliminating brief news reports of events which are likely to attract both U.S. and foreign attention anyway, VOA would find it almost impossible to maintain its role as a news medium, especially for those populations cut off, for one reason or another, from normal mass media communications.

We appear to be in danger of getting caught in the web of somewhat conflicting principles. We cannot do more with the image of the GVN than is made available by the GVN itself; in other words, unless we rely on distortion, whatever we mirror will be a reflection of the face the GVN presents to the world. I would imagine that this conviction has prompted USIA’s suggestion that we take up the censorship question with the GVN for the umpteenth time. If we were to do this while at the same time we are more or less assuring the GVN that the U.S. will try to “discourage” some elements of the American press, it seems to me we would appear to be talking out of both sides of our mouths at the same time. I don’t mind trying to discourage Newsweek, for example, but I don’t think we need to put ourselves in this position, more or less, with various GVN officials.

5. The question of TV may arise during your conversations with Mr. Murrow since, as you remember, his Deputy, Don Wilson, spent two hours talking to President Diem about it.³ In reviewing the recommendations of the Trueheart committee on this subject,⁴ you might want to amplify what we had agreed upon beyond the terms of the recommendation made to you. To set the record straight, USIS is intensely anxious to encourage the development of more and better communications with the village populations. TV seems, at first glance, to be an ideal way of doing this but the logistic and technical problems, if not the financial factor, justifiably suggest postponement of such a project. Since the need still exists, however, it would seem logical to press forward urgently with the proposed alternative calling for the distribution of 16mm film projectors and screens in those areas where the communication problem is most critical. I should like to add that at some date in the future, when the existing problems re TV can be solved, it would still appear to me, as it does now in principle, as a most effective communications technique.

6. Finally, could you persuade President Kennedy to broadcast a message via VOA (translated into Vietnamese using the fade-over technique) to ALL the Vietnamese people on the occasion of Tey [Tet?], 1962? We could use this locally, of course, but it would also reach some audience in North Vietnam. A greeting in French in the President’s own voice would help start it off. too.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 33s, Program Direction. Confidential.
2. Not further identified.
3. Wilson apparently visited Viet-Nam in late September or early October 1961, but no record of his meeting with Diem has been found.
4. Not further identified.