Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

204. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Léopoldville, September 9, 1960, 3 p.m.

659. In a conversation which lasted more than one hour, Chief of State made following points to Averell Harriman¹ and myself:

1. He was sure decision he had taken dismiss Lumumba was correct and he was going to stick to his guns. He knew population was behind him. When pressed as to how he planned to impose his authority, Kasavubu was vague and could only state right was on his side and eventually country would support him openly.

2. Governor stated he was surprised by Lumumba victory obtained in Chamber and particularly in Senate.² He declared anti-Lumumba forces had to have courage to stand up and be counted and not collapse as they appeared to have done in Senate where voting was so heavily pro-Lumumba. Kasavubu agreed his forces were afraid since Lumumba had control major portion military and police. Senators had been afraid to vote against Lumumba. Harriman made point that such parliamentary victory indicated to outside world that Lumumba was being supported by government.

3. Kasavubu declared Force Publique should be disarmed by UN. He stated although many soldiers loyal to him, Lumumba had succeeded converting army into political weapon by placing his friends in key positions. Once disarmed it should be reorganized by General Kettani through whom he believed he could successfully reorient the army.

4. Chief of State believes UN should protest and take countermeasures against unilateral military aid which Soviets are bringing into Congo. He was glad that by closing down airfields, UN had prevented Soviet planes from operating in country during past few days.

5. He declared Lumumba was surrounded by Communist advisers and that Prime Minister was in frequent contact with both Czech and Russian advisers.

6. Following his Monday night declaration dismissing Lumumba, he had received messages of support from Tshombe, Kalonji and Bolikango as well as other political leaders.

7. Harriman pointed out events last few days indicated Lumumba was getting stronger and asked Kasavubu what his plans were to counter-attack Lumumba. Kasavubu was nonplussed and asked for advice. I pointed out Congolese themselves and not outsiders had to resolve their own internal struggle for power. UN and friendly foreign countries could help only up to a point and that essence of independence was resolution of own governmental problems.

8. Kasavubu believed Tshombe could successfully defend Katanga against central government force who are not organized and who, in attacking Katanga and Kasai, would be spread thin.

9. He declared Lumumba was evil influence on country and Prime Minister was responsible for malaise and agitation which had happened since independence. So long as Lumumba remained in power such perturbation would continue thereby causing country to flounder deeper into political and economic anarchy.

10. Kasavubu agreed with my analysis that in order bring about peace and security, FP and police should be disarmed and courts should be set up and organized. These three elements at present time are major contributors to atmosphere of anarchy throughout country.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–960. Confidential. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels.
1. Former Governor of New York W. Averell Harriman was on a fact-finding mission in Africa for Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Records of many of his conversations, including this one, are in the Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Kennedy–Johnson Administration, Subject Files, Box 430, Africa Visit, 1960.
2. The Chamber of Deputies had voted on September 7 and the Senate on September 8 to overrule Kasavubu’s dismissal of Lumumba; for information concerning the debate, see Congo 1960, vol. II, pp. 827–850.