Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

294. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report¹

Washington, November 28, 1961.

… Subject: Views of Ngo Dinh Nhu on Vietnamese American relations.

1. On 27 November 1961, Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother and political advisor to President Diem, said that he had called Director General of Information Tran Van Tho that morning and advised him that he thought it improper that the Vietnamese press criticize the American Government. He said he fully understood their annoyance at American press stories of conditions being imposed upon the Vietnamese Government, unfair criticisms, etc. Nhu said that he had told Tho that Vietnamese criticisms of such statements were fair if addressed to the authors of the statements but not at a friendly government. He stated that this was a matter of simple justice and should not be interpreted as a decision by the Vietnamese Government not to insult the American Government for political reasons. He then added that it is most important that neither the Americans nor the Government of Viet-Nam (GV) be isolated by Communist propaganda whose primary objective is to isolate the Vietnamese Government from its people and the Americans from their companions in the Free World. …

2. Nhu stated that the difficulties between Vietnamese and Americans can be laid at the door of the Free World’s lack of any coherent concept of the development of an underdeveloped country toward democracy. He contrasted this with the definite stages by which the Communists view their political program. The Communists view an independent country as moving along a clear path to include the following four states: (a) neutrality, (b) anti Free World, (c) pro Soviet bloc, (d) popular democracy. It is this concept of stages which enables the Communist world to accept with no criticism, conditions or other harassment a country such as Cambodia in the neutral stage, the efforts to create a neutral Laos, and the situation of other underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia. While the Free World looks toward Laotian neutrality, for instance, as an objective, the Communists are content to consider it as one step toward the eventual goal. This concept of progression toward Communist control also explains the discipline of a Communist party in a country such as Cambodia when instructed to support the government in power.

3. In contrast, the Free World has only one step it expects any underdeveloped country to make. It expects it to move from the stage of underdevelopment to full-blooming democracy in one jump. The impossibility of such an abrupt change, the chaos which ensues when it is attempted and lack of understanding of this fact between the country itself and outside observers all lead to considerable lack of confidence and criticism between the Free World and the underdeveloped country. The greatest need in the Free World today is a clear concept of stages through which underdeveloped countries are expected to progress so that premature expectations of democracy will not destroy confidence between free nations. While this problem applies to Vietnam, it applies with equal force to other underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia.

4. Nhu stated that one of the first requirements of this progression is a step toward land reform and land resettlement, to give each citizen a plot of land of his own and a feeling of economic security. At the same time, like the tribes of Israel moving through the desert toward the promised land, the flame of future ideal, the Ark of the Covenant, must be kept in full view at all times. This eventual goal will give cohesion and force to the progress of the underdeveloped country through its necessary stages. In Viet-Nam this cohesive force is provided by the philosophical underpinnings of the Can Lao party, i.e. personalism, community life and collective improvement. A similar philosophical base must be found in every underdeveloped country moving through its necessary stages.

5. Nhu said that the problem of bringing about [garble] precision of these stages is one which calls for priority effort by the political theorists and thinkers of the best American institutions. Only if such a planned progression is achieved will we be able to avoid in the long term the misunderstandings and criticisms which have marked the press of Viet-Nam and the United States with regard to each other in recent times.

6. Nhu stated that the Taylor visit and its results reminded him of an incident which brought the delay of the arming and training of the Civil Guard. This occurred in 1956 [?] when Ho Thong Minh, then Minister of Defense, advised General Lawton Collins that President Diem had no support within the army. As a result, he said, the President planned to create a private army in the Civil Guard, which would give him control of the situation. General Collins understandably accepted this statement of a minister of the government and as a result assistance to the Civil Guard was passed to United States Operations Mission (USOM) and Michigan State University (MSU) which did not prepare it to become a paramilitary force for local defense. As a result of this comment by a minister, therefore, the training of the most important arm for anti-guerrilla operations was delayed a number of years. Nhu said that it was quite clear that General Taylor had been exposed to similar comments from very high officials in the government and from outsiders. The results of their criticisms are now being imposed on the President despite their errors. Nhu also said he had the impression that General Taylor’s mind was made up before he came to Vietnam, as his investigations were quite limited.

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1. Source: USAMHI, Kraemer Papers, VN 61-63. Confidential; Noforn/Continued Control.