Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization⁰

September 9, 1960, 9:17 p.m.

Topol 311. Paris for USRO and Embassy. Ref: Polto 295.¹ Suggest you convey to De Staercke Department’s appreciation for conveying points reftel to US privately rather than in NAC meeting. As Department has indicated previously, US sympathetic to Belgian reactions to past developments in Congo crisis, but believes it in no one’s interest to continue recriminations in NATO forum.

Believe Wigny–De Staercke approach offers opportunity for another general presentation of current US thinking on Congo problem. You therefore should draw on following material for discussion with De Staercke.

US policy on Congo remains essentially as presented to Wigny by Ambassador Burden in early August (Brussels 395 rptd Paris 176).² Subsequent events have demonstrated soundness this position and in particular have justified our faith in SYG’s ability deal with situation. US has been increasingly concerned at Lumumba’s actions and at growing Soviet influence in Congo. We have brought our concern to SYG’s attention on numerous occasions and have been gratified to see concrete steps he has recently taken in Congo to counter this influence.

On bases, US believes Belgian-SYG agreement covers present situation. Agree with Belgium that UN control of bases should in no way prejudice eventual disposition. Obviously in West’s interests to deny bases to unfriendly elements. US hopes eventual bilateral solution between Belgium and Congo on disposition bases will be successful in this regard.

Regarding Katanga, US continues believe thrust UN activities should not be directed to undermining Tshombe’s or Katanga’s position or, conversely, to facilitate Lumumba’s entry into Katanga. Recent UN actions to gain control airports should be effective in this regard On other hand, Tshombe’s recent reported criticism of UN for taking control of base in Katanga not helpful to UN’s or Katanga’s cause.

Moreover, we must point out unfortunate effects press announcements re Belgian arms shipments to Katanga and we have already mentioned to Belgian Embassy here. This, coupled with reported continued presence Belgian paratroopers Kitona, makes it more difficult to take away club of troop issue from Lumumba and Soviets. Lastly, we hope Lumumba situation will somehow unfold so that general Congolese agreement to establish looser federal structure might become possible.

We continue hope Belgian civilians will have major role to play in Congo future and that Belgian contribution to economic life there can be maintained. We have spoken to Secretary General along these lines and he has indicated his agreement.

Finally, U.S. has been deeply concerned at strains in U.S.-Belgian bonds friendship as well as indications Belgian disappointment with NATO as result unfortunate events in Congo. We trust Belgium shares our desire to repair damage and to maintain traditional close friendly relations with U.S. as well as to support fully NATO objectives. We are certain that, despite Belgian disappointment at certain positions U.S. has taken, Belgium, like ourselves, believes overriding goal must be to keep Congo from falling under bloc influence. Keeping in mind delicacy of UN role, as well as importance not losing support other African states, this has been throughout underlying U.S. motivation.

For Brussels: You may draw on foregoing in any forthcoming discussions with GOB.

For London and Paris: You may draw on above as appropriate in discussions with British and French.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–160. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Miller and Chadbourn; cleared by Ferguson, Sisco, Blue, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs Russell Fessenden, and McBride; and approved by White. Repeated to Brussels, London, and the Embassy in Paris.
1. Polto 295 from Paris, September 1, reported that Belgian Representative André de Staercke had conveyed Wigny’s views to U.S. Representative W. Randolph Burgess. Wigny was critical of the positions taken in the crisis by Belgium’s NATO allies, which he viewed as a lack of solidarity. He argued that the only way to restore a pro-Western Congo was through Katanga and that if civil war was not prevented, there would be a “tragic loss” for the West in the center of Africa, with the Soviets and their allies moving in. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 7, Document 160.