Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations⁰

August 16, 1960, 8:44 p.m.

228. Following are preliminary views Department re forthcoming SC session on Congo:

1. Successful outcome this session likely prove of crucial importance for US and UN. We believe UN withdrawal from Congo would prove calamitous. Certain result would be chaos in Congo with Lumumba probably turning to USSR for help. Further result would be intense cold war struggle for control of area with potential danger of conflict spreading beyond Congo. Thus, in our view, issue is much broader than fate of Congo alone. Accordingly Dept considers our main objective in SC must be assure continuation effective UN presence in Congo.

2. We believe key to satisfactory outcome lies in SC members, particularly A–A representatives, giving fullest possible support to SYG.

3. Under circumstances we do not think it appropriate for US to take lead in directing course SC session but should be guided by views of SYG as they develop in consultations with Africans.

4. Accordingly, Dept believes best posture for USUN is one of quiet but complete support of SYG. In this regard, we agree entirely with Hammarskjold’s interpretation of SC res of August 9 that UN force cannot be party to or used to influence outcome of internal conflict in Congo. Lumumba’s demands re use UN force and facilities clearly unacceptable and contrary to spirit operative para 4 of SC res 4426.

5. Dept also agrees with Hammarskjold’s opposition to withdrawal of non-African contingents from UN force. We accept reasoning outlined to you by Cordier (urtel 415)¹ on this point and you authorized make clear in all conversations we believe that under existing circumstances this force should continue consist of multi-national elements along present lines.

6. It impossible forecast now precisely what type resolution likely emerge. This will only become clear after SYG’s consultations. In general, however, we would hope see resolution which reaffirms confidence in SYG and accepts his interpretation of UN mandate. We would also like to see resolution which clearly implies SC disapproval Lumumba’s attitude. Moderate African delegations, particularly Tunisia, will be best indicator of how much traffic likely to bear in this regard.

7. Dept hopes question Belgian troops will receive minimum attention and that discussion will focus on crux of issue, which has now become dispute between Lumumba and SYG re future of UN role in Congo.

8. Assume you will keep in close personal touch with SYG, UK, France, Belgium and Tunisia. Believe would also be useful for USUN to pay special attention to those states which are furnishing contingents to UN force in Congo.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1660. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum; cleared by Hare, Wilcox, White, Calhoun, and by an aide for Satterthwaite; and approved by Dillon. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, Paris, Tunis, Colombo, and to San José for the Secretary.
1. Telegram 415 from USUN, August 15, reported that Cordier had shown the Hammarskjöld-Lumumba messages summarized in Document 175 to members of the U.S. Mission. According to Cordier, Hammarskjöld felt that if the non-African contingents were withdrawn, the entire force should be removed; to do otherwise would be to affirm “isolationist regionalism,” which contradicted the whole concept of the United Nations, and to endorse “inverted racism.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1560)