Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

166. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)¹

Washington. October 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Subjects for Exploration in Viet Nam

This memorandum contains a checklist of subjects that you may wish to explore during your trip to Viet Nam. It does not pretend to be a comprehensive listing of all of the questions that might be examined; I have eliminated many subjects that will be on everyone’s minds and probably on everyone’s lists. In the attachment to this memo, however, I have made a very brief listing of various sorts of limited holding actions that have been considered at various times in the course of work on SEA Task Force papers.

I. Military

1. ARVN Deployment. Is the ARVN really ninety percent committed to counterinsurgency operations? At any given time, what percentage of the ARVN is engaged in patrolling activities or offensive actions against the VC? (If you attempt to get figures which separate out ARVN casualties from those for the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, you ought also to get a breakdown of VC casualties which indicates which were ARVN-inflicted, which CG and SDC-inflicted. The GVN casualty figures alone, while reflecting the fact that the CG and SDC are more vulnerable and therefore more often attacked, will not necessarily prove that the ARVN is passive.)

2. Status of the Over-All Plan. While progress on getting GVN approval of the over-all plan is slow, the ARVN Staff is said to have approved over-all Corps-Area plans submitted by the corps commanders. Do these fit together to provide an over-all scheme of action?

3. Diem’s Attitudes Toward Military Planning and Operations. Is it true, as I have heard alleged, that Diem is not really interested in a major effort against the VC at this time; that he views this as a long-term problem which can only be dealt with on a very long-term basis; that he therefore prefers to concentrate on improvement of communications and to base his military planning primarily on the gradual extension of GVN control outward from Saigon?

4. Identification of VC Concentrations. What can we do to identify with greater precision the location of VC units in areas such as Zone D where we know there are large organized units? More photo recon? Send in small ranger units?

5. The Evaluation Center. Is full use being made of the evaluations produced by the U.S. evaluation center in the embassy? Should the GVN be encouraged to develop its own war room comparable to our evaluation center? What is the status of the GVN Central Intelligence Organization? (We give the GVN information based upon our evaluations, but do not give them access to the center, apparently because some of our information is obtained from GVN personnel through non-official channels.)

6. U.S. Advisory Personnel. Would it be desirable to get U.S. advisory personnel down to platoon level and permit them to engage in all military operations? (The Special Forces Officer whom I heard recommend such action indicated that it would require 400 additional personnel.) In order to increase the number of U.S. advisors in the field with combat experience, should brevet rank be given to American NCO’s?

7. Special Forces Personnel. Could more U.S. Special Forces Personnel be usefully employed? Is the supply of such personnel to the field too erratic? (A Special Forces Officer indicated that at times he was the only such officer in VietNam; this problem has allegedly since been solved.)

8. Self-Confidence and Offensive Spirit of the ARVN. Is there a real problem of increasing the self-confidence and offensive spirit of the ARVN? If so, which of the various R and D projects directed toward this problem show most promise? (e.g., dogs, defoliation).

a. You recently expressed some skepticism on the subject of defoliation. As I understood your argument, it was that defoliation simply cleared the way for the VC. But isn’t this a bit like the argument that one shouldn’t build roads because they run in two directions? The question is not whether defoliation may help the enemy as well as our side, it is rather one of the net benefit. It seems to me that a guerrilla force benefits more from forest cover than an anti-guerrilla force.

b. The MAAG proposes to use dogs on static sentry duty; Godel’s concept was that they should be used with patrols to help increase self-confidence by reducing prospects for ambush. Isn’t use on patrols the better employment?

9. Exotic Weapons. What is the current view of the R and D test center of such items as the micro-jet, Tetrahedron and Lazy Dog?

10. Doctrine for Use of Helicopters and Helio-Couriers. Does MAAG and the GVN have a clear military concept for use of helicopters and Helio-Couriers? How many more could be usefully employed? (Maintenance of helicopters has been a problem, but I believe that we are prepared to supply additional maintenance personnel through Air America.)

11. The Radio Location Effort. In view of the continuous increase in the number of VC transmitters and the inherent problems involved in location of them, does it make sense to continue to devote resources and personnel to this effort? If it does, how can the GVN be made to take a more cooperative attitude toward the effort?

12. Deployment and Use of the 30,000 Man Increase. The President’s approval of the 30,000 man increase in GVN armed forces (which will follow the 20,000 man increase now going forward) was given with the understanding that there would be agreement between the USG and the GVN on the use to which these forces were put. What are MAAG’s plans? Do they make sense? What is the status of GVN work on the problem? Have we begun to think about whether a further increase beyond the 30,000 would be desirable, and about the use to which such forces might be put? (You will recall that Diem asked for a total increase of 100,000.)

13. Training and Use of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Is training of the CG proceeding as rapidly as it could? Wouldn’t it be desirable to have the training and equipping of the CG and the SDC proceed simultaneously? (At present the CG is trained and equipped first and then it trains the SDC. The SDC has wholly inadequate weapons until it completes its training.) Could more be done (perhaps with mobile training teams) to train the CG where they are stationed rather than take them into special training camps? Do the concepts for use of the CG and SDC developed by the MAAG make sense? (A training plan and concept of use was submitted by the MAAG to the GVN in August and GVN comment is awaited.) SDC personnel are now often deployed in a way that makes no military sense. Is the CG deployed in areas with which the personnel are generally familiar?

II. Economic

(You will, of course, be exploring the current validity of the several programs of emergency economic and social action contained in the Staley Report.² I have commented on those programs below on which I have some question.)

1. Program Priorities. Are there U.S. projects now being conducted in Viet Nam which interfere with the effort against the VC by absorbing the time of President Diem and other top personnel and by diverting resources from essential military tasks? On the other hand, to what extent are important economic programs being cut back by the GVN because of concentration on the military threat or an unwillingness to mobilize necessary domestic resources? (For example, it is said that agriculturists and nurses being graduated from U.S.-supported schools are not being used on the grounds that GVN resources must be concentrated on the security problem. USOM is presently reviewing the Staley proposals and on-going programs with a view to determining priorities. It is not easy for any USOM, caught up in an existing program with every element of the program supported by proponents within the USOM, to re-orient its program. Outside advice could be most useful.)

2. Village Alarm System. What is the current status of the village alarm system? I do not know the details on this, but I have the impression that there may still be unresolved questions between USOM and the MAAG or the R and D center with respect to the kind of system that should be installed. This is one of the most important economic projects now going forward in VietNam.

3. Diem’s Road Program. Does Diem’s recently developed road program make any sense? A member of the recently returned Army Civic Action team indicated that it was grossly over-ambitious and that planning and execution were not adequately related to real priorities. Can it be cut down to essentials by agreement with the GVN on a first-stage program?

4. Rural Dispensary System. Are there ways that the existing rural dispensary system can be improved? For example, it has been indicated that supplies of anti-biotics intended to meet some weeks of need are exhausted within a couple of days of delivery while aspirin and other less wanted items are in more than adequate supply. (Note that the Staley Report’s recommendations on the rural medical program concentrated exclusively on the care of the wounded. They thus reflected pre-occupation with the security aspects of the medical problem. A much broader approach is needed.)

5. Rice Shortage. We shall be tackling the immediate problem created by the flooding in the Delta area. But what is the over-all rice situation? (Two months or so ago the embassy asked for some PL 480 rice. Rice was offered, I believe under Title II as a local currency sale. Partly because they were asked to pay for it in piasters and partly because the situation seemed to ease, the GVN turned down this proposal.)

III. Political-Social-Psychological

(I have included in this category several items which are economic or military in content or execution, but which have primarily social or psychological purposes.)

1. Attitudes of Troops and Local Officials. This is the most important non-military element involved in obtaining the cooperation of the villagers. It is said that Diem has disciplined and removed an increasing number of local officials guilty of graft, excessive harshness and ineffectiveness. Is the progress significant or only marginal? How can he be stimulated into further action?

Troops are also said to treat the local populace very harshly. The Civic Action Team is said to be recommending in its report that orders be issued to direct that speed limits shall be enforced against military vehicles and to enforce other criminal laws within the army. Will this be effective? Is the army’s behavior in part related to low pay (e.g., as when a soldier pays an exorbitantly low price for a chicken)? What can be done about the lack of adequate provision for the dependents of armed forces personnel when they are away from their homes? (Unlike the situation in most Asian countries, the families do not live with the troops in the field and so do not benefit from the soldier’s rice ration etc. I am not certain to what extent, if any, this problem was created by the redeployments which we have insisted upon under the CIP.)

2. Civic Action. The report of the U.S. Army Civic action team³ will have just been submitted to the MAAG. You will want to review it. One question that will need to be examined is whether adequate provision is made for giving funds to the ARVN for civic action purposes-to buy well-drilling equipment, simple brick-making machines, etc. A small immediate amount was recommended and may have been provided, but longer term needs will also require examination.

There is an important limitation in existing DOD military directives on this subject. They apparently provide that civic action may be conducted only to the extent that it does not interfere with military operations. If strictly applied this rule could bar all civic action in SVN. Obviously in a place like SVN where programs of this kind could make a most important contribution to the security effort, it is very short-sighted indeed to view them simply as competitive with military operations.

Would it facilitate GVN acceptance of civic action if, instead of submitting our own report and waiting for months for the GVN to react to it, we got together with someone like General Minh who has his own program and, using that program as a base, worked our own ideas into it? This, incidentally, is a technique that might be explored for more general application. Our general approach has been to prepare a lengthy report on a subject and submit to the GVN for consideration. That may be an excessively formal and not very effective way to get action on military and non-military programs.

3. Montagnards. A U.S.-developed plan for assisting the Montagnards⁴ has recently been submitted to the GVN. You may want to examine it and determine what can be done to speed action.

4. Agrarian Reform. The Washington Task Force received a report some time ago that the agrarian reform program had about ground to a halt.⁵ What, if anything, in the way of U.S. assistance or otherwise can be done to revive it?

5. Radio and TV. I have attached copies of the memos Donald Wilson left with us.⁶ As I have been given the picture, past delays on the radio program have been due partly to arguments between ourselves and the GVN over objectives and partly to disagreements among the American technicians involved. Disagreement over objectives has revolved primarily around Diem’s desire to have sufficient power (100 KW or more) to reach into North Viet-Nam and into other parts of Southeast Asia and our desire to concentrate upon a system directed entirely toward the internal communications problem. In August 1960 there was agreement with the GVN on our concept.

There are those who believe that much better cooperation could be obtained from the GVN if power were increased. (Diem has indicated in the past that once we have the station built, he will himself procure the equipment needed to increase the power.) The additional cost involved is a relatively minor element. Greater power would require a higher tower in Saigon which would have the additional advantage of providing the kind of tower required if a TV program is undertaken. However, the Country team has recently reviewed this power question and concluded that we should not reopen it, but should proceed with the agreed program. You may want to determine what continuing importance, if any, the power question has.

Lack of progress since August 1960 is caused in part by lack of trained personnel. We have never had more than two engineers in the field and have relied upon inadequately qualified GVN personnel to do much of the work. When the newly constructed radio tower in Hue fell to the ground because of inadequate engineering the USOM brought Chinese technicians from Hong Kong to supervise that part of the undertaking. At present there is no radio engineer in the USOM and ICA/Washington is having great difficulty finding one. This is primarily a Washington problem, but perhaps the USOM could explore the possibility of bringing in Chinese or other Asian engineers.

Non-project aid (commercial imports) are being used to provide some radio receivers. This arrangement, however, provides very haphazard distribution. The ICA Desk officer has been working on a proposal to procure receivers through project aid. This would permit the U.S. to subsidize purchase by picking up the difference between the purchase price and a lower selling price. It would also give us some control over distribution so that they would get out to the villages instead of being concentrated wholly in Saigon. This proposal has not yet been put to the field; you might want to explore it. You might also want to explore the feasibility of Japanese aid in this area.

The principal problem foreseen on TV is the problem of servicing under conditions where such skills are in very short supply and where security is very bad. A plan developed by Togoland to deal with this problem has been, I believe, sent to Saigon as a possible model. It is, I am told, a rather expensive and elaborate program.

Robert H. Johnson⁷

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared by Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff⁸

Washington, undated.

Check List of Limited Holding Actions in Southeast Asia From SEA Task Force Papers

1. Small Thai and SVN paramilitary units in southern Laos.

2. Army engineer construction battalion to Thailand for training and work on Bangkok by-pass.

3. Rotation of U.S. forces to Thailand for combined training, or stationing of a brigade task force team there.

4. U.S. aircraft and personnel for a defoliant spray program.

5. Expand naval capabilities by (a) expediting radios and motors for junks; (b) use of U.S. ships and aircraft for interdiction; (c) providing GVN more small boats under MAP.

6. Expedite encadrement of FAR.

7. Resettle Meo to highland area of south Laos on Viet Nam border.

8. Expedite delivery of equipment to Thai border police.

9. Help Thais establish Mekong River patrol.

10. Strengthen suitable bases in southern Laos such as Savannekhet, Pakse, Attopeu, and Saravane for operations by Thai, VN and Lao units. (Idea here, which has never been fully developed in discussions, is to supplement paramilitary action referred to in par. 1 above by creating strong bases in south Laos from which probing actions could be mounted to keep enemy off balance.)

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, 10/16/61-10/19/61. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Bagley.
2. See Document 93.
3. Not further identified.
4. Not further identified.
5. Not further identified.
6. Not found attached to the source text.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. Top Secret.