Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

292. Paper Prepared by Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, November 28, 1961.

• “1. The information which follows, and is attached, refers to the current planning for political contingencies in South VietNam, specifically to coup possibilities.
• “2. In the past two months, State has forwarded, on a very closely held basis, a letter to Ambassador Nolting outlining possible alternatives to Diem who the US might support. In response to the events of the past two weeks, State is now reviewing the situation. A new letter is being drafted which in present form identifies Tho and Thuan as possible new heads of state, lays down the premise that political exiles not be supported, and develops certain foreseeable coup situations. (This information is secondhand and while accurate may not be complete.)
• “3. As a related study, and to expand on the more narrow State effort, Bob Johnson prepared a paper on coupe. This is attached; a copy has been sent to Alexis Johnson. It lays out possible situations and develops certain tentative conclusions. In doing so, an argument is made that Amb. Nolting should stay in Saigon immediately following any negative answer from Diem.
• “I suggest you read the attached paper in its entirety.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69) The letter to Nolting which Bagley referred to is Document 181.

POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES IN VIET NAM

Alternative Situations

I. As a result of Nolting’s new efforts, Diem accepts the conditions we have laid down.

II. Diem does not accept the conditions and one of the following occurs:

A. No coup attempt, or, if there is one, it is defeated by Diem.

B. A coup led by experienced ARVN officers which might put Tho or Thuan at the head of the government.

C. A coup led by Nhu which uses Can Lao members of the ARVN officer corps as front men.

D. A coup which fails to put any single individual or group in charge, but results in a continuing struggle for power.

Like all such lists, the above list does not exhaust the possible permutations. In particular, various intermediate situations are possible. Some of these are covered in the discussion below

Discussion

Alternative I: If this occurs, our problems will by no means be solved. It is quite possible that we will get a formal agreement from Diem which he will then fail to carry out. Indeed, he may offer us such formal assurances for the precise purpose of heading off a coup and giving him time to organize to prevent such a coup. This time we cannot give Diem nearly as much time to perform as we have given him in the past. If it is evident within the following month or six weeks that he is not going to perform we will have to consider whether we should make an effort to have him replaced. If it becomes evident that he is buying time in order to build his defenses against a coup, we will have to move even more quickly.

Alternative II-A: If this occurs it will probably be because of one or a combination of three circumstances: (a) the military lacks the will and determination to mount a coup; (b) the U.S. fails to give a clear signal that it will support a coup group; or (c) Diem manages to find sufficient forces loyal to him to prevent coup plans from succeeding. This kind of a situation could be most difficult of all. We would be in a stand-off in our relations. The worst variant (though perhaps an unlikely one) would be one where we had become identified with a coup attempt that had failed. Our relations with Diem would then be at almost dead end. Under other variants, not including U.S. identification with an unsuccessful coup effort, we would have to consider such possibilities as simply withdrawing our offer of additional aid and attempting to revert to the status quo ante or attempting to develop a different kind of package which we would attempt to sell to Diem.

Alternative II-B: This would be the best of the alternative coup possibilities. What should be the U.S. role in bringing about such a state of affairs? The evidence suggests that all we will probably have to do to ensure that a coup takes place is to indicate clearly, but in an indirect fashion, that we will support a coup effort. In giving such indication, we might be well advised to indicate that we would much prefer an arrangement which provided for the constitutional succession of Vice President Tho.

What we do need to do positively in such a situation is to avoid the possibility that either alternative situation II-C or II-D would occur. Our control over troop dispositions which might bring Can Lao-officered units into Saigon to prevent a coup would be very limited. However, we should be able to do something about insuring that Vice President Tho is protected against assassination. Nhu would probably make him the first target of any move since he is the obvious successor. Nhu has already done his utmost to downgrade him.

Another possible danger that must be guarded against is that the Communists will exploit the situation to create confusion. We ought to have prepared now a very full appreciation of just how much trouble the Communists could create. My own belief is that they would not be able to move in and take over militarily. I also believe that it is highly doubtful that they have the capability to insinuate any of their followers into high positions in a coup party. They might exploit a situation of uncertainty (alternative II-D) to produce a period of chaos which would result in an early Communist takeover.

In the light of the above, the U.S. may have relatively little direct role to play. Our most important action will be to make clear that we will go along with a coup.

If this analysis is correct, we would not be well advised to pull our ambassador out and put Lansdale in Saigon if Diem refuses to sign on the dotted line. If we can get the kind of coup we want without evidence of overt U.S. involvement, we shall be better off than if we are clearly identified with a coup group. No matter how unpopular Diem may be and no matter how popular his successors, our identification with the change would be a definite drawback in Viet Nam and in the world at large. No government in a situation like that in Viet Nam is going to remain tremendously popular for very long. Moreover, in the larger arena of our relations with the rest of the world such identification could convert the situation in Viet Nam into one like that in Laos making it appear to be a straight U.S.-Bloc struggle for power with the Vietnamese as mere pawns. Our identification with the change may be an immediate bonus, but a long-term disadvantage. It would also involve a heavy additional commitment of U.S. prestige which may or may not be advantageous. If we send Lansdale when Nolting leaves, the coup will inevitably be viewed as another CIA effort since he is so clearly identifiable in the area.

Nolting himself should stay in Viet Nam long enough to “pass the word”. It is most important that it be passed in a way that gives it an authoritative coloration.

I am not altogether convinced that Nolting needs to leave in order to dramatize the breakdown in our relations and the need for change. The situation will be known quickly enough within the GVN without such action. There would be a real advantage in having him there to direct our responses in the event a coup occurs. Unfortunately the DCM is so new to that part of the world that he would be in great difficulty. If we want to indicate our displeasure we should be able to find other ways to communicate it. Nolting’s absence could conceivably deter a coup by the military. To sum up, I believe that, even if we go through with plans to withdraw Nolting, such withdrawal might better be deferred for a time to permit him to have some influence on developments that occur subsequent to his withdrawal.

Because of the disadvantages of U.S. identification, any military moves should be relatively unostentatious. We might, at some crucial stage, let coup leaders know privately that we were prepared to fly in forces, without putting such forces in a publicly visible position off the coast.

Alternative II-C: This alternative would create a worse situation than we have now. Nhu is much less popular than Diem. He would probably run a very repressive regime and would probably be most difficult to deal with. Moreover, if he were in control, the political situation might become even more unstable. There would probably be extensive purges and counter-coup plotting. The likelihood of a coup by Nhu succeeding is probably fairly low because he is so universally disliked. However, the potential role of the Can Lao is difficult to assess. What is more likely is a temporary Nhu success followed by a counter-coup by the experienced military officers. Such a development could produce the situation envisaged in Alternative Il-D.

Alternative II-D: A struggle for power could involve any or all of five elements-Diem, the regular ARVN officers, Nhu and the Can Lao, the Communists and the sects (which might be armed by any of the other three). Such a struggle could create a situation most favorable to the Communists. If we should support a coup effort by the officers, it would be most important to assure that it succeeded quickly and cleanly. One of the first objectives would therefore have to be the effective neutralization of Nhu. He would be the most immediate threat.

If there is any serious hitch indicating the possibility of success by the opposition, we may have to move quickly with military force. But couldn’t the necessary forces (which would not have to be very large) be kept in the Philippines or some considerable distance offshore and flown into Saigon?

Recommendations

1. We should obtain an intelligence appreciation of possible alternative developments. In order to keep distribution limited, it may be necessary to ask for a CIA appreciation rather than a coordinated estimate. The appreciation should deal with the probable role of the four principal power groupings (army, Nhu and the Can Lao, the Communists and the sects), and of Diem himself.

2. A high-level limited attendance meeting should discuss U.S. policy in various possible situations at a very early date. We should not wait for the outcome of our latest démarche to have such a discussion. The arguments above are intended to be provocative rather than dogmatic. They are based upon judgments that need to be examined.

Robert H. Johnson²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2561. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A copy of this paper was attached to a memorandum of November 30 from Bagley to Taylor, which reads:
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.