320. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Bill: I appreciate the difficulties you outlined in your letter of December 72 in providing expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps. I can also appreciate why the employment of GRC special forces might provide a possible solution, from a strictly technical point of view.
On the other hand, this solution raises certain difficult problems.
[Page 734]- 1.
- In most free countries the prospect of ChiNats fighting on the mainland of Asia raises the specter of opening a “Pandora’s Box”.
- 2.
- As you know, quite apart from whether Chinese are Communists or Nationalists, prejudice against them is strong throughout Southeast Asia, including VietNam, even though the GVN is apparently receptive to accepting some of them in the present emergency.
- 3.
- One of our objectives in Viet-Nam is to assist the Vietnamese to counter successfully the Communist-directed insurgency without attracting substantial ChiCom intervention. The introduction of ChiNats would certainly in some degree increase this hazard.
For the above reasons, I believe we should not introduce ChiNat forces into Viet-Nam at this time but should continue to explore other alternatives.
For instance, I believe we should closely examine whether interpreters are indispensable. Experience in the police training programs in VietNam, which may be similar to the individual and small unit training required for the Self Defense Corps, indicates that interpreters are not indispensable.
Additionally, we might examine the possibilities of getting experts from Malaya, the Philippines or Thailand, who are experienced in this work.
Another possibility might be to obtain a more precise estimate of the nature and extent of the training required through the results of our provincial survey teams, which are about to commence their investigations. We may find that training and equipping the Self Defense Corps should be done progressively in areas which become “white”, closely following an integrated plan of clearing areas, setting up Civil Guard units and ARVN back-up for quick reaction when the Self Defense Corps gives the alarm. An immediate nationwide on-the-spot training in white, pink, or red areas may invite serious trouble for the program.
Our relative success in Laos with Mobile Training Teams suggests the idea of traveling teams to train, advise, and equip rather than “on-the-spot” training by a large number of trainers scattered thinly in villages, vulnerable to VC attack.
The above thoughts are offered as possible alternatives which I believe should be explored before we consider utilizing GRC forces. Of course, if Chinese Communist forces are introduced into Viet-Nam this would substantially change the situation.
Sincerely,