Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

247. Draft National Security Action Memorandum¹

Washington, November 13, 1961.

TO

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

• South VietNam

The President today considered a memorandum on the subject of South VietNam,² submitted by the Secretary of State for himself and the Secretary of Defense.³

1. The President approved the recommendation that the Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the use of United States forces in South Viet-Nam under one or more of the following purposes:

(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to defend South Viet-Nam and to boost South Viet-Nam morale.

(b) Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North VietNam.

(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if there is organized Communist military intervention.

Planning under (b) should embrace initially actions within South VietNam. Actions that might be taken against North Viet-Nam or guerrilla bases in Laos should be considered separately. In connection with all the plans, the Department of Defense should consider the feasibility of moving troops or equipment in the near future to advanced positions in the Pacific, and submit recommendations concerning such action.

2. The following actions in support of the Government of Viet-Nam will be undertaken immediately, subject to the understanding that these actions would not take effect within South VietNam, be communicated to subordinate Vietnamese officials or made public until after the exchange of letters with President Diem contemplated in Paragraph 5 below:

(a) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control.

(b) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence.

(c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.

(d) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations.

(e) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.

(f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military forces as are required for increased United States participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under these recommendations.

(g) Provide such increased economic aid as may be required to permit the GVN to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabilitation program, to supply material in support of the security effort, and to give priority to projects in support of this expanded counter-insurgency program. (This could include increases in military pay, a full supply of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could assist the GVN in winning the war against the Viet Cong.)

(h) Encourage and support (including financial support) a request by the GVN to the FAO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of the flood area.

(i) Provide individual administrators and advisers for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

(j) Provide personnel for a joint survey with the GVN of conditions in each of the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency program in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them.

3. Ambassador Nolting is to be instructed to make an immediate approach to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to cope with the Viet Cong threat and the ravages of the flood as set forth under 2., above, if, on its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is prepared to carry out an effective and total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human, for the same end. Before setting in motion the United States proposals listed above, the United States Government would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to insure the success of this joint effort. On the part of the United States, it would be expected that these GVN undertakings would include, in accordance with the detailed recommendations of the Taylor Mission and the Country Team:

(a) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and broadening of the Government so as to realize the full potential of all non-Communist elements in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle.)

(b) The establishment of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.

(c) Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure so as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war.

4. An exchange of letters between Diem and the President is to be expedited.

(a) Diem’s letter would include: reference to the DRV violations of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 24 GVN letter to the ICC⁴ and other documents; pertinent references to GVN statements with respect to its intent to observe the Geneva Accords; reference to its need for flood relief and rehabilitation; reference to previous United States aid and the compliance hitherto by both countries with the Geneva Accords; reference to the USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords were signed, the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of the Accords in view of the DRV violations thereof; the lack of aggressive intent with respect to the DRV: GVN intent to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV violations ceased; and a request for additional United States assistance in the framework of foregoing policy. The letter should also set forth in appropriate general terms steps Diem has taken and is taking to reform Governmental structure.

(b) The President’s reply would be responsive to Diem’s request for additional assistance and acknowledge and agree to Diem’s statements on the intent promptly to return to strict compliance with the (Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations have ceased.

5. The “Jorden Report” is to be printed as a United States “white paper” and distributed to the Governments of all countries with which we have diplomatic relations, including the Communist states, to coincide as nearly as possible with the release of the exchange of letters between the President and Diem and shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the first increments of U.S. military personnel and equipment described in Paragraph 2, above, which would exceed the Geneva Accord ceilings.

6. The President directed that the following actions be considered for carrying out at the appropriate time in relation to the exchange of letters and other developments:

(a) A private approach to the Soviet Union that would include: our determination to prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism by whatever means is necessary; our concern over dangers to peace presented by the aggressive DRV policy with respect to South VietNam, our intent to return to full compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV does so; the distinction we draw between Laos and South VietNam, and our expectation that the Soviet Union will exercise its influence on the Chicoms and the DRV.

(b) A special diplomatic approach to the United Kingdom in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference requesting that the United Kingdom seek the support of the Soviet co-Chairman for a cessation of DRV aggression against South VietNam.

(c) A special diplomatic approach to India, both in its role as Chairman of the ICC and as a power having relations with Peiping and Hanoi. This approach should be made immediately prior to public release of the “Jorden Report” and the exchange of letters between Diem and the President.

(d) Special diplomatic approaches to Canada, as well as Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAR, and Yugoslavia. SEATO, NATO, and OAS members should be informed through those organizations, with selected members also informed individually. The possibility of some special approach to Poland as a member of the ICC should also be considered.

7. The President directed the Departments of State and Defense to develop detailed recommendations for a US command structure in South Viet-Nam that would have a senior US commander assuming responsibility for all phases of US activity, including economic aid, related to the counter-insurgency effort. Such a commander should report directly to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for operational purposes.

8. The President directed General Taylor and Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, in consultation with the Attorney General, to prepare statements to be used for background purposes pending release of the exchange of letters with Diem and other fuller disclosures of US policy.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of November 13 from Bromley Smith to the National Security Council that reported that the draft NSAM was being circulated for discussion in connection with an NSC meeting scheduled for 10 a.m., November 15.
2. See Document 234.
3. For the memorandum from Wheeler to Lemnitzer on implementation of these proposals, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 368-399.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)