203. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting0
[Here follows a list of 31 persons present, including General Twining, Army Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White, Admiral Burke, Marine Corps Commandant General David M. Shoup, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin. Department of State representatives included Merchant and Satterthwaite. Agenda item I concerned an unrelated subject.]
II Congo (State Initiative)
Mr. Merchant opened the discussion on the Congo by stating he wished to flag Soudan as a new possible African trouble spot. Ambassador Alphand had told him that the French were going to recognize Senegal and that the Soudanese had told us if the French did this they would cut all ties with France. Mr. Merchant said that this might make Soudan another Guinea. As to the latest word from the Congo, the head of the Guinean military element in the Congo had announced his intention to recommend the withdrawal of 750 Guinean troops from the UN forces, Kasavubu had announced a new government with Ileo as Prime Minister and 300 Lumumba troops had invaded Katanga. Also, the Katanga police had momentary control of the Elisabethville airport.
Mr. Merchant said that we had read with interest and appreciation the JCS paper of September 2 on the Congo. He pointed out that we have been supporting Hammarskjold’s efforts to work in the direction recommended by the JCS. He observed that we had to give the Secretary-General full marks on his initiative, clarity of views and efforts to [Page 469] keep the Russians out of the Congo. He said as a result of the Congo it could be that we were moving into a serious crisis in the UN which might conceivably result in a blow-up of that organization.
Admiral Burke asked what happened if the UN votes to dissolve its forces in the Congo. Does this mean we would move in?
Mr. Merchant said that was planned.
General Twining said that the Chiefs were puzzled over who should supervise contingency planning for the Congo. They wondered whether this should be done by USCINCEUR, CINCLANT or in Washington. He said there have been some political repercussions on CINCEUR’s activities in the UN ferrying operations in the Congo but that after all he was the unified commander for the African area. General Twining wondered whether it would be feasible to do this planning in Paris.
Mr. Merchant said his immediate reaction was there was a great difference between the CINCEUR ferrying operation for the UN and unilateral military operations. [2 lines of source text not declassified] He was inclined to feel that planning should be done on this side of the ocean.
Mr. Satterthwaite said that in the African mind NATO and colonialism are synonymous.
General Twining observed that CINCEUR would have information on the entire African area.
Mr. Satterthwaite said that the most important element in the UN forces was the Ghanaian army and he pointed out that a number of African countries continued to be affected by the Algerian situation.
General Shoup referred to the Indonesian troops which were on their way to the Congo and wondered how we could keep them under the UN. He expressed the fear that they would be for Lumumba.
Mr. Merchant admitted that this was a risk but that Hammarskjold had picked his governments carefully and that we would have to rely on Hammarskjold’s efforts to keep these troops loyal to the UN.
Mr. Smith observed that the Indonesian army was the strongest anti-communist force in that country.
General Lemnitzer wondered how it would be possible to keep the Russians from getting into the Congo. He questioned the optimism expressed in the meeting on the Congo’s future. He asked whether UN troops have orders to keep the Russians out.
Mr. Satterthwaite said that was the purpose of the Security Council meeting.2 He pointed out that the shipment of Belgian arms had made the West’s position much more difficult.
[Page 470]General White said the most important element in his mind was the necessity for UN control of the airports and harbors.
General Twining agreed and said that if UN port commanders had more explicit orders they could help calm the situation. For example, with explicit orders the port commanders could stop Russian airplanes and ships.
General White said the important thing was to make this all an issue with the UN on the one hand and the USSR on the other.
General Twining said UN operations in Korea had been most successful and he hoped the lessons learned there could be applied in the Congo.
General White said we should make sure that all aid to the Congo was channeled through UN machinery.
Mr. Merchant said this would be impossible to get through the UN because the other African nations would object to this precedent being established.
General White said he just didn’t understand how the UN operated. He said there didn’t seem to be any central direction. The UN cannot be effective until all members recognized it as a supra-national body.
Mr. Merchant said the UN couldn’t be genuinely effective as long as the USSR was in the organization.
General Lemnitzer said the nations ought to agree that all aid to the Congo should go through the UN.
Mr. Satterthwaite said we could take all steps to encourage this concept but that it would be difficult.
General Lemnitzer said in Korea we did not let arms come in unilaterally. In the Congo a Swedish general is in charge and so why couldn’t he be authorized to search the Russian planes and ships for arms.
Mr. Satterthwaite said that Hammarskjold would like to have this authority.
Mr. Merchant observed that Hammarskjold was walking simultaneously on half a dozen tightropes. He said that Hammarskjold didn’t want to force some of these issues and that he wanted a broad resolution giving him freedom of action.
General Lemnitzer thought the whole operation was inefficient.
Mr. Merchant said it wasn’t only a problem of Russia but also of Belgium.
General Twining wondered why that was, to which Mr. Merchant replied that the Belgians hadn’t told Hammarskjold that they still had troops in the Congo. Hammarskjold was quite upset to learn that there were 650 paratroops there when the Belgians said they had departed. He said the only pressure we could exercise on the USSR was by Hammarskjold keeping the general support of the African members.
[Page 471]Admiral Burke wondered what USIA was doing in the Congo.
Mr. Merchant said he would check with what the VOA was doing there. It was his impression that they were carrying the African story as straight news.
After a few more extraneous comments from the others Mr. Merchant concluded the Congo discussion by saying we must continue to support as firmly as possible the UN Secretary-General.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items III–VI]
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Top Secret. The memorandum was a Department of State draft, not cleared with the Department of Defense. No other drafting information appears on the source text.↩
- The discussion took place at the Department of Defense.↩
- The Security Council was meeting on the evening of September 9 at Hammarskjöld’s request.↩