Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

250. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)¹

Washington, November 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

• The Draft National Security Action Memo for South Viet Nam dated November 13, 1961²

I have only a fairly general understanding of the discussion on which the draft action memo is based, but there are certain aspects of the memo which give me some trouble.

I. General

Military Intervention. I fear that we are losing a strategic moment for the introduction of U.S. troop units. The world has been made aware of the crisis in Viet Nam as a result of the Taylor mission. Both the Bloc and the Free World are going to look upon the actions we take now as the key to our future actions no matter what we may say. A plate glass window on the 17th parallel or a flood relief task force could make a great political difference not only in Viet Nam, but in the whole area. Such intervention later might have much less political effect and may have to be on a much larger scale to have military effect. In any event, in the interim uncertainty as to our intentions will grow.

I am concerned about the relationship between our actions and the diplomatic noises we propose to make. Have we really decided to “prevent the fall of South Viet Nam by whatever means are necessary”? (par. 6 (a)) If not, should we say so to the USSR? I understand that endorsement of a general statement to this effect was explicitly avoided at the meeting on Saturday.³ I myself think that we ought to decide now the key question of whether we are prepared to introduce combat troops if necessary even if we are not going to introduce them now. That is obviously the ultimate test of whether we are prepared to prevent the fall of Viet Nam. Until we have decided it in our own minds, I do not think that we ought to make statements to the USSR that may reflect only hypothetical intentions. Past employment of such statements has depreciated their effect.

Finally, if we are really prepared to use troops eventually, shouldn’t there be some hint of this in our conversations with Diem (par. 3)? You would have a much better feel for this than I do, but I don’t think that some such indication would cause Diem to sit back and turn over responsibility for the ultimate fate of SVN to the U.S. The situation is not analogous to that in Laos where we have had to be very careful about the way we committed ourselves to Phoumi for fear that he would not take negotiations seriously.

What is needed, if we are not going to provide troops, is some equivalent of the bilateral agreement requested by the GVN. Perhaps it could take the form of pointing to our SEATO commitment and stating that we consider this commitment binding without regard to how other SEATO members may vote on intervention. (This was the formula developed for talks with Thanat but never, to my knowledge, used in those talks.)

The Command Concept. The proposal that a senior military commander be put in charge of all U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Viet Nam is going to create all kinds of problems and I fail to see that it has compensating advantages. Counterinsurgency efforts clearly embrace all activities of any importance. The change would reflect the changed character of our military relationship under the proposed recommendations-our greater operational involvementbut it will downgrade a capable ambassador who has a very good relationship with Diem to the role of a political adviser. It will create new, difficult problems of relationship between the USOM, embassy, USIA and the military. It will also tend to give the effort a wholly military cast which will be undesirable both intrinsically and because of its effect on the attitude of the rest of the world toward the Diem regime.

Why not reorganize the MAAG, give it a new name to reflect its new duties (including operational control of U.S. units) and put a senior general in charge, but leave ultimate responsibility with the ambassador? Or, if some change is absolutely necessary, it might possibly be better to make the ambassador and the military commander co-equal heads of our activities.

If we need to create a theater commander as a dramatic move, would it be better to give him all of SEA as his theater and leave the ambassador in charge in SVN? (Incidentally, if this change does go through as proposed, I assume that a Defense representative will become director of the Washington Task Force.)

II. Other Comments

• Par. 1: These three cases seem somewhat vaguely stated, perhaps deliberately so for security reasons. Are we clear as to what is intended by each?
• Par. 2 (a) and (c): Who is going to decide how many helicopters, hello-couriers, small craft, etc., are to be provided? There will be a real argument about such specifics unless there is already a clear understanding as to the requirements.
• Par. 2 (d): Do we know clearly how we are going to expedite Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps training? The Taylor Report was not specific on this. We have long been aware of the problem; “expediting” isn’t going to solve it unless we have a plan.
• Pars. 2 (e), (f) and (i): One of the very difficult problems involved in implementing the encadrement concept is going to be to find the necessary intelligence, military and administrative personnel. We will need a special study and crash effort on this problem. Should we rob U.S. activities around the world of French-speaking personnel? Is special incentive pay required to get people into this war area? Would active and reserve military personnel trained in military government be a good source of candidates for administrative cadres?
• Par. 2 (g): What is the relationship between existing economic aid and these proposals? For example, are flood requirements going to be covered within the existing commercial import program? Gardiner a week or so ago suggested such an approach to the Vietnamese⁴ pointing out that we are committed to make up any trade deficits under the agreed import criteria and that, therefore, if the flood increased total needs we would increase our total aid as that became necessary. The Vietnamese can be depended upon, however, to ask that such aid be clearly additional to the level we have set for the commercial import program. What is the significance of the material in parentheses? Does the President’s approval of the action memo constitute approval of our financing of an increase in military pay, etc.?
• Par. 2 (h): Are we clear that the FAO can undertake such a relief job? I understand that the organization has never run one. I would think we would want an organization that had considerable past experience-perhaps the International Red Cross though its scope may be too narrow for the job here. If an international approach should not prove feasible, how is the relief job to be organized?
• Par. 3: The proposed undertakings by the GVN seem exceedingly general. Wouldn’t they need to be spelled out in any communication? For just one example, the need to reduce static deployments of the ARVN ought to be covered. (Perhaps the mention of the detailed recommendations of the Taylor Mission and the Country Team is, however, intended to incorporate their proposals by reference.) I am puzzled by the reference in 3 (b) to wartime government agencies. I was not aware that we wanted the GVN to establish any number of new wartime agencies. It is difficult to say in the abstract whether this would be a good idea. It could provide the basis for some decentralization of power and for bringing new people into the government or new people to the top within the government. However, if it is like the last reorganization, it will be mostly facade. Reorganization could also lead to some loss of governmental effectiveness.

RHJ

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that a copy was also sent to McGeorge Bundy.
2. Document 247.
3. Apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 236.
4. Not further identified.