Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

350. Special National Intelligence Estimate⁰

SNIE 43–60

Washington, September 6, 1960.

THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS¹

The Problem

To re-examine the likelihood of renewed Chinese Communist military activity in the Taiwan Strait area in the next year or so, and the consequences of the loss, evacuation, or successful defense of the offshore islands.²

Conclusions

1. Chinese Communist military capabilities in the Taiwan Strait area have improved since 1958. At the same time, Peiping’s objectives in the Strait have not changed. We therefore believe that the Chinese Communists are likely within the next year or so to initiate a probing action to test again nationalist strength and morale and US resolve. Although it is possible, we believe it unlikely that the Chinese Communists would launch surprise frontal attacks on one or more of the major offshore islands, [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

2. The Soviet attitude toward Chinese Communist initiatives in the Taiwan Strait area, and the degree of support they might accord the Chinese, would depend to a considerable extent on the course of the current Sino-Soviet controversy. On balance, we believe that the USSR would agree to a Chinese Communist renewal of military pressure. However, we believe that Moscow would attempt to obtain assurances that Peiping would avoid actions likely to provoke a direct clash with US forces. [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

3. The loss of the major offshore islands either through assault or evacuation would be a severe blow to the Nationalist government and would impose a very heavy strain on US-Nationalist relations, [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

4. If the islands were lost as the result of a Chinese Communist military attack, the Nationalist armed forces would be seriously weakened and the contribution the Nationalists could make to the defense of Taiwan would be seriously reduced. The Nationalist leaders would probably conclude initially that their government’s rationale, national direction, and purpose had been all but swept away. These reactions might be somewhat mitigated in time if with US assistance a large part of the island garrisons were saved. [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

5. Only the strongest US pressure could persuade the Nationalists to withdraw their troops from the offshore islands. Even if they could be persuaded, which is by no means certain, the pressures that would have to be exerted on them would leave a residue of great bitterness toward the US and would initially produce most of the political and psychological manifestations of Nationalist distress which would follow a military defeat. [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

6. If the Nationalists were still convinced that the US would defend Taiwan and lend its full support to the political and economic development of the island, most of them would in time probably adjust to the situation and establish a new sense of individual and national purpose which would not necessarily exclude the hope of eventually regaining control of the mainland. Despite the demoralization and the political difficulties resulting from the loss of the major offshore islands, we believe that the government would continue to function and to maintain order on Taiwan, that it would still be possible to deny Taiwan to the Communists, and that the US could salvage some position of strength there. Taiwan would probably remain a link, although a much weaker and less militant one, in the anti-Communist defenses in the western Pacific. [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

7. Loss of the offshore islands, whether or not the US had intervened, would damage US prestige in the non-Communist world. A successful defense of the islands would give non-Communist nations greater confidence in US strength and determination. At the same time most of the non-Communist world would have been gravely alarmed by the outbreak of overt hostilities and in general would probably still believe that continued Nationalist control of the islands constituted a dangerous point of international tension. [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (47 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified]

[Here follow 9-1/2 pages of 2-column source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

   “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

   “Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 6 September 1960.”

1. This estimate supplements NIE 43–59, “Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China,” dated 17 November 1959 and SNIE 100–4–59, “Chinese Communist Intentions and Probable Courses of Action in the Taiwan Strait Area,” dated 13 March 1959. [Footnote in the source text. See Documents 341 and 272.]
2. This estimate is concerned primarily with the major offshore islands, Big and Little Chinmen and the Matsus. [Footnote in the source text.]