293. Letter From the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to General Samuel T. Williams1
Mon General—Warm thanks for your letter.2
Upon return here, the boss had another crash project for me to work on,3 so I’ve been quite apart from most of the follow-through of the Taylor group’s reports and activities. I’ve had to keep one eye cocked on it, but it hasn’t been enough-as perhaps you’ve seen in the press.
One of the conclusions drawn in town, and both Taylor &Rostow say it isn’t one of theirs (although I’m suspicious) is that we cannot help the VN win against the VC as long as a dictator (Diem) holds power. So, one of the thoughts being ginned up is that I go over as his personal advisor and, presumably, clobber him from up close. I pointed out that this was a duty without honor and I’d be dammed if I’d do that.4 Now I’m being asked about you, whether [Page 688] you’re free to become involved in VN affairs. I’m not certain if there’s a connection between these two things, so this is just a little personal alert.
In a memorandum of November 25 to McNamara, William Bundy wrote, among other things, that McGarr sent two messages through special channels reporting Diem’s disappointment that no decision had been reached regarding Lansdale’s return. Bundy had gathered from these messages and other indications that McGarr favored Lansdale’s return. Bundy himself concluded, “In spite of the importance of Ed’s assignment, I think he belongs in Vietnam, where he is of unique value.” (Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron; also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 Book 11, p. 422)
In a telephone call to Taylor at 12:11 p.m. on November 27, Rusk “suggested getting Lansdale out right away… not in lieu of the amb but to brief him and Diem.” The conversation continued, “We did have in mind bringing Nolting back if we did not see better response from Diem. T is getting uneasy and hopes the response from Diem would so indicate this. The Sec said but it might be well for L to get out before we get too wrong a response. T is concerned it would be viewed as his being a second amb. The Sec thinks that can be explained. T mentioned getting L from the AG for this and the Sec said it would not be for too long.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
Between midday November 27 and 30, a decision was made not to send Lansdale, for in a memorandum of November 30 to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy wrote that the President’s question of why Lansdale was the only man available for Viet-Nam was “probably moot at the moment.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Drawer, Memos to the President)
I do hope there is some sound way of getting you into the act on VN, because the situation there needs the best we have.
Diem has been getting worn out by all the vicious attacks on him. The first evening I was there, he looked really down in the dumps-so I told him to go to bed instead of talking to me. During the next several days, I went to work to keep him up, and he started becoming the fighter we knew of yore. However, these latest attacks on him-seemingly stemming from the Taylor group-apparently really got him down. Also, the wording of some of the U.S. proposals made it look as though the U.S. was going to act the same way the French have. I jumped back into the act long enough last night to try to straighten out this aspect.
The VC war is getting real rough. Your successor seems to be fighting it with memos, with the result that he has lost much of his influence with Diem, Thuan, etc. I urged Thuan to work with him more closely and Thuan pointed to a big stack of papers and said: that’s what I got the last time I asked for some help.
A number of our VN army friends have told me that Thuan is a jerk and no good. He and Diem have said much the same about some of their generals. I tried to explain to all that they had to work together in a team and that suffering casualties always creates emotional stress-which is the real basis for any falling out in a situation like theirs.
[Page 689]I’m afraid that another coup might get ginned up, despite present U.S. attitudes locally against it. If so, it could lead to real disaster.
Incidentally, Diem, Thuan, and the others think highly of Fritz Nolting. Too bad you didn’t have someone like him as ambassador while you were there.
We probably will be boosting our help by a lot more men, money, & material. However, what’s really lacking is something of the spirit, something of leadership qualities on our part, which would give meaning to our aid. It’s pure hell to be on the sidelines and seeing so conventional and unimaginative an approach being tried. About all I can do is continue putting in my two-bits worth every chance I get to add a bit of spark to the concepts. I’m afraid that these aren’t always welcome.
Rather than end this on a gloomy downbeat, let’s noodle out how to lick the crowd. One of the main problems is here at home, with Washington being only one phase. Do you feel up to entering the fray again—against folks of Durbrow’s ilk—but much subtler? I’ll see what I can noodle out for a sound place and way to do battle, if you feel up to it.
Warmest and best wishes, as always,
- Source: Hoover Institution Archives, Williams Papers, 1961 Letters. Handwritten by Lansdale.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Lansdale was asked by Attorney General Robert Kennedy to work on a project relating to Cuba.↩
- In a memorandum to the President of November 23, the President’s Naval Aide, Tazewell T. Shepard, wrote, “You wished to be reminded to discuss with Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer: (1) Why is Brigadier General Lansdale the only man available?” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Drawer, Memos to the President)↩