Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, May 15, 1958, 6 p.m.

4234. Embtel 4230.¹ Comment: In light strong position taken by Djuanda which I am certain reflects President’s views, unless Department instructs otherwise, I shall not seek immediate interview with Sukarno to present points embodied Deptel 3301.² He and Madame Sukarno are lunching with us on May 22 and this may provide opportunity for brief serious conversation. If not I shall ask him for appointment for another talk at which time I can cover these points among others. I also hope that in next press conference, Secretary will feel able take opportunity to say something reassuring to GOI. I have strong impression events here moving in direction favorable US interests and repeat that in my view time has come to give GOI more encouragement. I commented earlier that rebel action had been successful in precipitation issues. I think we can now go farther and say that this precipitation has resulted in decisions along lines favored by US. In my view we are at turn of tide in events which if seized can lead to gradual realization US objectives.

My discussion with Djuanda (Embtel 4230), Col. Cole’s talk with Lt. Col. Sukendro (ARMACX 161),³ and information I have reported from various other sources convince me that Sukarno, Djuanda, Subandrio and Nasution are united in conviction GOI can work with US only on following basis:

1. US to exercise its influence to bring about cessation of foreign support to rebels, especially air support.

2. GOI to reorganize Cabinet.

3. GOI to proceed to win military victory over rebels in Menado area.

4. GOI to move against Commies with US military aid supporting GOI forces.

5. GOI economic rehabilitation and development with US support.

You will understand extraordinary difficulty of obtaining clear-cut delineation of above items which stems from Indonesian sensitivity on subject strings to aid and consequent impossibility of setting forth US position to GOI in terms of quid pro quo. However, above appears to be essence of Indonesian attitude.

Points 2, 4, and 5 are in consonance with US objectives, but points 1 and 3 we recognize pose very difficult problems.

If as appears to be case, GOI is determined not to try again to open negotiations with rebels, and now insists on achieving military victory even at cost of accepting greater Commie support, then I believe we face new situation estimate of which might be somewhat as follows:

1. Rebel objectives at inception of revolt were set forth in proclamation reported Embtel 2489,⁴ February 11. In summary they encompassed following principal objectives:

(A) Restoration of Government based on constitution.

(B) Elimination of corruption.

(C) New cabinet formed by Hatta and Sultan to operate pending new constitution.

(D) More equitable distribution of revenues contributed by the regions.

2. GOI was not prepared at that time to accept these changes so rebels set up revolutionary Government and GOI launched military action. Now, however, issues have been precipitated by intervening events and GOI appears to be preparing to move in parallel line toward objectives originally set forth by rebels.

3. Time may be ripe, therefore, for reassessment of current rebel objectives. If rebel goals limited to achievement original political objectives, these appear to be in process realization. If, on other hand, rebels now look forward to military victory with foreign support and either complete takeover of GOI Government or fragmentation their country, these objectives would appear neither feasible nor in best US interests because they appear from here almost certain to involve swing of Java into Communist orbit.

4. If above reasoning sound, it would appear time has arrived to put brakes on rebel military effort. Since rebel movement has apparently exerted leverage sufficient to bring about GOI decision, it has served constructive purpose but I believe this is as far as it can go without pushing GOI to breaking point and alignment with Soviet bloc.

In view above considerations and uncompromising rejection US démarche on subject cease-fire by Djuanda which was, however, softened by news GOI seriously moving toward reorganization cabinet. I recommend consideration of following steps:

1. Statement by Secretary at next press conference deploring bombings, expressing hope conflict will soon be concluded and peace and stability restored to area and assuring GOI that US will do what it can to discourage foreign adventurers.

2. Take any steps available to us to slow down further material support for rebels.

3. Arrange if possible approach to rebels to:

(A) Ascertain present objectives, pointing out probably early fulfillment of their primary political objectives.

(B) Convey view of US that point has been reached at which further military action will play into hands of Communists.

(C) Urge rebels to move toward peaceful settlement of dispute. I am convinced it is in US interest to get this conflict settled soonest. It has served its purpose and continuance of fighting will, in my view, not serve US interests. It is clear that GOI will not serve US interests.[sic] It is clear that GOI will not make first overt move and covert move on their part was flatly rejected (ARMACX–158, May 12).⁵ It would seem, therefore, that next step should be to induce rebels to make covert overtures toward settlement.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1558. Secret; Niact. Transmitted in two sections.
1. Document 97.
2. Document 93.
3. Document 98.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/2–1158)
5. Document 90.