249. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Viet-Nam Task Force (Wood) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Steeves)1
SUBJECT
- Viet Cong Infiltration: Nature and Extent
- 1.
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Infiltration and Viet Cong Strength. We do not have good intelligence on VC strength or on the numerical importance of infiltration. It is abundantly clear, however, that infiltration is taking place, that it has been accelerated in recent months, and that the VC war could not be long continued without it.
The evidence of VC infiltration available to us has been summarized in the Jorden report. Some of this evidence was placed before the ICC in the recent GVN letter of October 24 regarding the kidnap-murder of Colonel Nam.2 This evidence includes the statements of interrogated prisoners as well as captured documents and diaries. It reveals that whole units as well as individuals have been infiltrated, and that the infiltration routes include southern Laos, the 17th parallel, and the sea.
Hard core VC strength is now estimated at about 20,000. These are armed and trained forces, about half of which are believed to operate in regular units. This summer, when hard core VC were believed to number 12,000, between five and thirty per cent were [Page 597] thought to have been infiltrated from the north. In early October, MAAG Saigon reported that 25 to 40 per cent of VC strength is probably composed of infiltrees. Thus, while it is clear that most VC have not been infiltrated from the north, it is also apparent that both the rate of infiltration and the percentage of infiltrees in the VC forces have increased.
Regardless of the relative number of VC infiltrated from the north, it has always been true that this element provides the leadership and the backbone of VC forces. This means of course that infiltration has always been essential to the prosecution of the VC war. It also means that continued acceleration of the VC drive will require increased infiltration as well as increased local recruitment.
Infiltration is relatively more significant in terms of total VC strength in the Plateau area than in the delta. While overall VC forces may now include as little as 25 per cent infiltrees, the VC operating on the plateau adjoining the Lao border are believed to be largely composed of men infiltrated from the north. The most conservative estimate now places the number of VC in that area at 4,000.
Recent intelligence indicates that infiltration directly across the 17th parallel is considerable. While it is probably easier to enter South Viet-Nam via Laos, there is no guarantee that friendly control of the Lao panhandle would seriously handicap the VC unless it was coupled with effective denial of the routes leading directly across the parallel.
- 2.
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VC Potential. The DRV is known to have more than 300,000 men in its armed forces. Probably the majority are veterans of the long guerrilla war against the French. Many are southerners who came north during the regroupment period following the Geneva Agreements in 1954. These forces obviously provide a very large reservoir of trained guerrilla forces which could be dispatched to South Viet-Nam very quickly. The VC could probably double or even triple their present strength, by infiltration alone, in a very short time. Since it requires about 15 GVN regulars to deal with one guerrilla, it seems clear that the VC can more than meet any increase in GVN forces.
To the VC infiltration potential must be added potential local support. Maximum voluntary supporters are now estimated by the GVN at 200,000; our people are inclined to cut this figure in half. However, much if not most local VC recruitment is accomplished by at least a measure of force or threat. To estimates of voluntary supporters a considerable number of involuntary supporters should probably be added.