Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 14, 1961, 11 a.m.

226. Task Force VN. This replies pares 1, 2 and 4 Department’s 160.² Reply other paras cabled separately.³

1. VC most likely continue concentrate efforts coming months on increased number small-scale military attacks and political activities in all parts South VietNam, with purpose hamper communications, extend control rural areas, isolate cities, disrupt economy, and discourage and frustrate GVN forces by steady infliction casualties in ambushes and attacks on small posts and units without exposing themselves effective counter attacks. Higher incidence all GQ [?] activity expected central VietNam, particularly in areas adjacent to Laos, but also including other areas which have been relatively quiet. Increase also likely in area surrounding Saigon, while Mekong Delta region probably will continue show high number incidents most sectors with possible increase end of rainy season November.

Larger-scale VC military attacks in force of 100 or more unlikely to occur very often in Mekong Delta area or in area around Saigon given improved RVNAF countermeasures these areas. Larger attacks in central VN highlands however a distinct possibility as DRV infiltrates more personnel and supplies from and through Laos. Possible that DRV might aim for establishment “liberated area” in central highlands for purpose setting up “revolutionary government,” but we do not believe this could be achieved without infiltration men and arms on greatly increased and much more obvious scale. Available signs indicate, however, that DRV not at this time prepared incur consequences of overt aggression: i.e., A likely condemnation by ICC (and therefore by neutrals) and risk of provoking direct US or SEATO intervention.

Indiscriminate terror campaign or one directed against Americans in Saigon a continuing grim prospect. If latter occurs, might well be directed toward American dependents as part of DRV tactics of gradually confining Americans to Saigon and eventually driving them out of VietNam. Thus far, however, GVN security measures in Saigon have proved reasonably effective.

VC political activities likely center on use “National Liberation Front” and related organizations to give semblance if not substance widespread support their cause and to cloak activities in guise popular revolutionary movement. Also will continue effort subvert tribal minorities in central VN highlands, with importance this area mounting if free world position Laos deteriorates.

Important note that while VC guerrilla capabilities increased recent months (such as estimated strength 14,000 as compared 7,000 Sept. 1960) and range their future activities likely to increase as result, they are not in position to sustain large-scale military operations against RVNAF or to secure “liberated area” in SVN in which establish solid political and military base for conduct their operations. They might however by indirect means achieve their intermediate objective of overthrowing Diem if continued or stepped up guerrilla activities were to engender frustration in GVN armed forces to point of bringing about coup.

2. We cannot predict with assurance when GVN will produce geographically phased national plan for systematic elimination of Viet Cong. We have been pressing for this ever since presentation of CIP in February. However, President Kennedy’s recent letter to President Diem⁴ suggesting development of such plan plus very strong local American representation at all appropriate GVN levels should move GVN to accord high priority to development of desired plan. CHMAAG in separate letters to Diem and Thuan as recently as 7 August⁵ again strongly urged development of national phased strategic operation plan for progressively clearing SVN of Viet Cong presence and influence.

Counter-insurgency planning as far as military is concerned stands as follows: area responsibilities of major commands and workable command structure have been established for planning and conduct of military operations against Viet Cong in consonance with CIP.

Concept for preparation of detailed ARVN counter-insurgency operations has now been reduced to writing and has been published in field command directive “Concepts of Pacification Operations” dated July 21, 1961.⁶ This RVNAF concept takes into account psywar, winning the people, civic action and necessary coordination of civil-military effort as well as strictly military considerations. Corps commanders have been directed to submit soonest their corps area plans based on this concept paper. These corps plans will then be combined into overall military operations plan. This 20 page concepts document is sound guide for conduct of military operations under conditions of tactics, terrain and politics existing here in Viet-Nam and stems almost entirely from the MAAG “Tactics and Techniques” study.

We visualize a national CIP to be composed somewhat as follows:

A. Statement of objectives of national plan.

B. Statement of responsibilities of governmental agencies and their plans as they affect overall national plan.

C. Establishment of machinery and responsibilities for coordination and execution.

D. Annexes covering in detail concept of carrying out counterinsurgency campaign in all its military, political, economic, psychological and social ramifications. This would include treatment of various phases required within each operation in each specific geographical area.

E. Annexes showing priority by geographic areas for carrying out offensive operations and setting forth in general terms goals for phasing of pacification process. Priority on clearing various areas of Viet Cong will probably depend on number of factors, among them strength of Viet Cong in area, threat they pose to important localities, their proximity to DRV and Laotian border, psychological factors and like.

National CIP must provide for flexibility sufficient to allow all agencies to react to changes in character and location of Viet Cong threat. Basic military concept of bringing entire country under governmental control is based on locating VC and eliminating them in successive areas. Larger groups would be located through use of net forces such as Rangers and eliminated with spear type forces such as regular ARVN battalions. Small VC groups or individuals more or less indigenous to their hamlet or village would be located and dealt with by civil guard and self-defense corps. This concept requires that civil and military leaders down to hamlet level, as part of “preparation phase”, know of planned operations long enough in advance to coordinate and cooperate in preparing target area, intelligence wise and psychologically, prior to actual attack-as well as during and after military phase. Concept also requires upgrading of civil guard and self-defense corps through provision of equipment and adequate training program now in progress. To assure peasants and villagers in given area that they will have continuing protection, and thus inducing them to furnish intelligence on indigenous VC individuals or small groups as well as any information which may reach them on larger groups.

Because of advanced development of VC control, they are so strongly entrenched in certain areas that successful military operations against them are necessary prerequisite to effective political, economic or psychological action in area. However, political, psychological and economic elements must also be employed as integral part of this military phase whenever applicable and to full degree possible. For these reasons in Viet-Nam it is necessary to give priority to military phase of counter-insurgent operations, in order that other and equally important elements of final victory can be fully exploited in phases which must immediately follow or whenever possible accompany actual military operations.

Phasing of plan should extend, not only to geographical areas to be cleared by military operations, but should also include progressively phased actions whereby cleared area would be returned to normal peace time conditions. These actions can be designated as “preparation phase” which precedes military operations end [and?] establishes proper element of acceptance for “military phase” during which area would be cleared of VC. This is then followed by “security phase” which is final phase permanently installing civil government in cleared area under governmental control as well as insuring its continued security. This requires pre-planned occupation by paramilitary, provincial security forces as other civil agencies under province chiefs. If this is impractical initially, then RVNAF forces involved in attack must remain to prevent VC organization from again taking over until province chief’s security forces can maintain order and control and rehabilitate area. Preplanning and implementation of this security phase at civil-military level requires close coordination and is most important.

Plan such as this should not of course be an inflexible one which does not permit for unforeseeable changes requiring adjustments in situation, but rather should provide well defined pre-planned series of intermediate goals based on progressive, geographically phased final objective-victory over VC. Such plan must be comprehensive in nature and take into full account political, psychological and civic action aspects of not only military defeat of VC but all important problem of preventing guerrilla re-entry into cleared areas.

4. RVNAF forces have dual mission of defending country against overt aggression and destruction of insurgent forces within country. Training now being conducted is directed towards preparing these forces for accomplishment these missions. Until one year ago, training emphasis was being placed primarily on preparing for defense against overt aggression rather than counter-insurgency operations. At that time only small percentage of training was devoted counter-guerrilla type training. In view of insurgency situation this was considered inadequate. As result MAAG recommendations JGS reoriented training program to insure all training was heavily weighted in counter-guerrilla subjects such as Ranger oriented training and psychological conditioning of individual. ARVN training progressing but slower than MAAG feels required by situation. This because bulk ARVN troops are committed against VC. At time their transfer from department interior to department defense, apparent that civil guard required military training before they could adequately perform fighting mission. At MAAG insistence JGS initiated program to train civil guard along counter-guerrilla lines. This program consists of individual, leadership and unit training. First group civil guard personnel began training January 1961. Civil guard force now being trained Quang Trung and Song Mai training centers with training completely oriented on counter-insurgency effort.

Mobile, lightly armed Ranger units specifically designed for combat against insurgents and their training continues receive heavy emphasis. Ranger cadre training initiated June 1960, and in April 1961, joint U.S.-ARVN Ranger training team began unit training program for Ranger companies. Intensive unit training now being conducted at two sites in or near actual operational areas assigned to companies. Plans have been made in past six months to expand overall RVNAF school system to meet increased need for trained leaders and specialists.

Due urgent necessity train forces more rapidly to meet current and developing situation, MAAG has developed a master training program to retrain on rotational basis, all present VN ground forces and train newly activated units. U.S. advisors will instruct ARVN and civil guard instructors and cadre, assist in selection training area and preparation training schedules and lesson plans, plus actively supervise actual training. This system has proved highly successful at Quang Trung and Song Mai training centers and with U.S. mobile training teams assigned to Ranger training sites. Training programs have been pared of all “nice to know” subjects and concentration has been placed on “must know” and training times have been cut to absolute minimum.

Sufficient Special Forces personnel now on hand to train Vietnamese Special Forces (1st Observation Group). In addition, 21 Ranger qualified personnel permanently assigned MAAG plus others experienced counter-guerrilla tactics and techniques. Also during FY 61, five Special Forces mobile training teams, totaling 53 personnel, have been brought South Viet-Nam and have been utilized for training regular ARVN forces. At present Special Forces mobile training team conduction gaining for Ranger units at three different training sites. Training of additional forces recently authorized will require additional MAAG advisors trained and qualified in Special Forces, Ranger and counter-guerrilla operations. No particular problem anticipated this regard in numbers or quality.

In summary, consider present quality counter-guerrilla training excellent. Problem lies ARVN ability to make available for training sufficient forces from operational areas. Success of MAAG plan mentioned above is largely dependent on output of trained units from 20,000 force increase which will serve as rotational base for old units now on operations.RVNAF has not yet felt results this form JCE [?] increase due to lead time required for activation, organization, equipping and training new units.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-1461. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Vientiane, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. Document 117.
3. See Document 120.
4. Document 114.
5. Not found.
6. Not found.