Office of the Historian

238. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President1

Washington, November 12, 1961.

At your request I have read again SNIE 10-4-61, “Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Actions in South Vietnam.”2

[Page 579]
1.
By and large-with one major exception-I agree with the estimate. The sentence which I would question is on page 6: “Nevertheless these developments are not likely to substantially alter (sic) Communist China’s attitudes towards military commitments in Southeast Asia.” I do not see how a country which is depending on Australia and Canada for a critical margin for feeding its cities, which is probing to see if it can get PL 480 grain, and whose agriculture and industry are disorganized in a crisis which will take several years at best to surmount, would go to war except as a suicidal act. The present Communist leaders have a long view of history and a great faith in the future of China. There is no evidence that they are in a suicidal mood. Mao’s basic precept has always been: “If the enemy attacks, I disappear; if he defends, I harass; and if he retreats, I attack.” Under present circumstances I believe that Communist China would be in a mood to postpone its advance into Southeast Asia even at the expense of what they would regard as a temporary stabilization of the Free World’s position in South Viet-Nam so long as we did not cross the 17th parallel with forces on the ground and threaten to liberate North VietNam. Then-but only then-do I believe they would go to war with us.
2.
Fundamentally the assessment in the SNIE is in accord with this judgment. It suggests that the actions taken by the U.S. would lead to essentially defensive responses.3 See, for example, the marked passages on pages 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16.
3.
I have marked one passage on page 13 with an “X”. This passage suggests the possibility that if it looked as though South Viet-Nam were winning out over the Communists in South VietNam, the Communists would consider sending North Vietnamese regular units into South VietNam, although they would recognize this action would raise the risks of broadening the war. As I said to you in my memorandum of yesterday,4 whether they would go to war in Southeast Asia depends on their assessment of U.S. strength and determination. Thus far their whole operation has been designed to bypass U.S. military strength, both nuclear and conventional. I do not believe that they would go to war in Southeast Asia merely to save a Communist foothold in South VietNam; and the whole argument of SNIE 10-4-61 tends to bear this out.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow.↩
  2. Not printed. A note on the source text indicates that a copy of SNIE 10-4-61 was attached to the source text, but this copy, which Rostow marked for the President, has not been found.↩
  3. Even selective air attack on North Vietnam. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.]↩
  4. Document 233.↩