Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 14, 1961, 7 p.m.

229. Task Force VN. This replies to pares 3 and 5 Department’s 160.² Since replies to other pares need not be classified above Secret, they are being forwarded by separate cable³ to facilitate handling and use.

3. Re action against North Vietnam, Diem is not impetuous man. Actions he has approved to date are limited in scope and intention: to build intelligence base and provide foundation for restricted harassment and sabotage. This is designed to maintain hope of liberation in north and inspire passive resistance to slow NVN’s development arid absorb its energies to divert them from attacks on SVN. It seeks to avoid encouraging any premature violent uprising which would be repressed for lack of sufficient support from free world. Diem also sees that larger scale attacks upon NVN would extend DRV’s liberty of action against SVN when he has enough problems from DRV’s covert attacks. In specific terms:

(A) Air Drops: Diem has accepted this tactic, and risk of losses among participants, but is deeply concerned over possible losses among limited number of pilots in VNAF. Within limits outlined above he would probably accept an enlarged program, especially one providing more modern aircraft and additional aircrews.

(B) Coastal raids: Diem accepts coastal infiltration of agents. Any program of coastal raids would be evaluated against considerations outlined above, as well as practical problems of providing necessary sea lift capable of penetrating DRV’s naval defenses (including some 25 modern Swatow class patrol gunboats).

5. Diem gravely concerned over deterioration situation southern Laos in recent months and would of course like to see action taken to clean up that area. Any decision on part of GVN to throw sizable force into this effort would be grave one not only because it would represent broadening of war in which GVN now engaged but because of limited available GVN forces to meet current military needs. Believe however that GVN would seriously consider as part cooperative effort commitment some additional forces beyond small number of Vietnamese Special Forces and regulars now engaged in Laos and along Lao border. GVN officials continue to talk in admiring and favorable terms about use of Pakistani troops in Laos, but we are not in position judge practicality of this idea. Diem might not insist upon actual involvement of US combat forces at outset of cooperative action in Laos but would certainly seek to obtain clear commitment by US to send in combat forces if need developed.

GVN operations Laos tactically and strategically sound and desirable. Due guerrilla war now going on in Viet Nam GVN military forces immediately available for cooperative action in Laos could probably consist only additional small units somewhat similar those now in Laos (principally along route 9) but with perhaps broader role, possibly to include limited combat support of Lao units. GVN might as calculated risk commit larger forces to Laos with view toward preventing intensified future VC infiltration through Laos, but sizable GVN operation in Laos could probably be considered only within time frame required to mobilize, train and equip additional forces now planned but not yet available. Forces being added under 30,000 increase will provide additional capability but these not available in significant numbers before late 1962. Should be recognized that, if the above occurs, there is possibility that increased enemy action will force GVN to escalate its forces committed across Lao border beyond whatever level it originally decides-e.g., small to sizable. In latter case it important it be kept in mind that additional 30,000 increment is required for GVN primary task of defeating insurgency within Viet Nam at approximately its present intensity.

Bangkok and Vientiane much better qualified than me to comment on likelihood Sarit and Phoumi cooperation in cleanup southern Laos. From Saigon it would appear that Phoumi could be persuaded without much trouble as we believe there is inclination on his part at times to throw in towel re northern Laos, withdraw his forces to south and attempt set up separate government there. Phoumi would probably regard cooperative effort in southern Laos as at least giving him greater assurance of being able hold out there if he is obliged give up north.

Would appear to US Sarit might be harder to convince that southern Laos should have priority as against occupying all parts of Laos adjacent to Mekong and thus bordering Thailand. We would assume if enough outside support thrown in (e.g., Pakistani troops) to conduct both operations, Sarit would willingly cooperate on southern Laos operation as well.

Above is based on my understanding first question under five refers to cooperative action just as remaining two questions do. If, however, first question stands alone and refers to unilateral GVN troop employment in eastern Laos for primary purpose defense South Viet Nam, then our response is:

With respect infiltration individuals or small groups VC, GVN troops not now capable with or without pushing out into Laos controlling very numerous rugged and forested infiltration points which occur entire length all borders here. Military forces required for high degree control infiltration type described above would be prohibitive regardless location of troops. On other hand for control any sizable communist troop units or supply routes GVN forces located Laos on major avenues of approach and commanding terrain worthy consideration. This for purposes early warning and desirability meeting enemy ahead of own borders plus additional indication determination stop aggression. Extent GVN troop commitment for this purpose would be governed by essentially same factors as those outlined above with respect to cooperative action in Laos. Presently RVNAF are studying MAAG recommended techniques to reduce infiltration such as defoliant, change from present static guard posts to mobile concept involving additional patrols including dogs, establishment of buffer population, additional roads and air fields and like, which are long range in nature and cannot be expected to stop but only progressively reduce infiltration.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-1461. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Vientiane, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. Document 117.
3. Document 119.