Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

239. Letter From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the President¹

Washington, November 12, 1961.

Mr. President: I have given a copy of this draft memorandum to Dean Rusk. He asked me to tell you his comment. “It is a matter of timing” bearing in mind “other communications” on the same subject.

Averell

[Attachment]

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)

Washington, November 11, 1961.

This memorandum outlines a diplomatic-political course of action in VietNam. It is put forward as offering the possibility of avoiding heavy United States military commitments with attendant risk and at the same time preventing the loss of South Viet-Nam to the Communists. The chance of its success cannot be estimated but it does not preclude other actions should it fail. Moreover, there are some indications that the Soviet Union would be interested in the establishment of a peaceful and stable situation in Southeast Asia, at least for a time.

Every effort should be made to bring the present Laos negotiations to a rapid conclusion-at Geneva and in Laos. Then certain commitments, already agreed to, would become operative, namely not to use Lao territory against any country with the undertaking by the U.S.S.R. as a co-chairman to police Communist-bloc observance. Compliance or noncompliance with this provision could be promptly ascertained.

The course here suggested involves a direct approach to the U.S.S.R., through our present relationship at the Geneva Conference on Laos. Thus there is hope for a fairly quick reading on the prospect for success.

1. Tactical: Concurrently with the publication of the “Jorden Report”, Harriman would be authorized to approach Pushkin at Geneva. He would recall that Pushkin has often said the Soviet Union is interested in a stable and peaceful situation in Southeast Asia. The progress made toward the settlement of the Laos question is meaningless if hostilities continue in neighboring VietNam. The United States believes that an effort should be made to resolve that situation peacefully and end the aggression against SVN. The violation of the 1954 Accords by NVN has caused the United States to support SVN. A peaceful settlement should be built on the foundation of the 1954 Accords. The U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom, as co-chairmen, should bring together a small group of the powers directly concerned to review the Accords to see how compliance can be secured and how they can be strengthened to meet today’s needs. If this small group of powers could agree on measures to this end, the co-chairmen could present the results of their work to the Geneva Conference as a whole for ratification. The powers which would be engaged in this review would be the U.K., U.S.S.R., United States, Communist China, France, North VietNam, South VietNam, and India (perhaps). Although France is not as directly concerned as the others we cannot afford the resentment which would be caused by excluding her. As chairman of the ICC and the largest free country in the general region, India could make an important contribution if it so desired. This group of seven or eight powers, comprising those most directly interested, would be broadly representative enough to ensure that its conclusions would be adopted by the Conference as a whole and it would be small enough to be workable.

If the initial talks with Pushkin seemed promising, it might be necessary for final arrangements to be made at Moscow by Thompson, possibly with Harriman.

2. The General Character of the Settlement We Are Prepared to Contemplate:

(a) Cessation of hostilities, if possible before discussion of other points is begun.

(b) Acceptance for the time being of the division of Viet-Nam with non-interference of any kind by one side in the other’s affairs.

(c) Mutual renunciation of the use of force against each other by North and South Viet-Nam and agreement that eventual reunification be sought only through peaceful means. (We should not preclude a restudy of the possibility of elections as a matter of strategy.)

(d) Mutually advantageous trade and economic relations between North and South VietNam. (This appears of greater importance to NVN).

(e) Strengthened and modernized ICC, or possibly some substitute mechanism for observation and enforcement.

(f) Under these conditions we might be prepared to adhere to the Accords as revised.

Harriman would be authorized to put forward these points with Pushkin as a basis of negotiations. (Supporting staff studies on each of them should begin at once.) In the course of his discussions, Harriman could point out that the level of our military assistance and the size of MAAG in South Viet-Nam are obviously related to the seriousness of the military situation there. As hostilities are brought under control and as the situation demonstrates stability, the natural consequence would be a concomitant reduction in U.S. military aid and advice.

3. The Internal Situation in South VietNam: The best any international settlement can do is to buy time. If the Government of South Viet-Nam continues a repressive, dictatorial and unpopular regime, the country will not long retain its independence. Nor can the United States afford to stake its prestige there. We must make it clear to Diem that we mean business about internal reform. This will require a strong ambassador who can control all U.S. activities (political, military, economic, etc.), and who is known by Diem to have the personal intimacy and confidence of the President and the Secretary. Additional military aid and increased U.S. participation with SEATO support should be promptly provided as necessary to hold the line, and to improve the present dangerous situation, both in gaining ground militarily as well as in building public morale.

4. The International Situation: Based on the “Jorden Report” world public opinion should be developed to understand the true nature of NVN aggression. Our actions with SEATO support must be clearly but firmly presented as necessary to permit the people of SVN to retain their freedom, but are limited in duration to the emergency. We cannot afford to face again the situation we have in Laos where most of world opinion, including some of our close allies, believe we have acted unwisely, to put it mildly, in attempting to dominate that country.

5. Other Alternatives: Major military commitment as well as possible UN initiative should be held in reserve as long as direct negotiations seemed to be making progress.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Personal. Handwritten by Harriman.