Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

165. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Viet-Nam Task Force (Wood) to the Director (Cottrell)¹

Washington, October 13, 1961.

CHECK LIST

Rationale for U.S. Support

While rice potential of SEA and strategic geography of a peninsula extending to 10°N are important, real reason for communist desire takeover in Viet-Nam is to show rest of world how dangerous it is to be allied with U.S.

Problem

Too much aid; not enough judgment. War being fought without plan. Our own chain command and theirs. Can they make better use of what they receive?

Recommendations: Based on necessity of Quantum Jump

Political

An Aide-Memoire to Diem: let it be known that you will permit the creation of two (not less) opposition parties with five deputies each in the National Assembly (123 deputies) provided these parties agree that the first priority is the defeat of the Viet Cong. If you do not agree, U.S. will find ways of criticizing you publicly for suppressing political freedom. This is necessary to improve your national and international prestige and gain further sympathy for increase international support. Practically, two small opposition parties full of ambitious and inexperienced leaders would cancel each other out and their foolishness would increase your prestige. It would be easy to arrange by elections to bring these people into National Assembly. Their speeches in National Assembly should receive brief, but factual press coverage. They should not be allowed to have their own newspapers.

Peasants

1. Flood victims should get food, medicine and shelter now.

2. Provincial officials: 50 % higher salaries and allowances than Saigon officials.

3. Air evacuation of civilian and military casualties: 24 doctors and 96 corpsmen and nurses (all Vietnamese, Filipino or Chinese) plus 12 aircraft (e.g. heliocouriers) loaned by U.S., but piloted and maintained by Vietnamese, Filipino or Chinese. Not more than six U.S. military doctors as advisers. Planes to be used only for medical air evacuation.

4. We will build 250 kw transmitter if Diem will agree that he or another top official will broadcast at least once a week.

5. Simplify USOM programs, reduce emphasis on industrial development; increase emphasis on training provincial administrators. Reduce training in U.S. (cultural shock); increase training in VietNam.

6. Strengthen village defense, barbed wire, bamboo stockades, flares, mines, food control, dogs.

7. Trips by FSO’s with MAAG advisers to get political reporting on provinces.²

Military

1. Land Frontier.

General Taylor fly over it.

20 U.S. encadred Ranger Companies.

U.S. air supply frontier posts.

All means to give confidence to patrols-dogs, walkie-talkies, flares, armalites.

2. Sea Frontier and Canals

USOM has had great success in motorizing fishing junks and sampans. Sampans can be used for canal patrol. See attached photo.³ Ask Ambassador to order MAAG Naval people to borrow USOM technicians and use their techniques now.

Role of 7th Fleet should be limited to patrolling 17th as show of force, reporting sightings to Vietnamese Navy and resupply.

No one from a U.S. ship should board a VN junk.

Should we supply 20 small, simple Coast Guard boats to VN Navy for inshore patrol? Place two Filipino technicians on each (radio and engineer)?

3. Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps

Put one good VNNCO in each untrained CG and SDC company.

Double size of CG training facility.

Start immediately MAAG training: and equipping of SDC.

4. Areas under VC Control

Install DF station at U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to get better fixes.

Possible flying DF station on a Caribou; Caribou to carry napalm for use on radio station.

Use U.S. encadred Ranger companies to penetrate VC controlled areas for intelligence and sabotage.

Develop food control program with Thompson.

Overfly with talking planes (see Thompson).

5. Province Chiefs and Chain of Command

A fixed and limited number CG and SDC under sole command of Province Chief; all other forces under ARVN. Province Chiefs, as Civil Authorities, have right of appeal to Diem.

6. Intelligence

Further unification under Col. Y.

7. Strategic Planning

Diem must accept a joint ARVN-MAAG planning board, composition ARVN: Rangers or divisions?

8. Foreign Troops

U.S. troops to encadre VN Ranger companies.

One U.S. School-Troop Unit (Embtel 488, attached).⁴

One U.S. Engineer Unit.

One ChiNat Division.⁵ (Embtel 488).

One USAF combat crew training team (Embtel 489, enclosed).⁶

9. NVN

We have handcuffed ourselves. Will cable.⁷

10. Prisoner defection

Simple, well publicized bounty and punishment system. If you are captured by force, you are killed or imprisoned. If you surrender, no charges. If you surrender and bring friends, big money. See Thompson.

Transportation

Emphasize air (landing strip program next six months); Deemphasize more roads for next six months (insufficient VN resources).

U.S.

Command Structure.

Direct delegation of authority to Ambassador from President placing him in control of all U.S. agencies and Departments represented in VietNam?

Since VN is biggest war in world today and directly involves U.S., we need best command and command structure.

Play Down

Negotiations with Cambodia-waste of energy.

Bilateral (U.S.-GVN)-can’t give them bigger commitment than they have.

SEATO—a drag.

Don’t Forget

Jorden

Harriman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1361. Top Secret. Initialed by Wood.
2. Paragraph 7 was added by hand.
3. Not found attached to the source text.
4. Not printed.
5. At this point the following sentence was crossed out: “Yes, give us strong recommendation. We are overcurbing and underusing the ChiNats. They cost us a lot and feel very frustrated (Burma, VN).”
6. Not attached to the source text, but in this telegram, October 13, Nolting reported that the deployment of the Jungle Jim unit for training, research and development purposes, and photo reconnaissance work was “highly desirable.” Nolting wrote that the Embassy had been assured by MAAG that the Jungle Jim unit would not engage “in missions, including airdrop against selected targets or undertake other operational missions, aside from photo reconnaissance, without our first referring question to Department for decision.” Nolting also offered his views on how the introduction of the aircraft and its personnel should be handled with the ICC. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5 MSP/10-1361)
7. No subsequent cable on this subject from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saigon during the time of the Taylor mission was found.