352. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
724. I am inclined to agree with Consul General Hong Kong1 that while Soviet and Chinese may succeed in plastering over cracks in their relations, they will probably not succeed in actually resolving their differences and in long run I believe these will tend to grow more acute. I would not, however, expect complete break [at] least in near future, but would not exclude break in party relations along lines of Soviet quarrel with Yugoslavia. These conclusions flow from analysis of what would appear from Moscow to be principal areas of disagreement between two countries and regimes.
Difficult distinguish between ideology and practice/particularly since communists almost invariably conduct arguments in doctrinal terms. There have been evidences that Mao takes particular pride his standing as theoretician, which no doubt higher than Khrushchev thoughout Bloc, but both men must be conscious of fact that ideological and political leadership will inevitably go together. With Khrushchev’s practical bent and greater maturity Soviet regime, natural Soviets should be revisionists and Chinese doctrinists. Despite emphasis on ideological matters, however, would seem unlikely that questions pure doctrine in themselves of great importance in dispute.
One of major issues is surely that of purpose for which power of Bloc to be used. In recent years Khrushchev as leader of Bloc has pressed for achievement of objectives which primarily of interest to USSR. China doubtless considers its primary objective of taking Taiwan has been neglected, as have other areas of major interest to China.
There is also obvious disagreement on tactics which Bloc should follow, which is of fundamental importance. This arises partly from differences in internal and external needs between two countries (Soviets, with growing economic strength, believe continuation peace, if not détente atmosphere, in their best interests). Khrushchev appears be personally completely convinced communists can win through demonstration superiority their system and exploitation growing Soviet economic powers. Red Chinese, with grave domestic economic problems, consider high stage tension necessary their survival and development.
[Page 722]Chinese Communists no doubt deeply resent failure Soviets assist them in attaining atomic capability. Prevention such development probably one of chief reasons for persistence with which Soviets have pressed for agreement end atomic testing.
Chinese probably believe commune system effective form of social organization in their present condition. Soviets probably oppose on ideological as well as practical grounds. From Soviet viewpoint, if commune system succeeded one of fundamental bases Soviet claim for Bloc leadership would be shaken; that is that USSR, being first to establish communist state and having had greater experience, has right to choose path for others to follow. On other hand, I suspect Soviets are also concerned as result their own experience that if Chinese push commune system too hard and too far, whole communist regime in China might be overthrown.
Whatever two regimes actually believe about inevitability of war, they clearly differ in methods avoiding it. Soviets place reliance on military strength of Bloc combined with reliance on peace forces (Bloc populations, friendly neutrals, “progressives” in capitalist countries) as well as negotiations and moves designed weaken and forestall determined reactions by free world governments. Chinese would appear believe in all-out support for revolutionary movements as means earliest seizure power by communists wherever possible. For example they have diplomatic relations with FNG rebels while Soviets so far have avoided this in order not irreparably damage relations with France. ChiComs must believe Soviet policy inhibits exploitation targets of opportunity whereas Soviets follow longer-range strategy and are prepared on occasion to use restraint in order go for bigger game. Chinese probably prepared run greater risk of war where specific Chinese interest involved than Soviets, though it cannot be said Khrushchev’s policies have been cautious in this respect.
Chinese doubtless resent fact Soviets have not given them free economic assistance and consider aid which Soviets have given non-Bloc countries could better be given them (though Khrushchev announced some time ago that all members socialist bloc would arrive at stage of communism at about same time, thereby implying large-scale assistance to China, what has happened thus far has been concentration external aid on non-Bloc countries).
On purely nationalistic basis there are conflicts of interest in Mongolia, Korea and Central Asia and Soviets doubtless view with apprehension exploding Chinese population.
Likely that Chinese sensitive over Soviet neutral position on Chinese disputes with India, Indonesia, Burma and Nepal and prob-ably over Soviet restraint in Laos situation. On other hand Soviets undoubtedly [Page 723] annoyed over damage their larger designs these areas by ChiCom actions.
We see many evidences here of temperamental and psychological conflict between Russians and Chinese. Chinese resent exclusion from World Councils whereas Khrushchev’s wide travels and many public appearances in part designed consolidate his personal position Bloc leadership. Both Russians and Chinese inordinately proud as well as sensitive. From what we know of Soviet methods they must certainly have offended Chinese sensibilities on many occasions and it seems clear Chinese have not concealed their contempt for Russians as inferior intellectually and culturally.
On other side of picture, both regimes believe in communist system and its eventual triumph. Both also cannot fail realize that Bloc as whole would be seriously and perhaps fatally weakened if their differences allowed develop into full break. Seems unlikely either side will renounce its position of fundamental disagreements however either under pressure or by negotiation though strong effort will be made present united front to world.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/9–1060. Confidential. Repeated to Hong Kong, Paris, London, Bonn, and USUN. A copy bears the President’s initials. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)↩
- Telegram 465 from Hong Kong, September 2, transmitted the Country Team’s assessment of Sino-Soviet relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/9–260; see Supplement)↩