Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

97. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, May 15, 1958, 1 p.m.

4230. For Assistant Secretary Robertson from Ambassador Jones. Deptels 3300 and 3301.¹ Démarche contained in reference telegrams was seed sown on stony ground, but I believe clarification of GOI attitude brought about thereby can be considered productive. Djuanda made clear (1) GOI was unified in rejection any consideration of negotiation with rebels; (2) principal leaders GOI aware dangers of Communist growth and have moved from talk stage to action stage; (3) reorganization of Cabinet now imminent.

Immediately upon receipt of reference telegrams, I requested appointment with Prime Minister Djuanda and was received at his home at 6:15 p.m. Foreign Minister has been ill for several days so was not present. I instructed ARMA to seek appointment with Nasution so that information would reach him simultaneously.

I presented verbal statement outlined in Deptel 3301 almost verbatim and informed Djuanda that I was planning to see Sukarno to speak to him along same lines. I then explored with Djuanda possibility of a cease-fire along lines contained Deptel 3300. Before I could complete what I had to say, almost at first mention of words “cease-fire,” Prime Minister interrupted and inquired what I meant by “cease-fire”. When I explained, he shook his head incredulously and said, “but this would mean negotiating with the rebels. This we could never accept”.

I pointed out that both he and General Nasution had emphasized their problem of two-front fight and difficulty of taking positive action against Communists within Java until cessation of military action. This would seem to lead to logical conclusion that less dangerous enemy should be eliminated by peaceful settlement which would permit concentration effort on enemy representing more serious threat to independence of nation. We were not suggesting terms of settlement—that was GOI business. We were simply offering use of US as voice to propose cease-fire.

I referred to Foreign Minister Subandrio’s suggestion that Secretary make statement on settlement of rebellion and that if GOI were willing to agree to a cease-fire Secretary would be willing to take initiative in publicly suggesting that both parties agree to cease-fire.

Djuanda rejected this flatly, commenting that there was one thing upon which he, President Sukarno, Suwirjo, head of PNI, and Army were in complete agreement—that was that there would be no negotiations with Indonesian Army officers who had sought foreign assistance in fighting other Indonesians. They were adamant on this point, he said. If GOI negotiated with rebels at this stage, it would be regarded as sign of weakness and blood of Indonesians shed in Sumatra would have been shed in vain, that is, authority of government and Army Headquarters would not have been reestablished. If they had been willing to negotiate they would have negotiated earlier. They certainly would not negotiate now with Colonel Sumual and Colonel Warouw.

We had long discussion of various aspects proposal but he was immovable. Basis of his position was cease-fire must lead to negotiations, GOI would not negotiate. I argued that GOI had insisted rebels in Menado had no popular support. If premise correct and cease-fire obtained, then GOI could simply await inevitable collapse of Sumual–Warouw. Djuanda said if GOI accepted cease-fire and rebels did not, GOI would appear weak. I countered with argument instead sign weakness, moral position of GOI would be greatly strengthened thereby.

I pointed out further that GOI might be risking Indonesian independence in order to carry out policy of crushing rebels. Prime Minister replied hotly, “Not if foreign interventionists stop supporting rebels. We can handle rebels if they do not receive additional foreign assistance. If rebels continue to receive additional foreign assistance then we too shall require additional foreign assistance”. If US would not help, they would be forced to go elsewhere.

I again pointed out effect this would almost inevitably have on independence of Indonesia and he said he recognized this only too well.

If US would not help even to extent of discouraging foreign assistance and GOI were faced with necessity of seeking additional aid from Soviet bloc, combination of external pressures from bloc plus internal Communist pressures might conceivably result in loss of independence and Communist Indonesia. He recognized fate of himself and others who were opposed to Communism under those circumstances but, he said, we have taken position from which we cannot withdraw.

This would be great tragedy, he said, particularly since GOI was beginning finally to take positive steps against Communists and adopt course in line with US thinking and was not because of pressures, he emphasized, but because it was right course to take and Indonesian leaders had finally awakened to fact. He summarized recent moves against PKI previously reported (May Day prohibitions, cancellation demonstrations against US, protection US economic interests after Aidit threat, etc.)² and said government was continuing to move in this direction as rapidly as possible. Within last three days, for example, he had succeeded in obtaining agreement of President, PNI leadership, and army to reorganization of cabinet which would dissolve ministries headed by Hanafi and Tobing.³ Sultan of Djogjakarta had finally agreed to enter cabinet but it still remained to be determined which portfolio to take, probably that of Economic Affairs. With this reorganization as first move he hoped that he could induce Hatta to join government at a later stage. He indicated Hatta, while opposing rebellion, would not join Cabinet until military action had ceased because of Hatta’s strong views that it never should have been thwarted and that affair could have been settled by negotiation.

Above program should be carried out within matter of days, he hoped. Agreement of NU was only element needed to enable him to move ahead immediately. Deputy Prime Minister Chalid, head of NU, agreed with program and would attempt to obtain NU concurrence at meeting of NU leaders Thursday and Friday.

Djuanda pleaded for US understanding of his government’s position and said if US sincere in desire to help and if we really meant what we said in my earlier statement (last two paragraphs Deptel 3301), there was one thing which his government needed more than anything else at present time—assurance US would do everything in its power to discourage further support to rebels from Philippines and Taiwan. He referred specifically to oil and gas supply from Philippines and Borneo by ship and air to Menado.

He knew, of course, he said, that US had power to influence events in Pacific area from which rebel support derived. Severance of rebel supply lines through US discouragement further aid to rebels he knew was within US capability if we were sincere and really wanted to end conflict. If, as he believed, withdrawal of further foreign support enabled GOI military forces end conflict, outcome, he felt strongly would be in mutual interest US and GOI. Should rebels reach point of being willing surrender, they would, in accordance Indonesian tradition, be treated generously. He thought Sumual, wealthy man now as result personal profit barter transactions during dissidence, would probably go abroad in any event.

While I was talking with Prime Minister, Col Cole (ARMA), was endeavoring to reach General Nasution, but General had previous commitments and Cole was received by Lt. Col. Sukendro at 8 PM. Col. Cole therefore did not cover reftels fully but did outline general idea on which reftels based, touching in exploratory way cease-fire suggestion.⁴

Colonel Sukendro, whom ARMA considers closest staff officer to Nasution in terms personal relations, expressed same view as Djuanda, that anything less than victory over rebels was out of question and that while Army was equally determined to crush rebels and Communists, General Nasution considered rebels must be liquidated to achieve his objectives and he would never consider negotiation with them. Army, however, had already begun to move against Communists within present capability and would do much more when rebel affair wound up. Sukendro expressed same view as Djuanda above that if intervention is stopped, GOI forces capable of rapid elimination of Menado rebels. With US assistance Army there would be in position to bring about changes in Cabinet apparently Sukendro not privy to or not privileged to reveal what Djuanda told me re prospects imminent Cabinet reorganization and intensified action against PKI.

My comments in telegram immediately following.⁵

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1558. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
1. Documents 92 and 93.

2. In telegram 4440 from Djakarta, May 28, the Embassy summarized these anti-Communist actions in part as follows:

   • “1. Prohibition of ‘foreign intervention’ demonstrations against U.S. Embassy in March 1958 in face of strong leftist propaganda linking U.S. to Sumatran arms drops.
   • “2. Prohibition of leftist rallies on 1 May and huge anti-intervention mass meeting on 16 May which would have been focused primarily against the U.S. on charge of intervention in Sumatra and North Sulawesi.
   • “3. Following threat by CPSec Aidit against U.S. commercial enterprises in telegram to Ambassador, Gen. Nasution announced that army would not tolerate any interference with foreign-owned oil interests and Prime Minister pledged protection to all U.S. interests.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/5–2858)

3. Ferdinand Lumban Tobing, Minister of Inter-Regional Affairs.
4. See Document 98.
5. See Document 99.