Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, May 17, 1958, 7 p.m.

4266. CINCPAC also for POLAD. For Assistant Secretary Robertson from Ambassador Jones. Foreign Minister summoned me this morning to inform me that battalion of Chinese troops had landed in Sulawesi to fight with rebels. I said I found this hard to believe and inquired how they got there. Foreign Minister said he believed they had arrived by corvette but had no further details. He took very serious view of this, pointing out difficulty of resisting pressure for foreign volunteers on behalf GOI under circumstances this kind.

He indicated that this and other evidence of continued build-up rebel forces combined with my démarche to Prime Minister May 15 (Embtel 4230)¹ had convinced Indonesian Government that there had been considerable retrogression in US position since my original exploration of arms subject of May 7 (Embtel 4112).² I denied that this was case, I pointed out PL 480 rice had been authorized, arms shipment under active exploration, and finally, that démarche referred to was exploration in attempt to help them solve problem. Foreign Minister asked me for summary of what I had told Djuanda. I reviewed conversation fully. When I had finished, he said he appreciated motives, but that cease-fire would imply recognition rebel regime or at least willingness to negotiate and this they would never consider.

Djuanda was terribly discouraged and was talking of resigning, he said. If Prime Minister took this step, reorganization of government would move in opposite direction than that desired by US. Djuanda felt that he was just reaching point of success in obtaining reorganization of government (NU had yesterday agreed to program reported Embtel 4230, paragraph 12) but that combination foregoing events plus bombing of Ambon market place last Sunday had given him feeling US not interested in helping. Bomber hit market place at most crowded time when people were shopping and on their way to church (Ambon being Christian) and more than 100 civilians had been killed. Ambonese were now violently bitter against both US and Menadonese.

Meanwhile, he pointed out, PKI was hammering away on slogan—“It is war, war against foreign country.” Almost every day that went by brought new evidence which they could exploit.

Foreign Minister pleaded for some positive gesture from US soonest. At moment moral support more than material support was required. Doubt of US intentions was growing on all sides. Djuanda government could not last much longer under present circumstances, he said. Its policy of discussions with us in attempt to obtain US assistance in discouraging foreign interference on side of rebels was certain to be branded as failure in near future. Should this happen, open attack on US would follow almost inevitably and acceptance of volunteers from Soviet bloc. Conviction was also growing in Djakarta, he said, that US Government was determined to cause Djuanda cabinet to fall. He knew reorganization of cabinet represented US desire, but he and Djuanda had hoped that US pressure was not directed at Djuanda as Prime Minister. He also thought that if it were, US was making grave mistake.

I assured him that this was certainly not the case. As he aware I had great confidence in Djuanda and was convinced he was man of integrity and sincerity of purpose, that he was known in US and that I could categorically deny that US policy was directed at liquidation Djuanda leadership.

If we wanted to help instead of hurt, then, Foreign Minister said, and assist Prime Minister in his desire to reorganize cabinet most helpful thing we could do would be for Secretary to make statement clearly indicating that US was willing to let Indonesian Government handle rebellion as internal affair. Public statement was urgently needed to reassure GOI that US was doing what it could to discourage foreign aid to rebels and was willing to let GOI fight it out and defeat rebels if such were outcome.

Comment: It is self-evident from above pressure is mounting here. Exact moment to ease up on our side is delicate decision but as I have indicated in Embtels 4234 and 4254,³ I believe that moment has arrived. Unless some positive evidence of US good will is forthcoming soon, I think we may anticipate explosion in near future which almost certain to be deleterious to US interests and objectives.

I think, for example, resignation of Djuanda would be contrary to US interest. It is difficult to know how seriously to take this possibility. Djuanda has threatened to resign before but had been holding on, anticipating possibility of ultimately getting Hatta, for whom he is willing to step aside, into cabinet. But there is apparently no chance of getting Hatta into cabinet before fight with rebels is over, on basis his own position.

Djuanda then becomes hope of (A) obtaining early reorganization of cabinet to get rid of world [?] elements, Hanafi and weak sister (Tobing) adding Sultan of Djogjakarta as member and (B) ultimate takeover of cabinet by Hatta. I am convinced if Djuanda resigned with lack of US support as contributing factor, alternative will be most unsatisfactory whereas if we can take some action that will be interpreted as favorable to him, I believe we have good chance of progressing toward what we want: action against PKI.

Let me reemphasize that there are no views that I know of in this community—American, British, Australian or anti-Communist Indonesian—in disagreement with idea that it is time for America to make strong positive gesture of support for GOI. My own view is that this can best come in public expression by Secretary, but it should be accompanied by real effort to discourage additional support for rebels and particularly bombing which has roused antagonism of even those elements sympathetic rebel objectives.⁴

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1758. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and also sent to CINCPAC.
1. Document 97.
2. Document 84.
3. Documents 99 and 100.

4. In telegram 3339 to Djakarta, May 17, the Department informed the Embassy that it could not confirm that Chinese troops landed in Sulawesi nor was there any indication that such a movement was underway. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1758)

   In telegram 4292 from Djakarta, May 19, Jones informed Robertson that he concurred that the Indonesian Government was apparently adamant against any open negotiations with the rebels, but noted that it had made covert approaches in the past. Consequently, Jones recommended that if General Kawilarang could be induced to contact General Gatot Subroto in Tokyo where both would be attending the Asian Games, “this would enable exploration possible settlement.” (Ibid., 756D.00/5–1958)