Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

363. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/80

Geneva, June 4, 1959, 8:15 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Secretary McElroy
  • Mr. Merchant
• France
  • Mr. Couve de Murville
  • Mr. Laloy
  • Mr. Lucet
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. P.F. Hancock
• USSR
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Mr. Zorin
  • Mr. Soldatov

SUBJECT

• Berlin

The conversation during dinner was nonsubstantive. The atmosphere was unstrained and Gromyko made a more than usual effort to be agreeable and witty.

After coffee the entire party settled down together and the Ministers launched into a discussion picking up where the conversation had ended in the afternoon.

In response to some remark of Secretary Herter’s which I missed, I heard Mr. Gromyko say that the Soviet Union would naturally defend the GDR and its sovereignty as a member of the Warsaw Pact.

The Secretary then said as he understood it the Soviets proposed to turn over their rights to the DDR.

Gromyko replied that the Soviets contemplated ceasing to exercise their functions which after the turnover would be exercised by the DDR.

The Secretary remarked, in apparent summary of their private conversation up to that point, that the Ministers seemed to be moving rapidly towards nothing.

Gromyko answered that the Soviets came to Geneva to negotiate seriously but if the Western Ministers put up proposals such as the ones submitted yesterday, then the Soviets gravely doubt that there is any desire on the Western part to negotiate seriously.

Couve de Murville said that there was nothing new in our position. As the Soviets know we will not give up our rights or the retention of our troops in Berlin but we are making an effort to meet the expressed worries of the Soviets.

Gromyko said that our proposals were no good for that purpose.

The Secretary interjected that it was the Soviets who had created the present tension and Gromyko countered by saying that it was Western troops in Berlin which created it. He added that we had also contributed to the present situation by what we had done in the Federal Republic of Germany and our earlier violation of the Potsdam Agreement.

The Secretary inquired who first broke the Potsdam Agreement and Gromyko replied that it would be a waste of time to argue points of past history. He said that the Soviets admit that the West have rights but that fourteen years have passed and there are now two states in Germany, which creates a changed situation.

The Secretary inquired directly if legal rights expire with time and Gromyko replied, “Yes.”

The Secretary said that time had passed and wondered with the passage of time if Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, for example, should not now be free.

Gromyko reacted violently and asked why the Secretary was introducing matters which had no connection with Berlin for purely polemical reasons. He said that he also could mention other things.

The Secretary returned to the question of why the passage of time affected our rights in Germany and asked wherein the danger lay which the Soviets professed to see.

Gromyko reiterated that fourteen years had passed and the DDR now existed as a state. West Berlin was in the center of DDR territory but apparently it is our desire to discuss internal matters unrelated to Berlin.

Couve said that we recognize as a fact that there is a so-called DDR and that West Berlin exists. We recognize reality and are prepared to adjust to it reasonably, to which Gromyko answered that he saw no evidence of any Western intent to adjust.

Couve repeated that the West would not change the status of Berlin nor withdraw its troops and that Mr. Gromyko should now realize this.

Gromyko inquired what proposals we had to make since those of yesterday obviously could not bring us closer to an agreement.

The Secretary remarked that he really didn’t know where we went from here.

Gromyko exclaimed, “You want us to undersign your occupation regime!” to which the Secretary answered that all we wanted was the Soviets to admit our rights.

Mr. Lloyd interjected that in three respects we had proffered concessions. He said that Mr. Gromyko by now should realize that we would not accept his free city proposal and apparently he would not accept our proposal for uniting Berlin. Within the limits of this basic disagreement we had offered to consider improvements in the propaganda situation and to place a ceiling over our troops and to consider any Soviet proposals on access. He added that Gromyko had made no concession whatsoever. Selwyn Lloyd continued that in any arrangement which might be agreed would be the explicit understanding that it would last until Germany was reunified.

Couve added that in addition to those mentioned by Mr. Lloyd we had made a fourth concession, namely, our willingness to consider an interim arrangement for West Berlin outside the Western Peace Plan.¹

Gromyko said he saw no sign of any concession in what we had said. On troops we were merely abandoning what we do not now have and we were asking him to countersign our occupation regime. He then asked as a question, what would we say to an agreement which said nothing on our rights.

Lloyd replied that if the Soviets agreed not to question any such arrangements for six months or some other brief period, that was one thing. On the other hand if they agreed that any such arrangements were valid until Germany was reunified, that was another.

Gromyko asked why we could not discuss arrangements now and further asked what was wrong with avoiding any invocation of our rights but merely agree on arrangements.

Couve said that our difficulty is perfectly clear and of Soviet creation. He said the Soviets have disputed our rights and in fact in the note of November 27² had declared them null and void. This statement had not been repeated by Mr. Gromyko at Geneva who had contented himself with saying that the Soviets do not like the present situation without disputing our legal position. Nevertheless the Soviets had originally raised the question of our rights in their notes and we are left wondering what would happen in the future.

Gromyko said we have so far reached no agreement on arrangements and suggested that that is what should be done.

Mr. Lloyd said that it was the Soviets who had sowed the seeds of doubts which now grew in our minds. Gromyko rejoined the doubts are not justified.

Mr. Lloyd added that we had thought the 1949 agreement³ was good but now the Soviets challenged it.

Gromyko said that he realized we were worried about our rights, “but let us eliminate them from the picture.”

The Secretary noted that if we say nothing of our rights, would not the Soviets assume that we have given them up? He said that they had been challenged by the Soviets and their notes had denied their continued existence. He asked if the Soviets would publicly acknowledge our rights in a form, for example, such as Mr. Khrushchev had done in his Leipzig speech.⁴

Gromyko said that he suggested this question of rights be set to one side and agreement reached on arrangements.

Couve reminded Gromyko that the Soviet Government had spoken of concluding a separate peace treaty with the DDR thereby extinguishing our rights. This posed an obvious problem for us.

Gromyko answered that the peace treaty was another matter and that if we reach agreement on arrangements for West Berlin then each state involved in the agreement will continue to fulfill its obligations.

The Secretary then said that Gromyko had said that no arrangements were possible until the occupation status of West Berlin had been given up.

Gromyko asked what our ideas were on West Berlin. He said they had had nothing from the Secretary on this point.

Mr. Lloyd said that he was repeating himself but that he had noted three concessions we had offered and Couve had added a fourth.

Mr. Gromyko ridiculed the proposal on troop ceilings.

Mr. Lloyd reminded Mr. Gromyko that on the question of access procedures we had indicated the possibility of the Soviets using Germans, to which Gromyko replied, “After all it’s their country.”

The Secretary said after all the Soviets have obligations to us. Gromyko’s reply was, “Our past obligations.”

Couve then suggested putting matters another way. Gromyko had asked us what our concessions or proposals were and he now asked Gromyko what were his. The Secretary noted in an aside that every Soviet proposal so far involved taking away our rights.

Gromyko again asked what we proposed to him. He said that on the third point (illegal and clandestine operations) he saw a certain forward step and he was thinking along approximately the same lines but that this could not be separated from the other elements.

Mr. Lloyd said that he had thought there had been some progress in the talk yesterday about access arrangements.

Gromyko said that he had discussed that fully yesterday and had nothing to add. He saw our cause for concern and realized that this was an important matter for us. He thought that it was possible to find a satisfactory understanding on this point but that it could not be agreed apart from the other related points.

In reply to Lloyd’s question as to what elements there were to be considered apart from propaganda, access and troops and Couve’s companion question as to Gromyko’s view on the troops, Gromyko answered that he had expressed himself many times. He understood that we wanted a guarantee on access but to require the Soviets to accept an agreement not to increase Western troops in Berlin was too much. He then asked how could we expect an agreement to be reached which involved maintaining the present situation in West Berlin.

Mr. Lloyd asked why the Soviets were worried over our symbolic troops in Berlin. Was it a question of prestige?

Gromyko did not reply directly but said that there was a physical relationship to the troops and the situation in the city and that whereas they might be only 11,000 or possibly 15,000, this number was worse than 50,000 Western troops in some other location in Europe.

Couve asked how many Soviet troops were in East Berlin and Gromyko said that he thought none. When Couve then asked how many Soviet troops were within a few miles of Berlin, Gromyko said that he did not know.

There was then some half serious talk about the rotating symbolic Four Power guard of Spandau Prison in West Berlin which was a Soviet military presence which Couve said we did not dispute.

The Secretary then said to Gromyko, “I would like to ask you if we were to sign a satisfactory agreement with no mention of our rights would you consider that we had given up all our rights?”

Gromyko turned aside the question by asking why it was being raised and referring to the fact that he had suggested that in any agreement there be neither any positive nor negative indication with respect to our rights.

The Secretary said this would leave us in a position where we did not know where we stood. We might say we had maintained our rights and the Soviets would claim we had abandoned them. He then asked if our old agreements would still stand, to which Gromyko replied that they would not be involved.

Couve then said in other words our old agreements would stand if they had not been renounced.

Mr. Merchant then asked Mr. Gromyko as a hypothetical question what public reply the Soviet Government would make if, having reached an agreement on West Berlin making no mention of our rights, the three Western Governments were to declare concurrently with the agreement or immediately afterwards that the Soviets had acknowledged that we were legally in Berlin and had not disputed our rights of presence there and access.

Gromyko asked why anyone should say anything about rights since they would not be involved in the agreement and that it would be contrary to our agreement to mention them.

Both Mr. Lloyd and Secretary Herter pushed him on this point, pointing out that it would be impossible not to answer publicly questions concerning the status of our rights and noting that we had Khrushchev’s public statement that we were legally in West Berlin. Gromyko kept insisting that the agreement would require that there be no mention of rights.

The Secretary said that it would be impossible for him to go home and face the Congress without being able to say exactly where our rights stood and Mr. McElroy noted that the challenge to our rights was the whole cause of the controversy and the reason for our presence in Geneva.

Mr. Gromyko was reminded that the Soviet note of November 27 had declared our rights null and void, to which he replied that we had given too narrow an interpretation to the language of the Soviet notes.

The Secretary said that the main question to be settled was the question of our rights and their acknowledgment.

Gromyko countered by saying that the main question was the presence of Western troops in West Berlin. For the fiftieth time he inquired what constructive proposals we had to offer, upon which unanswered question the meeting broke up at 11:20 p.m.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter on June 5. The conversation was held following a dinner given by Couve de Murville at Villa “La Barakat.” A brief summary account was transmitted in Cahto 70 from Geneva, June 5. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/6–559)
1. See footnote 1, Document 295.
2. See Document 72.
3. For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, June 20, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.
4. For text of Khrushchev’s speech at Leipzig on March 7, 1959, see Pravda, March 27, 1959; an extract from the speech is printed in Moskau Bonn, pp. 518–524.