Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

114. Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem¹

Washington, August 5, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: Dr. Eugene Staley has told me personally of the mission which he and his special financial group undertook to Viet-Nam at my request. He has told me of the courteous and understanding welcome he received from you and from the members of your government, and has described to me the progress you have already made despite the great difficulties of Communist subversion which you face. I was pleased to hear of the cooperative and friendly spirit which animated the meetings of the Vietnamese and American experts. It is particularly encouraging to me that this spirit of cooperation, which was embodied in the joint undertakings of the counter-insurgency plan and which was so evident during the visit of Vice President Johnson, will now be carried on through the very practical medium of parallel Vietnamese and American committees.

I have examined the joint action program which the Vietnamese and American experts propose² and I heartily agree with the three basic tenets on which their recommendations are based, namely:

1. Security requirements must, for the present, be given first priority.

2. Military operations will not achieve lasting results unless economic and social programs are continued and accelerated.

3. It is in our joint interest to accelerate measures to achieve a self-sustaining economy and a free and peaceful society in VietNam.

I also agree that we are more likely to succeed if both of our countries take adequate action now than if we react to the Communist threat by slow and insufficient measures.

I consider that the joint action program put before us by our expert groups offers a sound foundation on which our two governments can build rapidly and successfully. Therefore, having in mind your letter of June 9³ and the strong recommendation of Ambassador Nolting, I should like to inform you that the United States will provide equipment and assistance in training as needed for an increase in the armed forces of Viet-Nam from 170,000 to 200,000 men. In order to make such an increase as effective as possible I suggest that before the time when the level of 170,000 is reached our governments should satisfy themselves on the following points: (1) That there then exists a mutually agreed upon, geographically phased strategic plan for bringing Viet-Cong subversion in the Republic of Viet-Nam under control; (2) That on the basis of such a plan there exists an understanding on the training and use of these 30,000 additional men; (3) That the rate of increase from 170,000 to 200,000 will be regulated to permit the most efficient absorption and utilization of additional personnel and material in the Vietnamese armed forces with due regard to VietNam’s resources.

I also suggest, in view of the fact that the force level of 200,000 will probably not be reached until late in 1962, that decision regarding a further increase above 200,000 be postponed until next year when the question can be re-examined on the basis of the situation which we shall then be facing. Meanwhile, the buildup in equipment and training of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps within already agreed levels should be expedited.

Returning to the joint action program, I am most encouraged to learn of the large measure of agreement reached by our expert groups on the steps required to meet the piaster financing problems posed by the joint action program. It seems to me that in the light of these recommendations we can move forward simultaneously on measures to solve this problem by a combination of actions by the two governments: by the Government of the United States, within the limits of available funds, to provide the external resources which are required, including commodity imports which can be justified and absorbed under the seven criteria of the joint action program; and by the Government of VietNam, to generate the piasters to direct the resources of Viet-Nam to the highest priority requirements. The several means to acquire such piasters are spelled out in the joint action program. I hope that our parallel committees can immediately cooperate in working out target estimates for an import program which will give both our governments a basis for planning.

The early implementation of the joint recommendation of the expert groups regarding tax reform and the principle of a single and realistic rate of exchange, using methods which take into account the political and psychological factors which I know you have to weigh, will certainly increase the effectiveness of American aid to VietNam. I hope this recommendation can be implemented soon. Within the limits of funds to be made available by the Congress and within the agreed criteria, my policy shall be to help you as much as possible to achieve a break-through in your efforts to bring security to your people and to build toward economic independence.

Turning to the experts’ joint recommendations for emergency social action and to the direct aid programs already under way, I am asking Mr. Labouisse, Director of International Cooperation, to conduct through USOM Viet-Nam a thorough and expeditious review with your experts of the new proposals and of other programs which these proposals were intended to supplement. Among these I mention as of special interest the fields of communications, including television and radio; agrovilles, land development, agricultural credit and agricultural extension; extended assistance to road building; continued efforts to expand education, particularly primary and elementary education in the villages; training for rural administration; and plans to assure more and better equipped and trained officials, adequately compensated, especially in rural areas and in the villages. Our basic premise is that these programs be designed with your government to meet your needs and conditions, and that they be carried out by your people, with our assistance where required. I especially wish USOM to offer whatever help you think will be most effective to strengthen the vital ties of loyalty between the people of Free Viet-Nam and their government.

As an integral part of our efforts to meet the current crises, I believe it is essential that we continue and expand the progress which has already been made toward the long range development of VietNam. The emergency measures which we undertake should be solidly anchored-as soon as possible-in a comprehensive long range planning process to determine the best uses which can be made of available resources on a time-phased basis. Only in this way can we adequately meet the long and short term requirements which interact in the problems which our two countries must solve together. This will require the creation of more effective planning machinery as recommended in the joint report of our experts. In addition to development of a long range plan, the training of staff to carry on planning activities (covering such matters as the use of medical manpower and teachers for which Viet-Nam has competing civilian-military requirements) might be expedited. I urge that our parallel committees develop specific projects in line with the general recommendations of the report.

In the face of competing and urgent demands for aid and assistance from countries throughout the world we shall make our contribution to the future of VietNam. Our support of VietNam’s independence and development will, as I have assured you in the past, remain among the highest priorities of American foreign policy. As indicated above, we are prepared to commit, within the limits of our available aid funds, substantial resources to assist you in carrying out the military and economic and social components of the special action program. In order to speed the action during this emergency period and to permit greater flexibility I should like to emphasize that the chief responsibility for the planning and execution of the American share of the program will, more than ever, rest with Ambassador Nolting and, under his direction, with MAAG and USOM. In this connection I hope that, with the delegation of maximum authority to the parallel committees as recommended by our experts, the committees will assure follow-up action, approve modifications of the program and “recommend measures to improve and adapt the special action program as the situation changes.”

In conclusion I believe that we have now agreed on sound ways to strengthen the Vietnamese economy and Vietnamese security in the face of the mounting Communist threat. Now we can proceed to develop additional concrete plans and carry them out rapidly and effectively.

I firmly believe that if our countries continue to work so effectively together, the Almighty will grant us the strength and the will to succeed.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy⁴

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files; FRC 66 A 878, 350 GVN-TF-SFG. Attached to the source text is a copy of the letter of transmittal, dated August 6, from Nolting to Diem.
2. See Document 93.
3. See footnote 3, Document 69.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.