175. Editorial Note
On August 12, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld submitted to the Security Council a memorandum with his interpretation of operative paragraph 4 of the Council’s August 9 resolution, which reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo would “not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise.” The Secretary-General’s interpretation concluded that “the United Nations Force cannot be used on behalf of the central government to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action”, nor could it be used to assist the central government in subduing the provincial government. For text, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.6; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pages 549–551.
Secretary-General Hammarskjöld left a copy of the memorandum in Léopoldville for transmission to the Congolese Government. He passed through Léopoldville on August 12 on his way to Elisabethville, where he and Moise Tshombé agreed on arrangements for the deployment of U.N. troops to Katanga; the text of a communiqué issued at Elisabethville on August 13 is ibid., pages 551–552.
The Secretary-General returned to Léopoldville on August 14, planning to discuss his talks in Elisabethville with the Congolese Government, but a letter of August 14 from Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to Hammarskjöld rejected his interpretation of the Security Council resolution, accused him of intervening in the conflict between Katanga and the central government, and made a series of demands. Citing the Security Council resolution of July 14, which had authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Congolese Government with military assistance and to do so in consultation with it, Lumumba declared: “It is therefore clear that in its intervention in the Congo the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organization but rather that the Security Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of my [Page 413] Government.” He requested that Congolese troops take over the task of guarding all airfields in the Congo from U.N. troops, that Congolese troops and troops from the various African contingents in the Congo should be sent immediately to Katanga, that aircraft should be provided to the Congo Government for the purpose of restoring order, that arms and ammunition should be seized from the rebel partisans in Katanga and put at the disposal of the Congo Government, and that all non-African troops should be withdrawn from Katanga. He declared in conclusion that if his government did not “receive satisfaction,” it would be “obliged to take other steps.” For text, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.7; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pages 552–554.
In further exchanges of letters between Hammarskjöld and Lumumba on August 15, the latter declared that the Congo Government had lost confidence in the Secretary-General and requested that the Security Council send observers representing Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Ceylon, Liberia, Mali, Burma, India, Afghanistan, and Lebanon to the Congo to ensure the immediate and entire application of the three resolutions. Hammarskjöld declared that the dispute over the interpretation of the resolution would be submitted to the Security Council. For texts of these communications, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.7; for extracts, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, volume V, pages 97–98.