Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

57. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting⁰

Washington, November 21, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

PRESENT¹

• Defense
  • General Twining, USAF
  • General Lemnitzer, USA
  • General LeMay, USAF
• ISA
  • Mr. John N. Irwin
• State
  • Mr. Robert Murphy
  • Mr. Martin Hillenbrand

1. Berlin

General Twining opened the meeting with general remarks to the effect that the JCS were concerned that the U.S. would have to make a move very soon in connection with the Soviet intentions concerning Berlin. They did not want to be unprepared. With this in mind, they had prepared draft instructions to CINCUSAREUR² proposing the use of minimum force necessary to extricate any U.S. military truck convoy which might be detained by the Russians (General Twining had discussed the proposed instructions with Mr. Murphy the previous day and had indicated that Secretary McElroy would not approve such instructions at this time).

Mr. Murphy discussed the political situation in general terms. He indicated that the Department had some concern about German attitudes, citing as an example the so-called trade agreement between East Germany and the Federal Republic. However, he believed that Chancellor Adenauer was firm in his views, as indicated in his reaction to Ambassador Smirnov’s pronouncement concerning the turning over of Soviet occupation rights to the GDR.³ He said that it was perhaps too early to jump to conclusions on probable Soviet actions concerning Berlin but that the State Department view is that we should not give in on any substantial point. The question is one of means and tactics in countering or anticipating the Russian actions.

Mr. Murphy then referred to press items and other loose conversation regarding an airlift for Berlin, pointing out that evidence to date does not indicate that the USSR is thinking in terms of an immediate blockade of the civilian population of West Berlin. On the contrary, this would appear to be a more limited proposition designed to harass the Allied forces in Berlin with the ultimate intention of dislocating them from the city. There has been over-emphasis on the political reporting and press coverage on the question of the Russian intent to blockade the city. There does not appear to be a parallel with the 1948 blockade operation. However, the U.S. should remain flexible on the matter of an airlift which might conceivably be required by later developments, and no arbitrary decision should be taken now to exclude the possibility of an airlift.

General Twining expressed concern that all the conjecture with reference to an airlift, which was receiving wide publicity, might lead the Russians into a miscalculation that we intended to start an airlift as a response to their new Berlin moves. He said an airlift should be a “last resort” measure. Mr. Murphy agreed. General Twining quoted previous statements of the President as stating that an airlift means war. He stated that the British were openly discussing airlift possibilities and that we should do everything possible to stop public consideration of this possibility. Mr. Murphy agreed, but suggested that such speculation and public discussion were not easily stopped. He further pointed out in response to General Twining’s remarks that it had been General Clay’s and his position in 1948 that an airlift was a wrong solution for the Berlin situation; that we should then have stood for a solution on the ground as distinguished from the air.

With reference to the detention of convoys, Mr. Murphy indicated that the Department would like to explore at this meeting a different approach than that proposed in the JCS instructions to USAREUR. Instead of considering extricating a detained convoy with “minimum force necessary”, which appeared to be a negative approach, we would like to consider the possibility of providing a convoy with enough force to enable it to push through to its destination. There followed a general discussion in which Mr. Irwin pointed out that General Hodes’ proposal (endorsed by General Norstad) to extricate a convoy came about in consideration of the recent specific case in which for the first time the Soviets had held U.S. personnel and material at the check-point.⁴ The proposal had been considered in the context of past experience in Berlin; it involved the security of U.S. forces; it was not addressed to the willingness of the U.S. Government to consider a policy of utilizing force to push through an inspection point. Such a course of action goes far beyond, and encompasses a larger problem; than the rescue of detained American personnel. He also posed the question of the substitution of GDR personnel at the check-points in place of Russians, and the necessity for U.S. proposed courses of action to contemplate this contingency.

Mr. Murphy indicated that the Department felt that the proposal to extricate personnel was not an adequate answer to the basic problem. He proposed for consideration, in elaboration of his earlier remarks, that we inform the USSR in advance of our intention to take precautionary measures and to insure adequate security for our convoys. This would be done on the basis of our right of ingress which we intended to enforce. This warning would be given in advance of any use of force. He requested the JCS estimate of the military risks involved in such a course of action.

General Lemnitzer discussed the factual situation and the military risks involved in pushing across 100 miles of hostile territory. He pointed out that our Berlin forces consist of two small battle groups opposed to 25 top-notch Russian divisions. He stated that the military facts of life in that situation are hard. He pointed out the ease with which bridges could be blown up and road-blocks established. Mr. Murphy indicated he was fully aware of these problems and risks as well as the Soviet military strength on the spot. Our military posture is, of course, unsatisfactory when viewed exclusively in those terms and we have faced this problem for a long time. There is much more involved, of course, in that the Russians are aware that an attack against our small force would bring into play a vastly different power situation. The question is whether we can or should take the risk involved in pushing through a convoy with force. General LeMay expressed the view that the Soviets would back off. Mr. Murphy indicated that he felt they would also have backed off in 1948 but the Joint Chiefs at that time thought the risk was too great. We are up against the same problem today and he felt that the current JCS proposals represented an inadequate reaction. General Twining said that the “new approach” was in his opinion better and the Joint Chiefs would consider it. Mr. Murphy pointed out at this time that we are initiating an ad hoc working group to consider the Berlin situation and to recommend contingency measures and that we are already in touch with ISA and the Joint Staff to secure their representation on the group.⁵

Mr. Irwin commented that he was personally in sympathy with this approach. From the overall viewpoint of the Department of Defense, Mr. McElroy would feel that the position of strength we have gained through the Lebanon and Quemoy operations should not be dissipated by weakness over Berlin. He raised the question, assuming U.S. acceptance of such a firm policy, as to what degree of support we would secure from NATO (particularly the UK, France and Germany) and what pressures we would apply on them to secure their support. Would we be willing to act without them? Mr. Murphy concurred with the point of view on Lebanon and Quemoy. He felt that the Soviets have two objectives: (1) to secure from the Berlin situation a restoration of their prestige adversely affected as a result of Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits (he felt their prestige particularly had suffered in the Middle East) and (2) to move toward the accomplishment of their objectives in Germany. Berlin has been on the Soviet mind throughout the years and he had expected a serious Berlin crisis sooner than this. It may be that the Soviets have arrived at a decision to force the issue but we will have to find out as we go along and as their intentions and proposed courses of action become more clear. We had hoped that the working group could conduct a study of this problem as well as that stemming from their work we would be able to reach decisions which would, of course, have ultimately to be approved by the Secretary of State and the President. The next stop after agreement on the U.S. position would be discussions with the British, French and West Germans, as well as in NATO. Perhaps the talks should be held both here and in Bonn. We are disturbed at the British attitude which, at first glance, appears to be soft, although Mr. Macmillan has spoken firmly.

General Lemniter returned to the question of the State Department views on Russian intentions and asked why it was believed that the Russians did not intend to blockade the civilian population in Berlin. He asked what would happen if either the Russians or the East Germans began stopping train traffic and taking related measures to deny access to the city. Mr. Murphy indicated that such action would appear to be inconsistent with the present Soviet line. Their hope is to obtain a closer relationship between East and West Germany on their terms. A blockade would nullify their efforts to secure this objective and would stiffen West German resistance. It should not be overlooked also that there is an appealing aspect to some Germans to an end to the occupation of Berlin and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. To get the Allies out of Berlin would be in the Russian thinking a first step towards reunification of Germany. This would have an effect on the sentiments of a segment of German public opinion. Mr. Hillenbrand commented that in his opinion it would appear unlikely that there would be an immediate blockade of the civilian traffic, since the “squeeze” is now on the occupation powers. Such a blockade could come later if the Soviets calculated that it was necessary to put the “squeeze” on us through actions against the German population.

Mr. Murphy agreed that we could speak of Russian intentions only as a maneuver of the moment.

The agenda item concluded with a brief discussion of the Berlin air safety center in which it was pointed out that our present plans envisage not accepting East Germans as a substitute for the Russian personnel now manning the center. General Twining and Mr. Murphy then agreed that consideration of the Berlin problem should now be taken up by the ad hoc working group and that a report from the group should be received and considered as soon as possible.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

0. Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, vol. VI. Top Secret. Prepared by the Department of State and not cleared with the Department of Defense. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. A less-detailed memorandum for the record of this meeting is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Germany.
1. In addition to the officials listed below, 11 other military officers, 8 representatives from the Department of State, and 6 officials from CIA, NSC, JSSC, and ISA were present.
2. Not further identified.
3. See Document 53.
4. See footnote 1, Document 38.
5. The Ad Hoc working group on Berlin, chaired by Kohler and including Defense, JCS, and for the first meeting British and French representatives, held its first meeting at 3 p.m.on November 21 with the aim of coordinating and expediting actions with respect to the Berlin crisis. Memoranda for the record of its meetings on November 21, 22, and 24–26 are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Germany.