Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

362. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 4, 1959, 8:10 p.m.

Cahto 67. Uncleared summary private meeting June 4 follows (memo conversation being pouched):¹

Gromyko expressed following reactions: (1) Concerning access reaffirmed that what he had said day before on this point must be taken in conjunction with Soviet proposals on West Berlin; question was what type of West Berlin there was to be access to; (2) Any new arrangement reached could take form of agreement, protocol or declaration; (3) question of rights might not be mentioned and there might be simply an agreement reached on specific arrangements; (4) there was no question of new arrangements applying to both East and West Berlin; (5) he indicated symbolic troop units would be on order of platoon for each power.

Western Foreign Ministers again emphasized necessity of clearly acknowledging Western rights and attempted without success to get Gromyko to discuss para three Western paper (Cahto 64)² re subversion. At one point Lloyd suggested possibility of forum to hear complaints. Gromyko insisted upon talking only about arrangements in West Berlin alone to end activities he alleged being carried on there.

Greater part of meeting devoted to statements along familiar lines by each side regarding their positions. Secretary again emphasized importance reaffirming Western rights in view fact Soviets once said we had lost them and now spoke of turning over protection these rights to someone else without our knowing whether this someone would protect our rights. Gromyko insisted main question was status West Berlin and ending occupation there.

Secretary said Allied troops important reassurance to West Berliners, were symbolic and Soviets could take West Berlin tomorrow if they wanted unless it started world war. Lloyd expressed doubts neutral troops would remain indefinitely and Berliners would not have same confidence in them as in Allied troops.

After meeting Gromyko asked Secretary what he meant by remark to effect Soviets could capture West Berlin but this would mean world war. Secretary replied he only stated the obvious but such Soviet move would have consequences he had suggested. Gromyko said not good to make threats and these did not frighten Soviets. He could make strong statements too but thought this would not contribute to reaching agreement.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1327. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Lewis and concurred by Thompson.
1. US/MC/77, June 4. (Ibid., CF 1339)
2. See footnote 3, Document 358.