Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

233. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President¹

Washington, November 11, 1961.

Mr. Rusk will table this morning a proposal for action in Viet Nam² that stops short of installing U.S. forces now, but commits us-in our minds-to a full scale U.S. effort to save that country.

I appreciate, of course, the difficulty of the decision and the reasons for reserving this move; but I should like to set out as clearly as I can the reasons for placing some minimal U.S. ground force in Viet Nam as part of the initial package.

This problem has been bedevilled by confusion about the various things a U.S. force could initially accomplish: from fighting in the paddies and jungles (which no one proposes), to guarding engineer units. To simplify the matter, I shall make the case for placing immediately a U.S. (or SEATO) force of (say) 5,000 men on the 17th Parallel.³

1. From the point of view of Southeast Asia, this is the gut issue and gut decision they are awaiting. Our case for asking a great deal from Diem would be strengthened if this threshold in U.S. action were passed.

2. Without the troop commitment, the Communists (who have been reading of our fears of white men in Asia and of Nehru’s line on Ho Chi Minh) will believe they still have plenty of room for maneuver and to continue infiltration. An ambiguous signal to them is dangerous; and, whatever the rhetoric, they will interpret our policy by deeds, not words. The deeds proposed are, indeed, ambiguous.

3. When we publish the Jorden Report and enlarge the MAAG we shall be declaring the 1954 Accords are being violated and we propose to deal with the consequences of that violation, until the Accords are re-established. We cannot carry out the agreed seven steps without grossly exceeding the 1954 advisory ceiling. Under these circumstances, the question arises: What is there to protect South Viet Nam from the North Viet Nam divisions if the 1954 Accord is in temporary abeyance? A U.S. (or SEATO) force on the Parallel would provide an unambiguous answer.

4. If we go into a negotiation on Viet Nam with U.S. forces in place on the 17th Parallel, we have a bargaining counter for a return to the Geneva Accords namely, the withdrawal of our troops. Otherwise, as Desai pointed out, a negotiation about Viet Nam might be turned simply into a negotiation about South Viet Nam. In short, the presence of the U.S. force would give us the element which we badly lacked in the Laos negotiation, which led many of us, including Harriman, to urge the installation of SEATO Plan 5 in May.

Aside from these four specific points, there is a general attitude in the State Department paper which I regard as dangerous. It would inhibit U.S. action on our side of the truce lines of the Cold War for fear of enemy escalation. The lesson of the post-war, it seems to me, is that we must be prepared on our side of the line to do whatever we believe necessary to protect our own and the Free World’s interest. No one is proposing that we liberate North Viet Nam. No one is proposing at this stage-although the issue may have to be faced-selective action in North Viet Nam if Communist infiltration does not stop. General TaylorM’s proposals are, in my view, conservative proposals for action on our side of the Cold War truce lines, to buy time and permit negotiation to take over for an interval, under reasonably favorable circumstances. I think it unwise to inhibit ourselves in these regions for fear of what the enemy may do by way of reaction.

The steps proposed-including those which are now agreed-should, of course, not be taken unless we are deeply prepared for all the possible consequences. But, if the enemy goes to war-in Laos, South Viet Nam, or both-because of our actions on our side of the line, it means he has already decided to take Southeast Asia by whatever means are necessary; and that his actions up to this point simply meant that he was prepared to take South Viet Nam by cheap means and Laos by slow means, if possible. If he goes to war because of what we do on our side of the line, it does not mean that he went to war because of what we did. It means he had already determined to face war rather than forego victory in South Viet Nam, and that only our surrender of South Viet Nam could prevent war.

Because of this assessment, I question the State Department’s judgment on the relation between the introduction of U.S. troops and a Laos settlement. The Communist problem is to decide whether or not they are prepared to fight the U.S. (or SEATO) in Southeast Asia.

A final thought. With respect to both Cuba and Laos our legal and moral case was ambiguous. It was impossible in our kind of society to rally the full weight of American authority behind the military enterprises in those areas. The case of South Viet Nam is clean. We know it; the enemy knows it; and, in their hearts, the knowledgeable neutrals know it; e.g., Desai. The Jorden Report will, I believe, be widely persuasive. If we move without ambiguity-without the sickly pallor of our positions on Cuba and Laos-I believe we can unite the country and the Free World; and there is a better than even chance that the Communists will back down and bide their time. This we should cheerfully accept; because the underlying forces in Asia are with us, if we do not surrender and vigorously exploit them.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-628-71. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Gen. Taylor only-no further distribution.” Neither the original nor any other copy of this memorandum has been found at the Kennedy Library.
2. See Document 234.
3. Neither the place nor the figure are essential to the argument. As an initial point of disposition, I like the Parallel because it fits the diplomatic situation described in paragraph 3, below. I say 5,000 men because I understood from the MAAG adviser to the 1st ARVN division that static duty on the parallel was now being done by 3,500 men (half the division); and U.S. forces could relieve them. On the other hand, 5,000 seemed a rough minimum U.S. unit that could protect itself. [Footnote in the source text.]