Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

295. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report¹

Washington, November 29, 1961.

… Subject: Views of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

1. On 27 November 1961, President Ngo Dinh Diem said that the mission of General Maxwell D. Taylor to South Viet-Nam was somewhat similar to the mission of General Marshall to China. In the latter case, General Marshall insisted that Chiang Kai-shek divide his power with the Liberal Party, which had no authority and represented nothing but a few intellectuals. The American position after the Taylor Mission was completed bears similarities, as it apparently wishes to impose some sort of liberalization or change upon the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) which is not suited to the present situation or the Government’s structure. Diem said that he had been trying for a long time to build the infra-structure of a democratic system in South Viet-Nam but that he was faced with two major obstacles, the war being waged by the Vietnamese Communists, and the difficulty of finding loyal and efficient cadres for the GVN.

2. President Diem stated that he was conscious of the demand that “emergency” action be taken and this he had tried to accomplish. When discussing the specifics of “emergency” actions with such political figures as Pham Huy Quat, leader of the Front for National Unity, however, the President found nothing but vague and irrelevant ideas about giving greater freedom propounded. He found that such figures as Dr. Quat actively refused to accept the real “emergency” actions necessary, such as immediate and severe punishment of treason and cowardice in the face of the enemy. He planned in the next few days to establish provincial councils, but these would not be elected in the beginning but would be appointed from non-party people in the area. A similar technique was used in forming the National Economic Council which was nominated by various interest groups. It was delayed by the difficulties of finding labor representatives who were anything but Communist. Meanwhile oppositionists such as Pham Huy Quat were currying favor with potential foreign sponsors instead of helping the country to fight during this period.

3. Another drawback to the Taylor Report recommendations was the experience of the GVN with the Staley Report, which was delivered with great fanfare and indicated that all sorts of additional assistance would be forthcoming. The promised increase in American support had not materialized to date. Diem stated that he had taken steps to devaluate the recommendations.

4. The Vietnamese newspapers were commenting on the conditions stated in the Taylor Report, according to Diem, and the press revealed the depth of the antagonism of thinking Vietnamese to any conditions which they believed limited GVN sovereignty. Diem knew that his advisers and cabinet members would feel so strongly on this subject that he had not exposed the specifics of the Taylor recommendations to more than one or two individuals. (Field comment. Assistant Secretary of National Defense and Secretary of State at the Presidency Nguyen Dinh Thuan stated on 27 November that President Diem’s attitude was appropriately described as “frustrated” by the convergence of problems upon him, including what he deemed the unreality of the Taylor conditions; the extreme difficulty in locating appropriate individuals to whom power could be delegated and who would accept it; the pressures of the war; and, the fact that he had carefully consulted his Cabinet, National Assembly members, and other advisers on the desirability of receiving American troops, and now faced a difficult problem in re-orienting them.)

5. President Diem also expressed considerable fury and bafflement at how to handle American press representatives. He realized the importance of the American press influence, but insisted that it should assume responsibility commensurate with its power, and should also realize that the backdrop to the Vietnamese scene being reported is the Vietnamese Communist attack. He complained that if he did not give an interview to a foreign newsman, the latter criticized him for ignoring foreign newsmen, but that if he did give the interview, the reporter used almost nothing told to him and criticized the length of the interview. …

6. President Diem said that he intended to go ahead with extra financial expenditures and has instructed Thuan to find the necessary 600 million plasters, of which 40 million would be for Self Defense Corps equipment, 60 million would be to pay village notables, etc.

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1. Source: USAMHI, Kraemer Papers, VN 61 63. Confidential, Noforn/Continued Control.