Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

52. Telegram From the Commander in Berlin (Hamlett) to the Department of the Army⁰

Berlin, November 20, 1958, 4:30 p.m.

COB 133. DA pass to Defense and State. Sgd Hamlett.

1. References: A. Bonn’s 288 to Berlin, 19 Nov, 1071 to State Dept NOTAL.¹ B. Berlin’s 362 to Sec State, 20 Nov, 314 to Bonn, 46 to Paris, 107 to USAREUR.²

2. I wish to state without equivocation that it is my firm opinion that our current plan with respect to acceptance of GDR officials as agents of the Soviets will be the first step in the wrong direction and place us in a completely untenable position.

3. When the Soviets carry out Khrushchev’s announced intentions and turn over their remaining occupation authority, the myth of GDR officials acting as their agents will be too obvious to find support in any quarter. Reference 1B above, with which I concur completely, fully supports this position, and gives the reasons therefor.

4. We cannot show weakness in this issue. Berlin is in the eyes of the entire world. If we are not ready for the eventual show down, at least a self imposed blockade will be a far stronger action than de facto recognition of the GDR through the “agent” fallacy.

5. I cannot recommend too strongly that we accept a self-imposed blockade rather than the “agent” plan.

0. Source: Department of State, JCS Files. Secret, Also sent to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR and repeated to Bonn.
1. Not printed. (Ibid.; Central Files, 862.0221/11–1958)
2. Document 51.