Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

167. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, August 7, 1960, 11 p.m.

349. Re: Congo.

1. Lodge saw Hammarskjold late this afternoon (our first direct communication with SYG since his arrival from Leopoldville). After listening to SYG’s description of situation in Congo and especially Katanga, it was clear he saying presence Belgian troops Katanga was real issue. We asked him if this was case. He affirmed it emphatically and specifically, although in his written report he had decided play it differently.

2. As for res to be passed at next SC meeting, SYG said Belgian troops must leave Katanga and UN must enter to assure safety of lives and property. To do these things Tshombe must allow UN entry. Tshombe concerned for his personal safety and position if Belgian troops withdraw and UN moves in. This line of reasoning, SYG said, leads him to conclude res text must contain fol four points: (a) affirm SC’s two previous res’s; (b) specifically call for UN troops to go into Katanga (Cordier commented UK had suggested this as necessary element); (c) provide some elemental protection for Tshombe, not only for his own sake but for sake of all other provincial leaders, against Lumumba; (d) contain appeal to Belgium to assist UN entry into Katanga (rather than work strongly to contrary as has been case).

3. SYG read from several cables, first one having just come in from Bunche. In it Bunche said he had concluded situation could only be saved, if at all, by immediate withdrawal of all Belgian troops, with emphasis on immediate. Bunche acknowledged this would run risk of panic exodus by Belgians from Katanga and produce disorder there; but he expressed view such a risk must be taken in order pull rug out from under extremists among Congolese political leaders. Bunche said otherwise UN force could not hang on in Congo. It would soon incur hostility of local population and would disintegrate, some elements withdrawing and some, in effect, going into service of Congo Govt against Belgium.

4. SYG agreed with necessity for Belgian withdrawal but said it must be combined with arrival UN troops in order prevent violence and loss of life. SYG commented Bunche’s report was symptomatic of situation in Congo and fit with his own experience there last Tues and Fri.¹ He said he had felt impelled act last Tuesday in order forestall Guinea, Ghana, Soviets, Lumumba and Gizenga. All these working to stymie elements favorable to UN. (SYG mentioned Bomboko and Kanza as well as Congolese rep in Brussels as favorable to UN.) SYG commented extremists could start an uprising against UN “in one day” if they undertook all-out campaign on Leopoldville radio. SYG observed there would be “outside aid” for [from?] those units of UN who would then help Govt of Congo against Belgian troops.

5. SYG said his move on Friday to call SC was again taken to undercut extremists. (He expressed view Soviet Union itself was “trapped” as long as SC meeting and could not move on its own.)

6. Reverting to his decision on August 2 to move into Katanga, SYG reported Lumumba had ordered Gizenga fire Bomboko and Kanza from cabinet and threatened open political attack on UN if no movement made to Katanga. SYG said he therefore had no way in which to maneuver to play for time. Moreover, he said, moderates and radicals in cabinet, for different reasons, all took line opposing delay by UN. He added that moderates (Bomboko and Kanza) did however see need for negotiations with Belgians concerning modalities of UN entry into Katanga.

7. SYG said that as of last Tuesday he foresaw danger of explosion Wednesday from Gizenga. Lumumba had been scheduled to arrive on Thursday. SYG believed Gizenga would try steal Lumumba’s fire by moving before he arrived. SYG then made comment very unusual for him: he said his decision also influenced by news which reached him of “systematic action by Soviet agents to sabotage UN operation”. He concluded by saying he felt he had act in order avoid “a kind of Korea”.

8. SYG then turned to Katanga. He read from highly confidential report from Linner² (SYG’s Rep for Economic Affairs in Leopoldville) who had gone to Katanga with Bunche as emissary to Katanga business community. August 4 Linner met with 25 officials of business community, including head of Union Miniere. This group greeted him with “curses, spat upon him and called him a criminal”. They said arrival of UN troops would signal departure by whites as well as Congolese business personnel and economic collapse would come. They claimed “UN trying to take Katanga” for other Western interests. Linner reported he told them UN technical assistance would not mean replacement of Belgians. In fact, UN anxious that Belgians remain to keep economy going. Linner also explained general basis on which UN operated. This first meeting lasted 4 hours.

9. Later during night Linner said all but four of group with whom he had met came to him in private to say that they were under orders from Belgian Govt Rep d’Aspremont,³ who had instructed them to sabotage UN effort or they would all lose their jobs and be put in jail. They reported also that Tshombe was not politically strong but was maintained by money he received. They reported that several days earlier arrangements had been made to blow up some of mining properties when UN arrived.

10. Linner said at subsequent meetings colons had come around to acquiescence in UN arrival; however, on August 5 when UN plane approached airport carrying, among others, four UN military officers in plain clothes which Belgians themselves had requested, Belgian officer manned machine guns on airport roof to prevent aircraft from landing. When through Bundle’s efforts plane was allowed to land, passengers were kept inside plane. (SYG commented that keeping men closed up in plane on ground without ventilation threatened their lives.) Linner reported he had remarked to Belgian officer that 25 lives were at stake if plane had been shot down or if they died from sitting in closed airplane on airfield; Belgian’s reaction had been, so what!

11. SYG gives weight and credence to report of Linner whom he has known for long time and whom he considered particularly acceptable to Belgian mining interests in Katanga since Linner is Swede who has worked for large mining interests in Liberia. He does not consider Linner to be sensationalist in his reporting. SYG distressed and appalled at misinformation Belgians had spread in Katanga and at systematic effort, led by Belgian official, to support Tshombe and keep UN out.

12. SYG then told story of Bunche’s activity at time UN plane arrived at Elisabethville airport Friday morning. His account fit with that in press, Bunche being confronted with obstacles at airport and arranging only at last minute to get permission for plane to land.

13. SYG said he had confronted Wigny this morning with as much as he thought he could repeat of report by Linner as well as of Bunche’s experience. He said he emphasized that Belgian civilians on spot badly misinformed about UN and Belgian officers in Force Publique accepting orders from Katanga authorities against UN and in apparent disregard of official Belgian policy. He told Wigny he believed Belgium was not responsible for instigating what had been done in Katanga. But he did hold Belgium responsible for not preventing what had been done by local people. He told Wigny “You have the power to change the views” in Katanga.

14. SYG summarized by referring to Bunche’s recommendation for immediate total Belgian withdrawal as “next step”. SYG reaffirmed that it was desperately necessary to get UN troops into Katanga at once along with urgent Belgian withdrawal. Steps must be taken to break Tshombe’s resistance to arrival of UN troops. For that reason, and also because Tshombe understandably did not want to be under dictation of Lumumba, Hammarskjold had reached conclusion necessary for UN to find way to guarantee Tshombe’s right to speak and escape imprisonment or assassination. In response to our query, SYG said he thought this could be accomplished through some kind of provision in res to be passed by SC. Such provision should provide “cover” for UN to provide guarantees and stand up against Lumumba when he tries to insist on “getting” Tshombe.⁴

Lodge

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–760. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Brussels.
1. August 2 and 5.
2. Sture Linner, chief of U.N. civilian operations in the Congo.
3. Count Harold d’Aspremont-Lynden, head of the Belgian technical assistance mission to Katanga.
4. Before he left the Congo, Hammarskjöld told the U.S. Chargé that the Katanga situation was “brutal.” He considered the situation in the Congo disheartening and thought there was a grave danger it might become another “China.” (Memorandum prepared by John S. D. Eisenhower, August 10; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)