351. Editorial Note
At the 458th meeting of the National Security Council, September 7, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Robert H. Johnson, September 12, reads as follows:
“Mr. Dulles pointed out that he had briefed the Council about a month ago [on August 18; see Document 346] on Sino-Soviet relations, reporting on problems that had developed between the two countries. We now believe, Mr. Dulles indicated, that Communist China and the USSR have been quarreling for about two years. This quarrel has involved five fundamental issues. The first is whether Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful co-existence should be replaced by a more militant and revolutionary policy, especially in the underdeveloped countries. The Communist Chinese favor such a change. The second is whether the Bloc should avoid local wars or whether it should actually stimulate or incite ‘just’ wars. The Chinese favor the latter policy, the Soviets do not. The third issue is whether disarmament should be seriously negotiated. Moscow apparently favors serious negotiations, the Chinese do not. The fourth issue is whether Communist parties in non-Communist countries can hope to take power without armed struggle. The Soviets believe that they can, the Chinese believe that they cannot. The final issue is whether Communist parties in non-Communist countries should press minimum or maximum programs and whether they should cooperate with non-Communist political forces. The USSR favors minimum programs and cooperation with the non-Communists, the Chinese take the opposite position.
“Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Chinese had brought these issues forward at a meeting in Peiping of the World Federation of Trade Unions shortly before the Bucharest meeting in June. At Bucharest the Soviet Communists had been on the offensive. Following the Bucharest meeting, an eighty-four page memorandum had been distributed by the Soviets to all Communist parties. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] This memorandum re-affirmed the Soviet position on the issues in dispute and directly rebuked the Communist Chinese. It closed with a warning that if the Chinese failed to draw the proper conclusions, Soviet aid to Communist China would be reduced or eliminated.
“Khrushchev followed this memorandum with a bitter speech attacking Communist China. About a week later the Chinese issued a harsh rejoinder rejecting Soviet charges and reciting grievances relating to the failure of the USSR to support Communist China on the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese stated that unless the USSR backed down, Communist China would expel Soviet technicians and publicly repudiate Soviet aid. The Soviets replied to this statement with an angry letter re-affirming [Page 720] the Soviet position. Mr. Dulles noted that the Soviet home radio has begun to prepare the Soviet people for this dispute, having ceased comment in recent weeks on Communist China.
“Mr. Dulles stated that the Soviets had called a party plenum at which Communist China had been denounced for a Left sectarian deviationism. This denunciation was similar in character but not as strong as the Cominform’s original denunciation of Tito. Shortly after this denunciation, Soviet technicians began to leave Communist China. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] There has been some increase in the rate of departure but a number of technicians are still in Communist China. It is not clear who took the initiative with respect to the departure of the technicians; whether it was the Chinese or the Soviets. Concurrently with these developments and after a meeting of the Chinese Communist leadership, the Shanghai Journal published an emotional editorial expressing anger with the USSR. Mr. Dulles quoted from this editorial. He went on to say that similar emotional passages appeared in an article by a member of the Communist Chinese Politburo. This latter article also discussed a new Chinese policy of increased emphasis on agriculture. This new policy may reflect a concern over Chinese crop failures but it also perhaps reflects the likelihood of less Soviet aid for Chinese industry.
“Mr. Dulles noted that there will be an international Communist conclave in November at which an attempt will be made to resolve this issue. The Soviets have moved to isolate Communist China within the world Communist movement. Harsh attacks have been made on the Communist Chinese in Soviet media and the Soviets have charged Communist China with disorganizing and disorienting other Communist parties. The contents of a letter sent in August to all Communist parties has been obtained [1 line of source text not declassified]. This letter contained a sober analysis of the dispute and emphasized that the dispute should not be publicized because to do so would help the West. The letter also stated that the USSR would try to resolve the dispute in November. Between now and November both sides will be seeking to judge the degree of support they will obtain from other Communist parties. In this connection Mr. Dulles noted that the North Koreans had sided with Moscow. The Soviets, he said, may induce Communist China to seek an accommodation. However, Mr. Dulles saw little prospect that the dispute could be resolved under the present leadership in the two countries because the leadership in both countries had committed its prestige to too great an extent. The next move was up to Peiping. Mr. Dulles said the CIA had a great deal of documentation on this dispute and finally observed that he was afraid that the Communist Chinese and the USSR might get together in November. Secretary Herter asked whether it was correct that there were about 1000 technicians left in Communist China. Mr. Dulles confirmed that this was the fact.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)